K.N.Misra, J. - (1.) HEARD learned Counsel for the Petitioner and perused the impugned orders. The impugned order challenged is dated 24 -6 -1983 passed by the Board of Revenue rejecting the revision filed by the Petitioner, who was judgment -debtor and had raised objection that the delivery of possession was not made in accordance with the prescribed procedure and the execution application was also barred by limitation.
(2.) THE learned Counsel for the Petitioner contended that the suit was decreed by the trial Court on 12 -2 -1974. The execution application was moved on 14th March 1975 and as such it was barred by limitation, having been filed after the prescribed period of one year. This contention was rejected by the Board of Revenue saying that the limitation for execution of a decree is to be accounted from the date of the final decree and not from the date of the decree passed by the trial Court. Admittedly in this case an appeal was filed against the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. This appeal was dismissed on 13th August 1974. The execution application was thus filed within one year from the date of decree passed in appeal. On these facts the Board of Revenue held that the execution application was well within time as the limitation is to be counted for the execution of decree from the date of final decree as is provided at Serial No. 53 of Appendix III made under Rule 338 of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Rules. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner contended that the limitation is to be counted from the date of the trial Court's decree and in this connection he referred to Section 15(1) of the Limitation Act which provides that in computing the period of limitation for execution of decree, the execution of which has been stayed by injunction or order, that time of continuance of injunction or order, the day on which it was issued or made and the day on which it was withdrawn shall be excluded. The learned Counsel contended that since in the present case after filing the appeal the execution of the decree was not stayed, and as such the execution of the decree was to be carried out within one year, the execution application was thus, time barred as it was not filed within one year from the date of decree of the trial Court. I am unable to agree with this contention especially in view of specific provision contained in Appendix III of U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Rules, wherein, as provided at serial No. 53 the limitation for filing an execution application would be counted from the date of the final decree, which in the present case is 13th August 1974 when the appeal filed against the trial Court decree was dismissed'. The trial Court's decree merged in the appellate Court decree, and the appellate Court decree was a final decree as no appeal was filed against it. Thus, in my opinion the execution application was well within limitation.
(3.) LEARNED Counsel next contended that the delivery of possession in this case was not made in accordance with the prescribed procedure, inasmuch as no notice was given to the judgment debtor regarding execution of the decree by the Amin. He thus urged that the execution of decree was invalid and deserved to be quashed. In support of his argument he referred to Rule 154 of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Rules which requires the Kurk Amin to send notice to the person to be ejected on his arrival in the village to execute the decree. I have given my careful consideration to this argument but I do not find any substance in it.;