S.K. Dhaon, J. - (1.) THE Regional Transport Authority, Agra (hereinafter referred to as the Transport Authority), on the basis of the notification dated 10th January 1981 issued by the State Government under Section 43A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (as inserted by the U.P. Legislature, (hereinafter referred to as the notification) on April 1982 granted no less than 385 permanent stagee -arriage permits on the Aligarh -Jalesar -via Gond, Igtas, Hathras route (hereinafter referred to as the route). Under Section 47(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Central Act) the Transport Authority had fixed a limit of 41 stage carriages and 36 permanent stage carriages permits were already under issue. Therefore, there existed only five vacancies on the route and an equal number of permanent permits could be granted. However, the notification authorised the transport authorities in the State to grant permanent stage carriage permits on all non -notified routes to all eligible applicants in disregard of any limit or ceiling fixed on them (the routes). An existing operator of the route feels aggrieved by the said order dated 8th April 1982 passed by the Transport Authority. Hence this petition. The validity of the notification was challenged in this Court by means of writ petitions, one of them was filed by an existing operator of the route, (not the petitioner). This Court passed interim orders staying the operation of the notification. The interim orders continued to operate till 23rd March, 1982 when all the writ petitions were dismissed by a common judgment. During the pendency of the writ petition some petitions were filed in this Court at Lucknow. There too, on 28th January 1981, interim orders staying the operation of the notification were passed. The interim orders continued till after 24th February 1983. The aforementioned existing operator of the route questioned the correctness of the judgment of this Court in the Supreme Court by a Special Leave Petition. The Supreme Court, on 16th April 1902, passed an interim order staying the implementation of the notification with respect to the route.
(2.) IN pursuance of the impugned order the respondents 4 to 26 (hereinafter referred to as the contesting respondents were, on 14th April 1982, issued permanent stage carriage permits on the route. Subsequent to 16th April 1982, the Transport Authority refused to issue permits to the remaining grantees. One of them, Messrs Narendra Kumar Naresh Chandra, preferred a writ petition in this Court seeking, inter alia, the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the Transport Authority to perform the ministerial act of issuing a permit in pursuance of the impugned order granting permits on the route. This Court, on 18th October 1982, issued an interim mandamus directing the Transport Authority to issue a permit. This order too was challenged in the Supreme Court in a Special Leave Petition by another existing operator of the route viz. Sri Satya Vir Singh. In it, he also challenged the legality of the impugned order. The Supreme Court, on 5th November 1980, stayed the operation of the interim mandamus issued by this Court. It, on 21st February 1983, decided the Special Leave Petition preferred by Sri Satya Vir Singh and held that, in view of the interim order passed by it on 16th April 1982, this Court was not justified in issuing an interim mandamus. However, the Court did not refer at all to the impugned order passed by the Transport Authority. This petition was filed on 20th January 1983. It was founded mainly on the ground that the impugned order was passed in the teeth of the clear interim orders passed by this Court at Lucknow. It was prayed that a writ of mandamus may be issued commanding the Transport Authority to cancel the permits issued by it to the contesting respondents in pursuance of the impugned order. It was also prayed that the contesting respondents may be restrained from operating their stage carriages on the route. During the pendency of this petition, the Supreme Court, on 24th February 1983, set aside the judgment dated 23rd March 1982 given by this Court. It held that the notification was ultra vires, void and ineffective. The judgment of the Supreme Court is reported in (Rameshwar Prasad v. State of U.P. and six others : A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 383. Thereafter, the petitioner sought an amendment of the instant writ petition to challenge the legality of the impugned order on the ground that, in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Rameshwar Prasad's case (supra), the same had been rendered void ab initio A prayer for the issue of a writ of certiorari was sought to be included in the petition. The application for the amendment of the writ petition has been allowed by me today after considering the objections of the contesting respondents.
(3.) THE law declared by the Supreme Court in Rameshwar Prasad's case that the notification is "ultra vires, void and ineffective" is the law of the land as is the mandate of Article 141 of the Constitution. Admittedly, the impugned order was passed before that decision. The legal effect of the dictum is that notification had not been issued at all. It neither existed in the past nor shall it exist in the future unless re -issued in accordance with law. It did not see the light of the day at all. It remained still born throughout. The Courts do not enact law, but only discover or just find out the real law. Judges expound the law as always stood. They do not introduce a new law as the legislature does when making a statute. Likewise, Judges while interpreting a law do not either repeal it or amend it or modify it. In other words, the judiciary does not make an inroad into the legislative function of the State. Necessarily, precedent much less a dictum of the Supreme Court has a retrospective operation. Supreme Court has not prescribed the limits of the retrospectivity of the law declared by it in Rameshwar Prasad's case. Hence the problem of existing or vested rights being destroyed or impaired, as in the case of a legislative act does not arise at all.;