R.C.Deo Sharma - (1.) THIS is a State appeal against the acquittal of the respondent filed after obtaining leave. The respondent was being prosecuted before the learned IX Additional Munsif-Magistrate, Gonda for an offence punishable under section 22 of the U. P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953. When the case came up for hearing, the learned Magistrate on hearing arguments of the learned counsel for the parties felt that the sanction for prosecution given by the Additional District Magistrate, Gonda, was not in accordance with the provisions of Section 23 of the afore- said Act of 1953. Section 23 provided that no prosecution could be instituted under that Act except upon a complaint made by or under the authority of the Cane Commissioner or the District Magistrate. On the wordings of section 23 aforesaid the learned Magistrate held that the sanction having been accorded by the Additional District Magistrate Gonda, was not in accordance with the said provision. He accordingly acquitted the respondent. It is against this order that the State has filed this appeal after obtaining leave and it has been contended that the learned Magistrate has erred in ignoring the provisions of section 20 (2) of the CrPC. Sub-section (2) of section 20 read like this :- " The State Government may appoint any Executive Magistrate to be an Additional District Magistrate and such Magistrate shall have all or any of the powers of a District Magistrate under this code or under any other law for the time being in force." It has not been disputed that Sri Jagdish Singh was appointed as Additional District Magistrate Gonda and was functioning as such when he accorded sanction for the prosecution, The learned Deputy Government Advocate has produced a copy of the notification issued by the State Government in the Appointment Department dated 21st March 1977 appointing Sri Jagdish Singh to be the Additional District Magistrate of Gonda under section 20 (2) mentioning therein that he shall exercise all the powers of the District Magistrate under the Code of Criminal Procedure and under any other law for the time being in force.
(2.) LEARNED counsel appearing for the respondent has argued that the District Magistrate under section 23 of the aforesaid Act was a person designated and consequently the Additional District Magistrate could not have granted the sanction. I am unable to agree with the contention. A plain reading of the language of section 23 indicates that a complaint could be lodged by or under the authority of the District Magistrate. Section 20 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure read with the notification dated 21st March 1977 will indicate that Sri Jagannath Singh was appointed Additional District Magistrate Gonda and was empowered to exercise all the powers of the District Magistrate under the Code of Criminal Procedure and under any other law for the time being in force. The later term includes the U. P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953. Learned counsel also argued that by an amendment in section 20 (2) made by the Central Act No. 45 of 1978 it has been provided that the Additional District Magistrate so appointed shall exercise such of the powers of the District Magistrate under the Code or any other law for the time being in force as may be directed by the State 'Government. This amendment, however, came into force on 18th December 1978 and naturally could not be retrospective in operation. Any sanction granted before this amendment was therefore, to be examined in the light of the unamended provisions of section 20 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that being so a person appointed as Additional District Magistrate was competent to exercise all the powers of the District Magistrate under the Code or under any other law for the time being in force. My attention has been drawn by the learned counsel to a decision in Prabhulal v. Emperor, AIR 1944 Nagpur 84. That case, however, was under the Defence of India Rules and since the District Magistrate was not empowered to order a detention in the absence of a notification from the Central Government or the State Government, it was observed that the Additional District Magistrate was also not competent to do so and that the power of detention was not conferred on him under any law for the time being in force. It has therefore, no application to the facts of the present case. Reference was also made to the case of Ajaib Singh v. Gurbachan Singh, AIR 1964 SC 1619. That again has no application to the facts of the present case because power of detention under the Defence of India Act and Rules was exercisable by an officer not below the rank of a District Magistrate and it was held that even though the Additional District Magistrate was to exercise all the powers of the District Magistrate yet in rank he was below the rank of a District Magistrate. In this view of the matter, the sanction accorded by the Additional District Magistrate on 8th September 1978 was in accordance with the provisions of section 20 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure as it then stood. The acquittal based solely on this ground has therefore, to be set aside. Although the learned Munsif has in his brief judgment stated that the offences were proved by the evidence on record, but this was a solitary sentence not supported by any discussion of evidence or by any reasons whatsoever. Since the learned Magistrate was disposing of the matter only on the preliminary issue about the validity of the sanction, it seems he did not choose to discuss the evidence or record any reason in support of the finding. In fact, this is a mere observation and not a finding. The case shall therefore, go back to the trial court for a fresh hearing.
(3.) THE appeal is accordingly allowed and the order dated 9-4-1980 passed by the learned Magistrate acquitting the respondent is set aside. THE case shall be sent back to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gonda, who may either dispose it of himself or transfer it to a court having jurisdiction to decide the matter. Appeal allowed.;