R.M.Sahai, J. - (1.) IN this tenants' petition arising out of suit for eviction and arrears of rent the question that arises for consideration is if tenancy under U.P. Act XIII of 1972 could arise by estoppel and acquiescence.
(2.) ADMITTEDLY Ram Autar opposite party No. 3 was tenant of disputed shop and godown since October 1963. Adjacent to it he had a flour mill and a ginning machine. In 1965 he sold these to Bhawan Das father of Petitioner and inducted him in possession over the shop and godown. Since then Petitioners are in possession. They ran the flour mill and ginning machine till 1969. From 1970 they are carrying on radio repairing shop in premises in dispute. In 1970 these premises were sold by the land -lady to one Smt. Shanti Devi. It was however repurchased in January 1976. In February 1976 Petitioner filed application under Section 14 of the Act for regularisation of their tenancy presumably because tenancy was continuing in name of Ram Autar and rent receipts were also being issued in his name. This probably resulted in termination of Ram Autar's tenancy and the suit for eviction. It has been found by both Courts below that Petitioner was in possession since 1965 but the rent receipts were issued till 1976 in name of Ram Autar. Trial Court however dismissed the suit as according to it Ram Autar surrendered his tenancy and Petitioner was admitted as tenant with consent of the landlady. For recording these findings it relied on production of rent deed from custody of Petitioners, their possession for such a long time, impossibility of believing that Petitioners would have purchased flour and ginning machine from Ram Autar without assurance and consent of landlady to remain in possession over shop as without the shop and godown Petitioner would have been left with no place to carry on their business, nor could it be believed that when sale was made in 1970 to Shanti Devi the vendor and vendee were not aware of actual state of affairs. The trial Court accepted the explanation of Petitioners that rent was being paid in name of Ram Autar with understanding between landlady, Ram Autar and Petitioners as there were difficulties in getting the premises allotted in favour of Petitioners since the building was governed by U.P. Act III of 1947. In revision the order was set aside as Petitioners could be held tenant only if it was established that there was contract of tenancy between Petitioners and the landlady which was neither pleaded nor proved. It was held that no tenancy could be inferred from possession only. And in absence of any rent receipt either from opposite party or Smt. Shanti Devi, owner from 1970 to 1976, no consent could be assumed in favour of Petitioner. According to revising authority (he) could utmost be assignee or transferee but in absence of any privity of contract between the landlady and the assignee or transferee the assignee could not be held to be lessee.
(3.) TENANT is defined Under Section 3(a) of the Act to mean a person by whom rent is payable. Who can be such a person under the Act? The one to whom the premises are allotted under Act or who enters into agreement with the landlord. That is either there is contract created by Statute or by act of parties. Latter may be in writing or oral as an agreement or contract to be binding need not necessarily be in writing unless expressly provided. Agreement may also be inferred or it may arise by conduct of parties. For instance acceptance of rent by landlord by a person, in occupation as tenant. It may also arise by acquiescence or estoppel, a principle founded on justice and fair -play, provided it is established that representation was made, it was acted upon and the representee altered its position to its prejudice. If these three are established then the person who by representation or conduct induces reasonable belief that he consents to it shall be precluded from going back on it. If a man either by words or conduct has intimated that he consent to an act which has been done, and that he will offer no opposition to it, although it could not have been lawfully done without his consent and he induces others to do that from which they otherwise might have abstained, he cannot question the legality of the act he had so sanctioned Caireross v. Leremer, 1860 3 HLC 829. Petitioner has been found to be in possession since 1965 to the knowledge of opposite party. Length of possession and passage of time are circumstances which strongly in favour of Petitioner Added to this is the finding that opposite party had knowledge of it. Therefore she should be deemed to have consented in possession of Petitioner. Her case that premises were sublet by Ram Autar to Petitioner has not been believed. Continuance of possession coupled with absence of any action till the application for regularisation Under Section 14 of the Act was made by Petitioner gives rise to reasonable inference that she was not only aware but agreed by her conduct to the arrangement of Petitioner entering into possession and paying rent in name of Ram Autar. By her own conduct therefore she is estopped and agreement in continuance of Petitioners possession subject to payment of rent, may be in name of Ram Autar has to be inferred. The opposite party could not have been in doubt about the person who was paying the rent. Its effect could not be wiped off by camouflage of issuing receipt in name of Ram Autar. It is not an unknown phenomenon in our society. To keep the grip tight over tenant the landlord at times resorts to practice of not issuing any receipt or in such cases to issue it in name of another so as to turn it to his advantage by alleging sub -letting as there is no limitation in the (? Act) for taking action against such occupant. Therefore non -issuing of receipt or issuing it in name of erstwhile tenant is not decisive of privity of contract or relationship of landlord and tenant. It is not issue of rent receipt by landlord but its payment or liability to pay it and its acceptance which brings into being relationship of landlord and tenant. Receipt was no doubt issued in name of Ram Autar but parties being aware that in fact it was being paid by Petitioner the opposite party shall be deemed to have represented to Petitioner that she agreed to his tenancy. And he acting on the representation was induced to belief that he has been accepted as tenant. And the payment in name of Ram Autar was made due to difficulties of allotment and changing of electric connection etc. If he would have known that opposite party was not accepting him as tenant he would have not purchased the flour mill and ginning machine. All the ingredients of estoppel therefore were satisfied.;