K. P. Singh, J. - (1.) THE contesting opposite parties Gaya Bux Singh and others had filed an objection under Section 9 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act claiming right in the disputed land as is evident from Annexure I attached with the writ petition. THE consolidation officer through his judgment dated 16-10-1979 had rejected the claim of the contesting opposite parties. THE contesting opposite parties had preferred an appeal. At the appellate stage they had moved an application for amendment giving better particulars of their claim. THE appellate authority through its judgment dated 18-4-1972 rejected the amendment application and also dismissed the appeal. THEreafter the contesting opposite parties preferred a revision which has been allowed by the revisional authority through its judgment dated 10-9-1972. Aggrieved by the judgment of the revisional authority the petitioners have approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
(2.) THE learned counsel for the petitioner has contended before me that the revisional authority has patently erred in remanding the case. Basic year entry should have been accepted by the revisional authority in the circumstances of the present case. Secondly, it has been contended that the amendment could not be allowed in the circumstances of the present case as the contesting opposite parties had claimed exclusive right in the disputed grove. Third contention has been raised that since five generations, the petitioners were separate and in possession, hence the judgment of the subordinate authorities should not have been interfered with. Lastly, it has been contended that the order of remand passed by the revisional authority is against the principle contained in Order 41 Rule 23 CPC hence the impugned judgment should be quashed. I have examined the contentions raised on behalf of the parties and I have gone through the judgments attached with the writ petition. It has been more than often emphasized that the consolidation authorities should not adhere to technicalities. The appellate authority appears to me to have patently erred in rejecting the amendment application moved on behalf of the contesting opposite parties. The perusal of Annexure I indicates that the opposite parties had claimed co-bhumidhari right on the basis of the disputed land being ancestral and if at the appellate stage the contesting opposite parties had filed better particulars and had prayed for amendment, the appellate authority acted illegally in rejecting the amendment application. There is no specific prohibition in the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act to the effect that amendment of the objection could not be done at the appellate stage, or at any stage. The appellate authority enjoys the same powers as the consolidation officer and the procedure is only to advance justice and not to hamper justice. In this view of the matter I think that the consolidation authorities have ample powers to permit amendment in the pleadings. The appellate authority wrongly refused amendment of the pleadings in the present case. As regards the petitioners' contention that the order of remand is not in consonance with the provisions of Order 41 Rule 23 CPC it is sufficient to indicate that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code as such are inapplicable to the cases under the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. The principle underlying the provisions of Civil Procedure Code are applicable in trying the cases before the consolidation authorities. The order of remand passed by the revisional authority is in the interest of justice and no exception can be taken to the judgment of the revisional authority on technical grounds raised on behalf of the petitioners.
(3.) AS regards basic year entry and the question of separation in the family, it is sufficient to indicate that the aforesaid questions can effectively be examined when the contesting opposite parties get an opportunity to amend their pleadings and lead proper evidence in support of the claim made in the amendment application. I think that the revisional authority has correctly passed the order of remand in the circumstances of the present case. The contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners are too technical and hamper the advancement of justice between the parties. In writ jurisdiction I am not inclined to accept the too technical arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioners. In the result, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. Parties are directed to bear their own costs. Petition dismissed.;