K.N.Goyal, R.C.Deo Sharma, JJ. - (1.) Heard learned counsel for the petitioner. The petitioner had been appointed as District Government Counsel (Civil) Bahraich on 21.7.1978. In April, 1981 the Government took a general decision to terminate the appointments of all the District Government Counsel which had been made during the period between June, 1977 and to invite fresh proposals for appointments. The persons whose appointment were so terminated were also eligible for consideration for reappointment. The office of the District Government Counsel held by the petitioner was thus declared vacant and fresh proposals were invited. The district authorities, namely, the District Judge and the District Magistrate, sent their proposals. Among the persons proposed were the petitioner as well as the opposite party No. 4. The petitioner claims to have been placed at No. 1 in the list prepared by the District Judge and of No. 3 in the list prepared by the District Magistrate while opposite party no. was placed at No. 2 in the list prepared by the District Magistrate. The proposals received from the District Officers were not accepted by the State Government. However, the appointment of the petitioner was terminated vide order dated 27.5.82, and the District Magistrate was directed to send fresh proposals and in the meantime opposite party No. 4 was appointed on adhoc basis during the interregnum until regular appointment was made at the post. Aggrieved by this order Annexure - 9 the petitioner has come to this court.
(2.) Learned Counsel has relied upon Rajendra Shankar Tripathi v. State of U.P., 1979 Cri. LJ. 243 in which a Division Bench quashed the appointment of a District Government Counsel (Criminal) on the ground of violation of Section 2 (5) Cr. PC. In the instant case it is not alleged that there was violation of any statutory provision. Another decision cited by the learned counsel is Suresh Prakash Agarwal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1971 S.L.R. 326. In that case Hon'ble Satish Chandra, J., as his Lordship then was quashed the order of removal of the petitioner who was a Panel Lawyer. This order was quashed on the ground that Para 156(8) of Legal Remembrancer's Manual provided that a panel lawyer could be removed of his work was reported or considered unsatisfactory. In that case there was no such report or finding or conclusion and the order of removal was held to be in violation of the said clause (8) and as such although the provisions of the Manual were not statutory the removal was held violative of Article 16(1) of the Constitution, in the instant case, the petitioner's appointment has not been terminated on the ground of any unsatisfactory work or conduct. Indeed the State has not alleged anything against the petitioner. The officer of Government Counsel were all held at pleasure, and the Legal Remembracer's Manual itself laid down that such appointment were in the nature of contractual engagements and created a relationship of confidence as one between client and counsel and were at the pleasure of the State Government. It was in pursuance of this residuary power of the State Government that if decided to re - examine all appointments made during a certain period while not ruling out fresh appointments of same persons wherever considered fit. Learned counsel has criticised this policy decision as arbitrary and as motivated by political considerations.Unfortunately, however it is not practicable for this Court to scrutinise the appointments of Government Counsel on the basis of competitive merit. It is of course not a happy situation that successor Governments look with suspicion an appointments of standing counsel appointed by their predecessors. However, when die Government (which includes the political executive as will as bureaucracy) as litigant chooses to appoint one person instead of another as its counsel it may take into account various factors which on a totality go into the creation of a relationship of confidence between the two. Hence a judicial scrutiny of comparative merit of various counsel is extremely difficult. In this view of the matter after the suggestions of arbitrariness and political motivation are, tor all practical purpose, normally, not open to scrutiny in the matter of appointment or removal of Government Counsel, unlike the case civil servants. However, it has not even remotely been suggested before us that the opposite party No. 4 was either in competent or was lacking in integrity.
(3.) The only other point urged was that the Legal Remembrancer's Manual did not provide any adhoc appointment. However, the said Manual does not expressly inhibit any adhoc appointment. Once a regular appointment is terminated, and another regular appointment is awaited, then the time gap has lo be filled in. In such an eventuality an adhoc appointment cannot be ruled out.;