Kamal Narain Singh, J. - (1.) THE petitioner is a member of the Indian Forest Service. In 1970, he was posted as Divisional Forest Officer, Haldwani Division, Haldwani from July 1970 to November 1970. N.P. Tripathi, at the relevant time, was posted as Conservator of Forests, Western Circle, which included Haldwani Division. He awarded adverse entry to the petitioner. The Chief Conservator of Forests, who was the reviewing authority, did not agree with the remark of the reporting officer but the State Government disagreed with the reviewing authority and approved the remark made by the reporting authority. Thereupon, the Chief Conservator of Forests communicated the adverse entry to the petitioner in March 1973. The petitioner made a representation to the State Government, which was rejected, and the Government decision was communicated to the petitioner under Government order dated 3 -10 -1975. The petitioner thereupon filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the Government order dated 7 -8 -1982 communicating the adverse entry as also the Government order dated 3 -10 -1975 rejecting the petitioner's representation. The Central Government has, in exercise of powers conferred by the All India Services Act, 1951, framed rules regulating the recording and review of the entries in the character rolls, which are known as All India Services (Confidential Rolls) Rules, 1970. Rule S of the aforesaid Rules lays down that where a confidential report contains an adverse remark against a member of service, the same shall be communicated to him together with a substance of the entire confidential report. Rule 9 provides for representation to the Government against the remark communicated to the member of service within three months of the date of the communication of the remark. Rule 10 confers power on the State Government to consider the representation made against the adverse remark. It further provides that the Government shall, if it considers necessary, in consultation with the reporting authority or the reviewing authority, consider the representation made under Rule 9 by a member of the service and pass orders as far as possible within three months of the date of submission of the representation. The second proviso to Rule 10 lays down that the order accepting or rejecting the representation shall be passed only by an authority superior to the reviewing authority, and where the reporting authority or the reviewing authority is Minister, the said order shall be passed by the Council of Ministers or such committee thereof as may be constituted in this behalf by the Government. The second proviso indicates that while considering the representation of the member of the service against the award of adverse remark, the State Government has to act in a fair manner, and it further provides that the representation should be considered by a higher authority, and if the adverse entry is awarded by a Minister, the representation against such entry should be considered by the council of Ministers or a committee thereof. The purpose of these rules is to ensure fair -play to the member of service in the matter relating to award of adverse entries.
(2.) IT is urged on behalf of the petitioner that the order of the State Government rejecting the petitioner's representation is vitiated on the ground of bias. In support of this contention it is asserted that N.P. Tripathi, the then Conservator of Forests, who had awarded the adverse entry as reporting officer, was posted as Secretary to the Forest Department in the Government of Uttar Pradesh at the time petitioner made the representation, and he dealt with the petitioner's representation, and it was on his noting and report that the State Government rejected the petitioner's representation. These facts are not disputed. Instead, they are almost conceded as would be clear from a perusal of paragraphs 11(a) and 11(b) of the counter -affidavit filed by N.P. Tripathi. In the background of those facts it is submitted that the petitioner had made representation against the adverse remarks recorded by N.P. Tripathi, and he was the person who participated in the deliberations of the Government in rejecting the petitioner's representation. The participation of N.P. Tripathi was against the principles of natural justice which vitiated the Government's decision. Learned Standing Counsel, on the other hand, urged that no doubt, N.P. Tripathi was the Secretary of the Forest Department at the relevant time, and he had submitted his notings on the petitioner's representation but he had not taken the final decision in the matter, instead the final decision in rejecting the representation had been taken by the Minister concerned, and therefore, the plea of bias has no substance. Bias is a part of rule of natural justice. Rules of natural justice are of great significance, and the courts have applied the rules of natural justice in judging the validity of judicial and administrative acts. The rules of natural justice consist of three principles: (i) no one shall be judge in his own cause; (ii) no decision shall be given against a party without giving him opportunity of hearing; and (iii) decision must be taken in good faith without any bias. These principles have all along been applied to judicial as well as quasi -judicial tribunals, see State of U.P. v. Mohammad Nook : A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 86 and Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand : A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 425. Rules of natural justice are not codified, and it is difficult to lay down positively the extent and scope of these rules. What particular rules of natural justice apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the frame -work of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala : A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 198.
(3.) WHENEVER a complaint is made before a Court that some principles of natural justice had been contravened, the Court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a fair and just decision of that case. Though the rules of natural justice including the doctrine of bias were freely applied to the proceedings before Judicial and quasi -judicial Tribunals but a doubt existed about the application of those rules to administrative enquiries made by executive and administrative officers where the decision was not required to be given in a judicial or quasi -judicial manner. The doubt has, however, been resolved in favour of principles of natural justice by the Supreme Court in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India : A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 150 where it was held that arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi -judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far -reaching effect than a decision in a quasi -judicial enquiry, and therefore there was no reason as to why the principles of natural justice could not be applicable to administrative enquiries. The Supreme Court observed: ......Till very recently it was the opinion of the Courts that unless the authority concerned was required by the law under which it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the application of the rules of natural justice. The validity of that limitation is now questioned if the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice there is no reason why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries. Often times it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi -judicial enquiries. Enquiries which where considered administrative at one time are now being considered as quasi judicial in character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi -judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision la an administrative enquiry may have more far -reaching effect than a decision in a quasi judicial enquiry.;