M.N. Shukla, J. - (1.) THE Petitioner is the tenant of an accommodation in house No. 13/207, Halka Madan Nai Ki Mandi, Agra. The Respondents Nos. 2 to 4 are owners and landlords of the same. An application Under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act (U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972) hereinafter referred to as the Act, was filed by the landlords against the Petitioner on the ground that they required the accommodation in dispute for their own residence, as the one already occupied by them was not sufficient for their needs. The Petitioner contested the application on the ground that the need of the landlords was not bona fide and in the event of ejectment he would suffer greater hardship than would be caused to the landlords in case the application was rejected. At a later stage, it appears that the landlord -Respondents secured an amendment of the petition on the ground that they had retired from their official positions and had vacated the public premises which were in their possession at the time of their employment and hence they were entitled to the benefit of Sub -section (1 -A) of Section 21 of the Act. The averment made in the amendment application is significant and reads: 15 -A. That the provisions of Section 21(1 -A) of the Act are applicable to the case and the bona fide need of the applicant and hardship of the opposite party is not to be considered under law, even the opposite party would not suffer any hardship and the comparative hardship of applicant would be greater If the application is rejected.
(2.) THE substantive relief claimed even in the amendment application was that an order for release of the premises in. dispute be passed against the tenant. Thereafter evidence was led by the parties in the shape of affidavits and the Prescribed Authority, after appraisal of the entire material on record, came to the conclusion that Sub -section (1 -A) of Section 21 of the Act did not apply to the case, as the application moved by the landlords was not bonafide. Inasmuch as some tenants had vacated the tenements occupied by them in the same building during the pendency of the case and the landlords were already in occupation of those portions. Consequently, the application was rejected by the Prescribed Authority by its order dated 5 -11 -1981. The landlords preferred an appeal which was allowed by the appellate authority by its order dated 22 -4 -1983 and the landlords' release application was allowed. Aggrieved by this order of the appellate authority the Petitioner has filed this writ petition.
(3.) THE contention raised before me on behalf of the Petitioner was that the appellate order was wholly without jurisdiction, the appeal Itself was not competent and the learned Judge committed apparent error of law by deciding the appeal as if it arose out of an application under Sub -section (1)(a) of Section 21 of the Act. This contention is untenable. I am unable to accept the argument pressed before me that after the amendment being allowed the original application presented under Sub -section (1)(a) of Section 21 of the Act ceased to exist in law and that it was completely replaced by a totally different application to be labelled as one under Sub -section (1 -A) of Section 21 of the Act. I have already adverted to the substantive relief claimed in the amendment application which does not bear out any such argument. There was no prayer for converting the original application made under Sub -section (1)(a) into one under Sub -section (1 -A) of Section 21. The averment expressly made in the application, to which I have already adverted, was that on the facts now brought on record by means of amendment the bonafide need of the applicant and hardship of the opposite party is not to be considered under law. Thus, in substance the prayer contained in the amendment application was that it was not open, on the facts of the case, to the opposite party -tenant to show that he would suffer greater hardship in the event of the release application being allowed and further that the Prescribed Authority was not required under the law to examine whether the landlords application was bona fide. The contention that the original application was completely replaced by a new application and was no longer available for adjudication by the authorities concerned is not substantiated even by the manner in which the authorities proceeded to dispose of the matter. It is important to note that the Prescribed Authority after dealing with the landlords case embarked upon the enquiry relating to the comparative needs and hardship of the parties and after weighing the claims of both parties ultimately decided that the Petitioner -tenant would suffer greater hardship. It is well settled that even in a case In which Sub -section (1 -A) of Section 21 of the Act Is attracted the landlord applicant is not absolved of the onus of establishing that his application is bona fide. Sub -section (1 -A) is an integral part of Section 21 and, therefore, the preliminary requirement for passing any order of release in the landlords' favour is that his application must be bona fide. It is not difficult to visualise instances where inspite of the full operation of the provisions of Sub -section (1 -A) of Section 21 of the Act the landlord may be actuated by ulterior motive in applying for release and thereby securing ejectment of a sitting tenant. Hence, the condition precedent to the passing of a release order Under Section 21 of the Act, whether it is under Sub -section (1)(a) or Sub -section (1 -A), is a finding that the application is bona fide.;