Gopi Nath, J. - (1.) THIS is a defendant's application it revision directed against an order passed by the Civil Judge, Mirzapur dated 3 -8 -1982 allowing an application of the plaintiff for permission to file certain papers after the framing of the issues in the case. The impugned order reads as follows: 37C. By the plaintiff for permission to file 31 papers per list 38C. Admit on Rs. 25/ - as costs plaintiff counsel examined P. W. 2 Ravi Kumar Agrawal. His statement could not be concluded as the defendant's counsel wants to prepare the case on the basis of the papers filed today. So adjourned. Put up on 5 -8 -1982 for further evidence. The order has been challenged on the ground that the papers could not be received in evidence after the framing of the issues without good cause being shown to the satisfaction of the Court for the non -production of the same before the settlement of issues. The plaintiff prayed for permission to file the documents by application No. 37 -C. The application was allowed. It can, therefore, be assumed that the Court below was satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the papers. It is true that the Court has not recorded its reasons for according the permission prayed for. The question is whether interference is called for in the impugned order.
(2.) IT seems to me that the order does not amount to a 'case decided' nor does it call for an interference in exercise of this Court's power under Section 115, Code of Civil Procedure. Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the word 'case' as occurring in Section 115, Code of Civil Procedure, is of a wide and comprehensive import, and includes even a part of it. Reliance has been placed on M/s. Sadhu Ram Bali Ram and another v. M/s. Ghansham Dass Madan Lal and others : A.I.R. 1975 P&H. 174, Rama Shanker Tiwari v. Mahadeo and others : 1968 A.L.J. 109, Major S.S. Khanna v. Brig. F.J. Dillon : A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 497 Narayan Sonaji Sagne v. Sheshrao Vithoba and others : A.I.R. 1948 Nag. 258, and Chattarpal Singh v. Raja Ram : I.L.R. 7 Alld. 661, Learned counsel has further placed reliance on Oil and Natural Gas Omission Nazira v. Ganesh Prasad Singh and others : A.I.R. 1983 Gau. 8, Mahanth Som Prakash Das v. Sri Udasin Panchayati Akhara Bara and others : A.I.R. 1983 Pat. 35, Ranajit Kanungo v. Ibcon Pvt. Ltd. Bombay : A.I.R. 1982 Kar. 219, Harish v. Som Nath and others : A.I.R. 1982 Raj. 77, Raja Ramakaran v. B Ramulu : A.I.R. 1982 Andh. Pra. 256, Smt. Katti and others v Rattia and others : A.I.R. 1981 Punj. and Har. 185, Mangal Chand Chauhan v. Raton Lal Nahata : A.I.R. 1981 Gau. 93, Sobha and others v. Behari Lal and others : A.I.R. 1981 Hima. Pra. 18, Food Corporation of India v. Birendra Nath Dhar : A.I.R. 1978 Cal. 264 and M/s. Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. M/s. Rajarishi Exports (P) Ltd. : A.I.R. 1978 Ori. 179 to submit that the scope of the word 'case' has been widened by the amendment made in Section 115, Code of Civil Procedure. The real question, however, is what is the meaning of the expression 'case decided.' That question is concluded against the applicant by the decisions rendered by me in British India Corporation Ltd. Kanpur and another v. G.S. Nigam (Civil Revision No. 7 of 1982, decided on 18 -4 -1983) and Manohar Lal v. Valerior (Cawnpore) Pvt. Ltd. and another : A.I.R. 1980 Alld. 327 In Baldevdas Shivlal and another v. Filmistan Distributors (India) Pvt. Ltd. and others : A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 406 it was held: ...........A case may be said to be decided, if the Court adjudicates for the purposes of the suit some right or obligation of the parties in controversy; every order in the suit cannot be regarded as a case decided within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In British India Corporation Ltd., Kanpur and another v. G.S. Nigam (Civil Revision No. 7 of 1982, decided on 18 -4 -1983). I, after a consideration of most of the cases cited by the learned counsel for the applicant, held that the words 'case decided' mean the adjudication of a controversy as to the rights and obligations of the parties in the suit, and it must necessarily touch on the right and obligation in controversy in order to constitute the decision of deciding a case. See also Manohar Lal v. Valerior (Cawnpore) Pvt. Ltd. and another (supra), Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra : A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 47 and K. Balasubramania Chetty v. N.M. Sambandamoorthy Chetty : A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 818. Orders passed merely for the progress of a proceeding are not orders, deciding a case, and would accordingly not fall within the meaning of the expression 'case decided.' They are only steps towards the final adjudication of the case, and only regulate the procedure, and do not affect any right or obligation of the parties. Discovery or production of documents accordingly is not a matter relating to the rights and obligations of the parties in controversy in a suit, and hence an order in that regard does not amount to 'case decided' see The Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Gokal Chand : A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 799. An order regarding admission of evidence was also held not an order relating to the rights or obligations of the parties in controversy in a suit in Smt. Shanti Kaur and others v. Heen Jehan Begam and others, 1976 (2) A.L.R. 694. Further, an interlocutory order, in order to amount to a 'case decided' has to be on a substantial question arising in regard to the rights and obligations of the parties in controversy see Badrinath Gupta v. Estates Officer (Controller of Aerodromes) : A.I.R. 1977 J. and K. 38. I have further held in Manohar Lal v. Valerior (Cawnpore) Pvt. Ltd. and another (supra) and British India Corporation Ltd. Kanpur and another v. G.S. Nigam (Civil Revision No. 7 of 1982, decided on 18 -4 -1983) that by the amendment made in Section 115, Code of Civil Procedure, the scope of the word 'case' has not been widened. It has only been explained. The word 'case' always includes the whole or a part of the case and an interlocutory order passed in a suit can also amount to a 'case decided' provided it satisfies the test discussed above, as regards the decision of a case.
(3.) LEARNED counsel for the applicant placed strong reliance on Mahanth Som Prakash Das v. Sri Udasin Panchayati Akahara Aara and others (supra) Ram Nath Singh and others v. Brij Kishore Singh and others : A.I.R. 1980 Pat. 160, Food Corporation of India v. Birendra Nath Dhar (supra) and Nanu Ram and others v. Vardichand and another : A.I.R. 1978 Raj. 138 to submit that an order passed not strictly in accordance with the provisions of Order XIII, Rules 1 and 2, Code of Civil Procedure, calls for an interference under Section 115 of the Code. In Mahanth Som Prakash Das v. Sri Udasin Panchayati Akhara Bara and others (supra) the Court below refused to entertain certain documents filed by the plaintiff. That order was reversed by the High Court, and it was held that the Explanation added to sub -section (2) of Section 115 C.P.C. widened the scope of the word 'case' as in that section with great respect to the learned Judge, I have, in the case of Manohar Lal v. Valertor (Cawnpore) Pvt. Ltd. and another (supra) and British India Corporation Ltd., Kanpur and another v. G.S. Nigam (Civil Revision No. 7 of 1982, decided on 18 -4 -1983) taken the view that the Explanation added to sub -section (2) of Section 115, Code of Civil Procedure, has not enlarged the scope of the word 'case,' and the meaning of that word as explained by the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above has not undergone any change by the amendment made in Section 115. The decisions in Parsuram Dubey v. Mahanth Laxman Das and others : A.I.R. 1974 Pat. 278 and Ramgulam Choudhary and others v. Nawin Choudhary and others : A.I.R. 1972 Pat. 499 which have been dissented from in Som Prakash Dass's case (supra) have accordingly not been affected by the amendment made in Section 113. I have also taken the same view in the case of Manohar Lal v. Valerior (Cawnpore) Pvt. Ltd. and another (supra) and British India Corporation Ltd. Kanpur and another v. G.S. Nigam Civil Revision No. 7 of 1982, decided on 18.4.1983) as has been taken by the Patna High Court in Ramgulam Choudhary and others v. Nawin Choudhary others (supra) and Parsuram Dubey v. Mahanth Laxman Das and others (supra). The decision in Ram Nath Singh and others v. Brij Kishore Singh and others (supra) does not touch upon the question of 'case decided'. It deals with the question of admission of documents and lays down that the admission of documents is a matter of discretion of the Court, and that discretion ought to be exercised judiciously. The case, instead of helping the applicant, goes against him in that, the order refusing to admit the documents was set aside by the High Court on the ground that the provisions of Order XIII do not lay down any absolute bar to the admission of the documents after the framing of the issues. In Food Corporation of India v. Virendra Nath Dhar (supra) it was held that by virtue of the Explanation added to sub -section (2) of Section 115 by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1976, the scope of word 'case' has been widened, and hence an order directing production of documents will amount to 'case decided.' With great respect, I have not been able to persuade myself to agree to this view, and my detailed reasonings are contained in the decisions rendered in Manohar Lal v. Valerior (Cawnpore) Pvt. Ltd. and another (supra) and in British India Corporation Ltd. Kanpur and another v. B.S. Nigam (Civil Revision No. 7 of 1982, decided on 18 -4 -1983) Nanu Ram and others v. Vardichand and another (supra) does not deal with the question of 'case decided' and in a way goes against the applicant In that, the order of refusal to admit the documents was set aside by the High Court on the ground that there was no absolute bar to the admission of documents after the framing of issues. In Kanda and others v. Waghu : A.I.R. 1950 P.C. 68 it was held that in the matter of admitting documents. "The Court has a discretion and while generally speaking will be a wise exercise of the discretion to admit such evidence the question must be decided in each case in the light of the particular circumstances.........." The Court below has, in the exercise of its discretion, admitted the documents on payment of Rs. 25/ - by way of costs. The order does not call for any interference. The revision is accordingly dismissed. Although the opposite party has entered appearance but as the revision is being dismissed at the admission stage, I make no order as to costs.;