Jagmohan Lal, J. - (1.) This writ petition has been referred to a Bench by a learned single Judge of this Court who was of the opinion that the case involved a consideration of the question whether Rule 1713 of the Revised Discipline and Appeal Rules (Railways) is mendatory or directory and that question is an important one to be decided by a Bench. 2: The brief facts of this case were that the petitioner D. D. Kumaria was a driver Grade B on 27-1-1967 when he was driving 2FBL Passenger Train in the yard of the Station Deo-rakot. The train instead of stopping at the railway platform where it ought to have stopped overshot that place and went ahead by 1029 feet. It was considered that it was due to wrong driving on the part of the petitioner who had done so in violation of the General Rules 79 and 76 (b). An enquiry was made in this matter and when the petitioner was prima facie found to be at fault a charge-sheet dated 17-3-1967 was served on him vide Annexure 1. There was only one charge against him which was to the effect : "That the said Sh. D. D. Kumaria, while functioning as a Driver of 2 FBL Passenger train Ex. Lucknow to Faizabad with Engine No. 24469-HP S/2, violated Gr. 79 and Gr: 76(b). He failed to stop his train within the Loop Starter of Deorakot station, but instead overshot it by a distance of 1029 ft. on 27-1-1967 at 13/26 hrs." A copy of the finding arrived at by the Fact Finding Committee which had made the preliminary enquiry also served on the petitioner along with this charge-sheet. It was further stated in the charge-sheet that the charge was based on the finding of the Facts Finding Committee and the statement of even witnesses named there-in. The petitioner was required to submit his explanation and name the witnesses whom he wanted to produce in his defence. Under Rule 1712 the petitioner was afforded the facility of nominating a railway servant to act as his defence counsel. For this purpose the petitioner named one L. J. Clarkson, Senior Loco Inspector, Mughalsarai. The petitioner submitted a reply to this charge-sheet in which he also requested that copies of certain documents should be made available to him. 3. It appears that Clarkson whom the petitioner wanted to act as his defence counsel could not be spared by the railway administration and the petitioner was therefore asked to name some other person. The petitioner who was insisting on getting the help of Clarkson, reluctantly agreed to nominate another railway servant named A. B. L. Rawat whose services were made available to him. But the petitioner did not give up his stand to get a defence counsel of his own choice in Clarkson. After the railway administration refused to oblige him on that question the petitioner refused to participate in the enquiry. So an ex-parte enquiry was made by S. Kamsica, Senior Loco Inspector who submitted his report on 30th July 1967. He held the charge to be proved against the petitioner. The Divisional Mechanical' Engineer who was the appointing authority of the petitioner on considering this report agreed with the finding recorded by the Inquiry Officer and served a cause notice on the petitioner to show cause why the major penalty of removing him from service be not imposed on him. Along with this show cause notice a copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer was also supplied to him. The petitioner gave a reply to this notice challenging the finding of the Enquiry Officer. The Divisional Mechanical Engineer then passed the impugned order Annexure 10 dated 2nd December 1967 reducing him from the post of Driver Grade B to the post of Shunter Grade B. Against this order of punishment the petitioner filed an appeal vide Annexure 11 dated 9-1-1968 which was dismissed by the Divisional Superintendent by a non-speaking order vide Annexure 12 dated 7-6-1968. Feeling aggrieved by these orders the petitioner has approached this court praying for the quashing of the orders Annexures 10 and 12 of which the validity has been challenged by him on a number of grounds. A counter-affidavit was filed on behalf of the opposite parties who are the Divisional Superintendent and the Divisional Mechanical Engineer, Northern Railway. 4. As regards the point whether Rule 1713 is Mandator, or directory, we find that this rule lays down. "The Disciplinary Authority shall, if it is not the Inquiring Authority, consider the record of the inquiry and record its findings on each charge." The purpose behind this rule is that the punishing authority should apply its mind to the report of the inquiring authority and should not act mechanically on that report. If there are several charges against that servant out of which some only have been held to be proved by the inquiring authority and the punishing authority also agrees with those findings it can simply record that those particular had been proved. Recording, of reasons by the punishing authority while agreeing with the finding of the inquiring authority is not essential in terms of this rule. This rule came for consideration before the Supreme Court in Union of India v. K. Rajappa A.I.R. 1970 S. C. 748 when that Court held: "Rule 1713 does not lay down any particular form or manner in which the disciplinary authority should record its findings on each charge. All that Rule requires is that the record of the enquiry should be considered and the disciplinary authority should proceed to give its findings on each charge. This does not and cannot mean that it is obligatory on the disciplinary authority to discuss the evidence and the facts and circumstances established at the departmental enquiry in details and write as if it were an order or a judgment of a judicial tribunal. The rule certainly requires the disciplinary authority to give consideration to the record of the proceedings ...... ,..". A Bench of this Court also considered this rule in L.R. Malhotra v. Financial Advisor 1970 A.L.J. 1095 when it was observed that Rule 1713 is mandatory and contains a very salutary principle and not meant to be a mere ceremony. We are in respectful agreement with this observation which is in consonance with the law enunciated by the Supreme Court also. 5. As regards the application of this rule to the facts of the present case, we find that there was single charge against the petitioner. The Enquiry Officer found this charge proved. The punishing authority expressed itself on this finding in the following words : "On a careful consideration of the report and in particular of the conclusion reached in respect of the charge framed against Shri D. D. Kumaria, the under-signed agrees with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and holds that the charge is proved. The under signed, has, therefore, provisionally come to the conclusion that Shri D. D. Kumaria is not a fit person to be retained in service and that he should be removed from service. Shri D. D. Kumaria is hereby given an opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken. Any representation which he may make in that connection will be considered by the undersigned. Such representation, if any, should be made in writing which must be based only on the evidence adduced during the enquiry and submitted so as to reach the undersigned not later than 15 days." In our opinion this observation recorded by the Divisional Mechanical Engineer substantially complies with the requirement of Rule 1713. 6. The learned counsel for the Petitioner however assailed these orders passed by the punishing authority and the appellate authority on several grounds. Firstly, it was contended that the petitioner was under Rule 1712(2) and the note appended to it entitled to have the assistance of L. J. Clarkson, Senior Loco Inspector as his defence lawyer whose services could be available by extending a little accommodation to the petitioner and to that person who himself was willing to act as such in the initial stages. It is argued that the railway administration was not justified in refusing this request of the petitioner and offering him the hoison's choice either to nominate another railway servant as his defence counsel or to conduct the proceedings himself without any such assistance. It is pointed out that in these circumstances the petitioner had reluctantly ,appointed another railway servant A.B.L. Rawat as his defence counsel though he had stated from the very beginning that he would not be of much help to him being a non-technical person. On that other hand, the case of the railway administration is that Clarkson could not be spared due to his heavy charge at the place of his posting and so the petitioner was given option to nominate another person. It is argued that the rules did not contemplate that the charged servant has any vested right in this matter irrespective of the exigencies of the work. In any ease, the petitioner was not justified in refusing to participate in the 'disciplinary proceedings on 27-7-1967 when by that time Clarkson himself had refused to assist the petitioner and the petitioner had before that date nominate another railway servant to assist him. On these facts we are not satisfied that the petitioner's insistence to have the assistance of only Clarkson as his defence counsel was justified. 7. In the second place it is argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that even though the petitioner refused to participate in the proceedings and the enquiry proceeded ex-parte, the Enquiry Officer has to comply with the rules in conducting a fair and impartial enquiry. In this connection reference is made to Rule 1712 (3) which provides : "The Inquiring Authority shall, in the course of the inquiry consider such documentary evidence and take such oral evidence including cross-examination of the Railway Servant and witnesses, as may be relevant or material in regard to the charges. The railway servant shall have the opportunity of adducing relevant evidence on which he relies, the evidence of witnesses shall be taken in his presence, he or the person assisting him shall he given the opportunity of cross-examining, the witnesses and no materials shall be relied on against him without his being given an opportunity of explaining them." 8. It is pointed Out that in this case from the very beginning it had been disclosed by the Enquiry Officer that the charge against the petitioner was based besides the findings of the facts Finding Committee on the statements of seven witnesses named therein. The petitioner stated in para 20 of the writ petition that out of these witnesses B.P. Srivastava, Guard, M.A. Zafar and Cabinman Mewa Lal were present at the enquiry on 27-7-1967 though the remaining witnesses had not turned up on that date but even the statements of the said three witnesses were not recorded by the Enquiry Officer. This fact has not been denied by the opposite parties in the counter-affidavit. The report of the Enquiry Officer does not contain any reference to the statements of these witnesses which means that none of them was examined by the Enquiry Officer either on 27-7-1967 or thereafter before the report was prepared by him. On the other hand the report appears to have been based on some documents which had not been disclosed in the charge-sheet. On these facts we are not satisfied that the Enquiry Officer made a proper enquiry, even though it was an exparte proceedings, as contemplated by the rules. 9. The petitioner in his show cause notice had assailed the report of the Enquiry Officer on several grounds, but the Divisional Mechanical Engineer passed his order of punishment vide Annexure 10 without even referring to the objections raised by the petitioner in reply to the show cause notice, much less to state reasons for overruling those objections. 10. The petitioner then filed an appeal against that order vide Annexure 11. In the memo, of appeal against the petitioner had raised several objections against the procedure adopted by the Enquiry Officer and had challenged his finding as well as the order of punishment. He had made a specific request that he should be given a personal hearing. The petitioner's grievance is that he should be given a personal hearing. The petitioner's grievance is that no personal hearing was given to him in breach of Rule 1732. It is not denied by the opposite parties that no personal hearing was given to the petitioner, and no reason has been stated on their behalf for refusing him this hearing which is contemplated by the rule. The appellate authority did not even record a speaking order rejecting the objections raised by the petitioner in his memo. of appeal but passed a non-speaking order in the following words: "The appeal is rejected." In this connection reference was made to Rule 1731(2) which provides: "In the case of an appeal against an order imposing any of the penalties specified in Rule 1707, the appellate authority shall consider- (a) whether the procedure prescribed in these rules has been complied with, and, if not, whether such non-compliance has resulted in violation of any provisions of the constitution or in a failure of justice; (b) Whether the findings are justified; and (c) Whether the penalty imposed is excessive adequate or made-quate................" We look in vain to the order of the appellate authority to find out if he had really considered this appeal in the manner contemplated by this rule. 11. We are accordingly of the opinion that the orders passed by the Divisional Mechanical Engineer and the Divisional Superintendent Annexures 10 and 12 respectively are not in accordance with law and they need be quashed. 12. We accordingly allow this writ petition and quash the orders Annexure 10 and 12 passed by the Divisional Mechanical Engineer and the Divisional Superintendent respectively. It shall however be open to the opposite parties to conduct a fresh enquiry according to the rules, if they so like. In the circumstances of the case the parties shall bear their own costs. Petition allowed.;