- (1.) These appeals raise a common auestion of law. It appears that in both these cases the authorities concerned received complaints making serious allegations of corruption against the respondent. They sent the complaints to the District Magistrate concerned for investigation and verification in one case and to the Vigilance Department in the other case and at the same time they passed an order suspending the respondent. The respondent challenged the order of suspension by a writ petition instituted in this Court. A learned Single Judge held that Rule 49-A of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules provided for an order of suspension when an inauiry is contemplated or is proceeding. The expression "an inquiry is contemplated" refers to the formal disciplinary inauiry held under Rule 55 of the Rules. The order of suspension cannot hence be passed until the authority concerned has decided to initiate the departmental inauirv. In the present cases the order was passed much prior to that stage, namely when the complaints had been sent only for verification and before anv decision to commence formal discipilinary proceedings was taken. On this view the impugned orders of suspension were auashed. Aggrieved the State has come up in appeal.
(2.) In several decisions the Supreme Court has observed that suspension can be of several kinds. Everv employer has an inherent right to suspend the employee but such inherent right of suspension can be exercised only for prohibiting the employee from attending to his work, but without affecting his emoluments or privileges. When such an order is Passed the employer is not entitled to affect the statutory or the contractual right of the employee to get the emoluments and privileges of his post. An order of suspension can also be passed by way of punishment or during an inauiry into the charges of misconduct, but these categories of suspension orders can be passed only if the authority is empowered to do so either by the prescribed conditions of service or by the terms of the contract. The employer has no inherent right to pass such a suspension order. See: T. Caiee V/s. U. Jormanik Siem, 1961 AIR(SC) 276Paragraph 14; B. P. Kapur V/s. Union of India, 1964 AIR(SC) 787Paragraphs 9 and 11 and V. P.Gindroniva v. State of M. P., 1970 AIR(SC) 1494.
(3.) In the present cases the authorities do not rely upon their inherent right to suspend the Government servant. The order of suspension provides that the officer shall receive suspension allowance which is one-third of the regular pay. This shows that the impugned order of suspension was not passed in the exercise of the inherent powers. The impugned order of suspension is to be justified by Rule 49-A of the C. C. A. Rules. Rule 49-A was promulgated bv the notification dated 30th January 1953. This notification was made as a result of the recommendations made bv the Disciplinary Proceedings Inquiry Committee appointed bv the Government of U. P. in 1952. This Committee was headed by the then Chief Minister, the Hon'ble Mr. Govind Ballabha Pant. In paragraph 15 of this report the Committee holds: "15. Under present administrative practice suspension is frequently ordered in cases where an inauirv is started into the conduct of a government servant. In Rule 49 of the C. C. A. Rules suspension is mentioned as one of the penalties which can be imposed on a delinquent government servant, But there are several auestions connected with suspension which require thorough examination. For example, it is nowhere laid down at what stage of an inquiry a person should be suspended and practice varies according to the inclination of the authority concerned. Sometimes a Government servant is placed under suspension as soon as there is reason to suspect any misbehaviour on his part even though there may not be full material available to frame a charge against him. Such hurried suspension obviously involves hardship to the suspended government servant and if further inauiry results in the government servant concerned being found not guilty, it also involves wasteful expenditure of public funds. Another point in connection with suspension which has recently been brought into prominence bv rulings of certain High Courts is that suspension amounts in effect to reduction in rank and thereby attracts article 311 (2) and conseauenttlv suspension should only be ordered after going through the full procedure of inauiry and punishment prescribed under Rule 55 of the C. C. A. Rules. We have carefully examined the foregoing points and to remove these difficulties recommend as follows: (i) Suspension should be removed from the list of punishments mentioned in Rule 49 of the C C. A. rules and other cognate rules. (ii) A separate rule should be framed to enable the competent authority to order suspension pending inauiry. (iii) If the inauirv finally results in the dismissal, or removal of the government servant the order of dismissal or removal should take effect from the date on which suspension came into effect. (iv) The power of suspension should vest in the appointing authority and in the case of government servants belonging to a State Service there should be no delegation of this power to anv lower authority. In the case of government servants not belonging to a State Service the Power mav be delegated to an authority lower than the appointing authority and the particular authority to which such power be delegated mav be examined with reference to the various classes of government servants in different departments. (v) Suspension should not ordinarily be resorted to unless the allegations are serious enough to warrant removal, dismissal or reduction and should in such cases immediately precede the framing of charges and their communication to the accused government servant. Appendix "F" gives drafts of two new Rules 49-A and 49-B embodying the above recommendations which should be added to the C. C. A. Rules.";