JUDGEMENT
M.C.DESAI, J. -
(1.) THIS is a case referred under section 24(2) of the U.P. Agricultural Income -tax Act by Revision Board at the assessees instance, the questions requiring this courts answer being :
'1. Whether in the circumstances of the case all or any of the applications in revision filed by the State should be dismissed as being barred by limitation on the ground that they had been filed beyond a reasonable time ? 2. Whether if the applications are not dismissed on that ground, the Board the power after the expiry of the period prescribed by section 25 or section 26 of altering the order of the assessing authority ?'
(2.) THE facts as they appear from the statement are as follows : For the assessment year 1358 (i.e. July 1, 1950, to June 30, 1951), the assessing authority made the assessment order on September 29, 1951. The State Government on July 9, 1954, applied to the Revision Board to revise the assessment order under section 22, which reads as follows :
'22, (1) The Revision Board may, on their own motion or on an application, call for the record of any proceeding.... and... may pass such orders as they think fit.'
The existing sub -section (1A) laying down that an application under sub -section (1) must be within on year from the date of the service of the order complained of, did not exist on the relevant dates and was enacted by Act No. 14 of 1956. The present case is not governed by that sub -section. The Board entertained the revision application filed by the State and on January 29, 1955, passed another assessment order enhancing the tax.
Coming to question No. 1 we find that there did not exist any law which compelled the Board to reject the States application on the ground that it was filed after the expiry of a certain period. As no period of limitation was prescribed for such an application no application was required to be dismissed on the mere ground the of the expiry of a certain period. Revisional Jurisdiction of the Board is discretionary : vide the word 'may' used in sub -section (1) of section 22, and it was always open to the Board to refuse to entertain an application on the ground that it was unduly delayed. Laches is a ground for refusing to exercise revisional jurisdiction, though it is a matter of discretion and not of law. The practice of this court not to entertain an application for revision revision in a criminal case in a civil suit or for a writ after the expiry of 90 days is based on a rule of prudence and this court has no jurisdiction to impose this practice upon the Revision Board. There is no question of 'reasonable period of limitation' : a period of limitation is always fixed by the legislature and is not to be implied by a court in the absence of a statutory provision. The principle of the law of contract that if time is not fixed for the doing of an act, the law implies reasonable time for the doing of it, has no application to an application to an application to be presented under a statutory provision to a court or another tribunal. If the legislature giving a party a right to make an application to a court or another tribunal does not prescribe the time within which it should be made, the law does not imply that it must be made within a reasonable time and does not require that if it is not made it must invariably be rejected. It can be rejected on the ground that it was not made within a reasonable time but this is in exercise of the discretion vesting in the court or tribunal and not in compliance with any law. No law compels a High Court or any other authority to refuse to exercise revisional jurisdiction on the ground of laches and if a High Court or any other authority refuses the jurisdiction on the ground of laches it does not arbitrarily or erroneously. Therefore the Board could, but was not obliged to, reject the States application on the ground of laches and our answer to question No. 1 is that the Board could in its discretion,, but was not bound by any law to, dismiss the States application on the ground that it was field after more than 2 years and 9 months. Since it was the contention of the assessee that the Board ought to have dismissed the application on this ground, the answer can be said to be against the assessee.
(3.) AS regards question No. 2. we are not quite sure that it arises out of the order passed by the Board under section 22. The Board wrote in the order :
'On behalf of the assessee the applications were contested only on the ground that they were beyond limitation.... no period of limitation was prescribed under the Act for a revision application... Relying on section 25 and 26 under which application can be made within a period of one year, it was contended a revision application beyond a period of one year from the date of the order challenged should not be entertained on the ground of limitation.' ;
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