Desai, C.J. - (1.) This second appeal by a plaintiff whose suit for arrears of rent and ejectment of the respondent from an accommodation governed by the Rent Control and Eviction Act has been dismissed by the courts below, came up for hearing before one of us and he referred it to a larger Bench on account of conflict among various authorities of this Court. Sri K. B. Sinha for the appellant does not press the appeal as regards the arrears of rent and we are concerned only with the question of ejectment of the respondent. The facts giving rise to the dispute are as follows. In 1952 a Munsif acting under Section 5 (4) of the Act made an order fixing Rs. 15/- as the rent of the accommodation to be paid by the respondent to the appellant. The appellant sent by registered post a notice which was received by the respondent on 28-8-1958. The relevant contents of the notice were thus : "Rent from 1-9-57 to 31-7-58 at a rate of Rs. 15/- per month amounting to Rs. 165/-are due which please pay. Since my client does not wish to keep you a tenant your tenancy is terminated and you are hereby asked to vacate the premises in your occupation on the 30th day after the receipt of this notice failing which legal action shall be taken against you for the costs of which you shall be held responsible." The respondent did not pay the arrears to the appellant. Instead he deposited them in the court of a Munsiff on 15-9-58 with an application in which he alleged that he was depositing them on account of a bona fide doubt or dispute as to the person who was entitled to receive them. He did not allege in the application that he had tendered the arrears to the appellant and that he had refused to accept them. After the arrears were deposited the Munsiff issued notice to the parties and on 13-12-58 passed an order directing the arrears to be paid to the appellant. It will be noticed that the period of thirty days since the respondent's receiving the notice to pay the arrears had expired much before this date. The respondent also did not vacate and deliver possession over the accommodation to the appellant. Consequently the appellant instituted the suit giving rise to this appeal, for arrears of rent and ejectment. The suit was contested on several grounds which found favour with the courts below and they dismissed it.
(2.) The appellant gave one notice and that was both for terminating the tenancy of the respondent and for payment of the arrears. As regards the notice terminating the tenancy we find nothing illegal in it. It did not become illegal merely because it was accompanied by a demand for arrears of rent. A document purporting to have a legal effect may fail to achieve that effect if it lacks something but cannot fail to achieve it just because it contains a superfluous matter, unless the law makes it devoid of the effect on account of its containing the superfluous matter. There is nothing in Sections 106 and 111 (h) of the Transfer of Property Act to indicate that if a notice terminating the tenancy contains another demand it is invalid or ceases to be a notice terminating the tenancy. It has been held by this Court that one notice terminating the tenancy and demanding arrears of rent is not invalid; see Jagat Narain Mehra v. Madan Lal, 1961 All LJ 442 in which Oak and Kailash Prasad, JJ., overruled Ram Krishna Prasad v. Mohd. Yahia, 1960 All LJ 579 : (AIR 1960 All 482) in which a contrary view was taken by Dhavan, J.
(3.) Another defect pointed out in the notice terminating the tenancy was that it terminated the tenancy on the date on which the notice was given and not after thirty days. Under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act the respondent's tenancy was a tenancy from month to month "terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by thirty days' notice". The respondent's tenancy could be terminated, as laid down in Section 111 (h) "on the expiration of a notice to determine the lease, or to quit ..... duly given . . . . . " by the appellant to the respondent. What is required by these provisions is that a notice terminating the tenancy should be given and that the tenancy is terminated on the expiry of thirty days. It was contended by Sri Mangi Lal that the appellant by his notice terminated the respondent's tenancy on the date on which he gave the notice and not after thirty days but we do not read the notice in this sense. The appellant did not say in the notice that the respondent's tenancy was terminated on the date on which the notice was given; he wrote "your tenancy is terminated" and not "your tenancy is terminated today". He used the present tense but it does not mean that he was terminating the tenancy in present : the present tense is quite consistent with the termination of the tenancy in futuro when the act by which the tenancy is to terminate in futuro is done in present. Since it was by the act of giving the notice that the tenancy was to be terminated he could say "your tenancy is terminated.'' The tenancy of the respondent was terminated by the notice given by him and, therefore, on the date on which he gave, the notice he could say "your tenancy is terminated". What he meant was "your tenancy is terminated after the expiry of thirty days, from the receipt of the notice"; this was made clear by the addition that he should vacate the accommodation on the 30th day after the receipt of the notice. There is undoubtedly a distinction between terminating the tenancy at once and calling upon the tenant to deliver possession after 30 days and terminating tenancy after 30 days : in the former case the relationship of landlord and tenant comes to an end at once and the tenant is given a right to remain in possession for 30 days either as a licensee or as a tenant on sufferance, whereas in the latter case he remains a tenant for 30 days. But it is clear from the notice that the appellant did not intend to terminate the tenancy on the date on which he gave the notice; he did not give the respondent a right to remain in possession for 30 days as his licensee or a tenant on sufferance after the termination of his tenancy. He meant to retain him as his tenant for 30 days. It is true that under the Transfer of Property Act only a notice to terminate the tenancy is required and not a notice to deliver possession because it is the tenant's own duty to deliver possession as soon as his tenancy is terminated, but it does not follow that a notice terminating the tenancy cannot include in it a demand for delivery of possession or that a notice to deliver possession means that the tenancy has already been terminated. The notice cannot be interpreted to mean a notice terminating the tenancy with immediate effect and calling upon the respondent to deliver possession after 30 days. In this connection Bradley v. Atkinson ILR 7 All 899 (FB) was cited before us but this does not govern the facts of the instant case. The notice dealt with in that case was that if the tenant did not vacate within a month from the date of the notice the landlord would file a suit against him for ejectment and for arrears of rent and the Full Bench held that it was not a notice to quit at all inasmuch as it did not contain a notice of the lessor's intention to terminate the tenancy. The notice evidently only asked for delivery of possession without any reference to the termination of the tenancy and it was because of this that the Full Bench held that it was not a notice terminating the tenancy. A notice terminating the tenancy may include a demand for possession but a notice only demanding possession cannot be interpreted as a notice terminating the tenancy. There is nothing to prevent a landlord's asking his tenant to deliver possession without his terminating the tenancy and this is what was done by the landlord in Bradley's case ILR 7 All 899 (FBJ. Since there was no termination of tenancy his suit for ejectment of the tenant was dismissed. It was observed by Straight, J, that the notice never gave any indication to the tenant that if he did not comply with the notice he would continue in possession as a trespasser. In the present case the appellant has clearly said that he was terminating the tenancy of the respondent and, therefore, the notice is quite different from the notice dealt with in the case of Bradley.;