MAHABIR SUGAR MILLS LIMITED Vs. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
LAWS(ALL)-1963-9-16
HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Decided on September 24,1963

MAHABIR SUGAR MILLS LTD. Appellant
VERSUS
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH Respondents

JUDGEMENT

Desai, C.J. - (1.) THIS is a statement of a case submitted to this Court by the Revision Board under Section 24 (4) of the U P. Agricultural Income-tax Act; this Court is called upon to answer the following questions: (1) Whether the revision application moved by the State on 15-9-1951 against the order passed by the Assessing Authority on 20-7-1950 was belated or not within the meaning of Section 22 of the U. P. Agricultural Income-tax Act? (2) Where the amounts spent on the following items; (1) Farm Manager's pay (2) Cashier's pay (3) Time Keeper's pay (4) Fieldman's pay were permissible items of expenditure Under Section 6 (2) (b) (iv), U. P. Agricultural Income Tax Act and Rule 13, U. P. Agricultural Income Tax Rules?
(2.) THE facts as they emerge from the statement are that on 20-7-1950 the assessing authority passed an assessment order holding that the total agricultural income of the assessee was less than the taxable minimum and directing refund of the tax already realised from it under its earlier assessment order. On 8-9-1951 the State applied for revision of the order under Section 22 which reads as follows: "THE Revision Board may, on their own motion or on art application, call for the record, of any proceeding ...... and ...... may pass such orders as they think fit." THEre is a proviso to this provision with which we are not concerned. No period of limitation for an application for revision under Section 22 is laid down in the section or in any other provision. THE Revision Board entertained the application and allowed it on 10-11-1951. It assessed the income under Section 16 (3) after disallowing certain deductions claimed by the assessee. It is evident from the order passed by the Revision Board that the assessee did not at all raise before it the question that the application for revision filed by the State was a belated one and should not have been entertained by the Board. Subsequently it applied under Section 24 (2) for a case being stated to this Court and the Board refused to do so and this Court under Section 24 (4) ordered the Board to state the case. Question No. 1 does not arise from the order passed by the Revision Board under Section 22 at all and could not be required by this Court to be referred by the Board to it. This Court's jurisdiction under Section 24 (7) is confined to deciding questions of law arising out of the Revision Board's order passed under Section 22 and referred by it. Since no question, not even of law, not arising out of the order passed by the Board under Section 22 can be referred by it to this Court at all, this Court has no jurisdiction to decide such a question. The question referred to this Court is also not a "question of law. Section 22 does not prescribe any period of limitation within which an application for revision under Section 22 be made to the Board and, there- fore, no application is bound to be rejected on the ground that it was made after the expiry of a certain, time. Since the revisions jurisdiction of the Board is discretionary it is open to it to refuse to exercise it on the ground that the application was moved after undue delay. This is a matter of its discretion and not of law. If it in exercise of its discretion decides to revise an order even-though the application under Section 22 was made after undue delay it cannot be said to infringe any law and. no question can be said to arise out of the order passed by it under Section 22. Section 22 does not deal with the question when an application for revision can be said to be belated or when it can be said to be not belated and, therefore, there is nothing like an application being "belated within the meaning of section"; "Belated or not within the meaning of Section 22" assumes that Section 22 itself states which application is belated or which application is not belated; when it does not in fact say which application is belated or which application is not belated the question whether an application is "belated or not within the meaning of Section-22" is impossible.
(3.) THE question is, therefore, left unanswered and even if it were answered, the answer would be that the application could not be said to be "belated within- the meaning of Section 22" and thus against the assessee. It is not disputed that the deductions claimed by the assessee are under Section 6 (2) (b) (iv), e. g. "expenses incurred in the previous year in raising the crop from which the agricultural income is derived, in making it fit for market and in transporting it to market, including the maintenance or hire of agricultural implements and cattle required for these purposes". The statement of the case does not mention what duties are performed by the farm manager, the cashier, the time keener and the fieldman employed by the assessee and whether they have any connection whatsoever with the raising of the crop or making it fit for market or transporting it to market It was for the assessee to prove that the salaries paid to these servants were expenses incurred in raising the crop or in making it fit for market or in transporting it to market; unless it did so it was not entitled to deduct. the salaries paid to them in the previous year. Since in the statement of the case there is nothing to show that their duties were connected with the acts of raising the crop, making it fit for market and transporting it to market it is not possible for this Court to answer the question in the affirmative and, therefore, it must be; answered in the negative.;


Click here to view full judgement.
Copyright © Regent Computronics Pvt.Ltd.