R. Singh, J. - (1.) THIS execution second appeal arises put of an objection taken to the execution of a decree for possession. It appears that the Respondents decree -holders sued for possession of some land and also preyed for demolition of certain constructions said to have been made by the Appellants on the land. This suit was decreed ex -party on the 5th May, 1947. The Defendants Appellants went in appeal and then again in second appeal but both the appeals were dismissed and the decree became final on the 15th November, 1949. The decree holders then applied for execution of the decree on the 25th of April 1951. In this application they mentioned the property which was decreed in their favour and asked for a relief of possession on the laud and for demolition of the constructions. The application was registered and notice was issued to the judgment debtors, namely, the present Appellants. The decree holders, however, did not deposit the possess fee and the execution application was dismissed for default of the decree holders.
(2.) THE decree holders made a second application for execution on the 12th January, 1952, and objections were filed by the Appellants judgment debtors under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. They pleaded that the execution application was barred by time and that the land which had been decreed in favour of the Plaintiffs had vested in the State under the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The learned Munsif who heard the objections found in favour of the Appellants on both the points and allowed the objection. The decree holders then went in appeal. The lower appellate Court found in favour of the decree holders on both the points and dismissed the objection. The judgments debtors have now same up in second appeal. Of the two points raised in the two Courts below the learned Counsel for the Appellants now states that he does not wish to press the point about the land having been taken over by the State under the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The land is situate in a town area and as such the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act does not apply to this area. The only ground which has been pressed in appeal is that the execution application made on the 12th January, 1952, was barred by limitation in as much as the previous application made on the 30th April, 1951, by the decree holders was not in accordance with law. The only mistake which appears to have crept in, in the original application dated the 30th April, 1951, was that the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure under which the relief was claimed in execution had been wrongly quoted. The decree holders quoted Order 21 Rule 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure instead of Order 21 Rule 35 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In other respects the application was perfectly in order. The area which had been decreed in favour of the decree holders was shown by letters ABCD in the map prepared by the Commissioner which formed part of the decree and the decree holders had clearly mentioned that they wanted possession of this area ABCD which was situate in the bigger plot No. 715. The learned Counsel for the Appellants has argued that the description was not sufficient and the application should therefore be held not to be in accordance with law. Unfortunately the learned Munsif who tried the original case did not specify clearly the land decreed in favour of the decree holders and was content only by making the report of the Commissioner and the map drawn up by him a part of the decree. A decree should be such that no reference to any other document should be necessary in order to execute it. If it is necessary to make the map of the Commissioner a part of the decree the Court should clearly specify the findings of the Commissioner which it wishes to make a part of the operative order. It is not sufficient to make the map and the report of the Commissioner a part of the decree leaving it to the execution Court to determine what was the finding of the Commissioner. Nevertheless, the description given by the decree holders of the property in respect of which possession was claimed was under the circumstances the only proper description and it cannot therefore be said that the description of the property as given in the application for execution was insufficient or defective.
(3.) IT has further been argued on behalf of the Appellants that the application for execution having been dismissed for default of the decree holders it should not be held to be a step in aid of execution. The entry in Sub -clause (5) Column 3 against Article 182 of the Limitation Act is as follows: (Where the application next hereinafter mentioned has been made) the date of the final order passed on an application made in accordance with law to the proper Court for execution or to take some step in aid of execution of the decree or order.;