- (1.) THIS is an application in revision by Umrao Lal from his conviction and sentence under section 193, I. P. C. One Babu Ram was prosecuted for demanding a bribe from the applicant and the applicant was the principal witness in the case against him. He was examined-in-chief on 17-11-1950 and made the following statement: "i had a talk with Babu Ram at the house of Matru Lal. Babu Ram demanded 200/- Rs. from me in consideration of his getting the case relating to the money order hushed up. Matru Lal settled the transaction for Rs. 50/ -. I paid Rs. 40/- which I had with me then to Matru Lal who gave them to Babu Ram. " He was cross-examined under Section 255 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on 8-12-1950 and in the course of the cross-examination he made the following statement: "the talk about the payment of the bribe had taken place between me and Matru Lal. The accused never demanded a bribe from me. He did not hear the talk about the payment of the bribe. When I paid Rs. 40/- to Matru Lal, he was not present. " The Magistrate who tried the case against Babu Ram was of the opinion that the above two statements made by the applicant were so contradictory to each other that one of them was necessarily false. He considered it expedient in the interests of Justice to prosecute him for committing perjury in respect of either of them and made a complaint for his prosecution under Section 193, I. P. C. Thereupon he was tried under Section 193 and has been convicted of the same offence by the courts below.
(2.) THE following contentions were raised on his behalf: 1. That he could not be convicted under Section 193, I. P. C. unless it was found which of the two statements was false. 2. That the two statements were made in one deposition in the course of a trial. 3. That the applicant had 'locus paenitentiae' and could correct the previous false statement which was wrong. These contentions are all unsound. "whoever being legally bound by an oath or by an express provision of law to state the truth. . . . . . makes any statement which is false, and which he either knows or believes to be false or does not believe to be true, is said to give false evidence. " See Section 191, I. P. C. "whoever gives false evidence at any stage of a judicial proceeding" is punishable under Section 193, I. P. C. Under Section 236 of the Code of Criminal Procedure an accused may be charged in the alternative with having committed some one of two or more offences. If a witness bound by an oath or law to speak the truth, makes two statements one of which is necessarily false and the prosecution is unable to prove which one of them is false, he can be charged in the alternative with having made one or the other statement falsely. Illustration (b) to the Section shows that he can also be convicted in the alternative. If the prosecution succeeds in proving that an accused in the witness box deliberately made two statements which are , so contradictory to, and irreconcilable with, each other, that both cannot possibly be true, he can be convicted of perjury even without its being proved which one of them was not true. It has been held in -- 'queen-Empress v. Ghulet', 7 All 44 (A); -- 'habibullah v. Queen-Empress', 10 Cal 937 (B) and -- 'taj Mahomed v. Emperor', AIR 1928 Lah 125 at p. 128 (C) that an accused who is proved to have made two wholly irreconcilable statements can be convicted of perjury without its being shown which one of them was false.
(3.) REALLY the question is whether it is proved or not that the accused committed perjury. If he has made two statements which are so contradictory and irreconcilable that both cannot possibly be true, it means that one of them is false and if the other ingredients of the offence are made out, he can be convicted. It is only when the prosecution charges him with making a particular statement falsely, that it has to prove that that statement is false and not the other. In that case the mere fact and that he made the other statement conflicting with it would not suffice because it may very well be that the other statement was false and not the statement with: which he was charged. When all that is proved is that one of the two statements is false, it means that it is not proved that a particular statement is false. If the accused is charged with making that statement falsely, naturally the charge must fail. In -- 'r. v. Wheatland', (1838) 8 Car and P 238 (D), the accused made one statement before a magistrate and a wholly contradictory statement at the Quarter Sessions, he was prosecuted for perjury in respect of the latter statement and it was proved that the falsity of the latter statement could not be proved merely by the fact that it was contradicted by the earlier statement,;