<JGN>Ram Surat Ram (Maurya)</JGN>,J. - (1.) HEARD Sri G.K. Maurya, counsel for the petitioner and Sri Suresh Singh, respondent no.16. The writ petition has been filed against the order of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation dated 26.10.2012 by which the delay in filing the appeal has been condoned and the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation dated 30.10.2013 dismissing the revision against the aforesaid order. Against the order of the Consolidation Officer dated 15.10.2008 an appeal was filed on 26.12.2008. In the appeal a delay condonation application along with affidavit has been filed. In the affidavit it has been stated that as the appeal was to be filed on behalf of several appellants and they were not united together accordingly, the delay had occurred. It is only when they united together then on 22.12.2008 an application for issue of a certified copy of the order dated 15.10.2008 was filed which was issued on 23.12.2008. Thereafter the appeal was prepared on 24.12.2008 and 25.12.2008 being a holiday it was filed on 26.12.2008. Under Section 11 of the Act limitation for filing an appeal is 21 days. Accordingly, there was delay of about 52 days in filing the appeal. The grounds for condonation of delay have been taken that there were several appellants and they could not unit at a time, accordingly, the appeal could not be filed. A perusal of the memorandum of appeal shows that there were 18 appellants. The Settlement Officer, Consolidation found that as the petitioner had not filed any counter affidavit to the affidavit filed in support of the delay condonation application and there were several appellants as such cause for delay appeared to him proper and he condoned the delay by order dated 26.10.2012 and the revision filed against the aforesaid order has been dismissed by order dated 30.10.2013.
(2.) THE counsel for the petitioner submits that the Supreme Court in Popat Bahiru Govardhana vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, 2013(121) RD 249 in paragraph 13 has held as follows: "13. it is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that , "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation...." In the case cited by the counsel for the petitioner an application under Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act was moved with a delay of 4 days. As the provision of Section 5 of Limitation Act is not applicable in the application under Section 28A of the Act, therefore, the case relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner has no application in this matter. In the case of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others, JT 2013(12) SCC450, the Supreme Court has summarized the following principles: "i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice -oriented, non - pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact - situation. iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. xiii)The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. " In view of the aforesaid principle laid down by the Apex Court, the impugned orders do not suffer from any illegality and no interference is required by this Court. The writ petition is dismissed.;