AJAI LAMBA,J. - (1.) THIS is third application for bail in Case Crime No.124 of 2012 under Sections 394/411 I.P.C., Police Station Harchandpur, District Raebareli.
(2.) LEARNED counsel for the applicant contends that two of the witnesses have already deposed on behalf of the prosecution. The accused present in court were not identified. I have gone through contents of the statement. Observations by the Bail Court are not required to be made in regard to quality of evidence. Suffice it to say that the trial is at the stage of recording evidence. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Akil @ Javed Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) reported in (2013) 7 SCC 125 has held in following terms: "41. In a comprehensive decision of this Court in State of U.P. V. Shambhu Nath Singh and others {2001 SCC(Cri) 798} the legal position on this aspect has been dealt with in extenso. Useful reference can be made to paras 10-14 and 18: (SCC pp.672-74) "10. Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short "the Code") is the only provision which confers power on the trial court for granting adjournments in criminal proceedings. The conditions laid down by the legislature for granting such adjournments have been clearly incorporated in the section. It reads thus: * * * 11. The first sub-section [of Section 309 CrPC] mandates on the trial courts that the proceedings shall be held expeditiously but the words "as expeditiously as possible" have provided some play at the joints and it is through such play that delay often creeps in the trials. Even so, the next limb of the sub-section sounded for a more vigorous stance to be adopted by the court at a further advanced stage of the trial. That stage is when examination of the witnesses begins. The legislature which diluted the vigour of the mandate contained in the initial limb of the sub-section by using the words "as expeditiously as possible" has chosen to make the requirement for the next stage (when examination of the witnesses has started) to be quite stern. Once the case reaches that stage the statutory command is that such examination "shall be continued from day to day until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined". The solitary exception to the said stringent rule is, if the court finds that adjournment "beyond the following day to be necessary" the same can be granted for which a condition is imposed on the court that reasons for the same should be recorded. Even this dilution has been taken away when witnesses are in attendance before the court. In such situation the court is not given any power to adjourn the case except in the extreme contingency for which the second proviso to sub-section (2) has imposed another condition, "[p]rovided further that when witnesses are in attendance, no adjournment or postponement shall be granted, without examining them, except for special reasons to be recorded in writing". 12. Thus, the legal position is that once examination of witnesses started, the court has to continue the trial from day to day until all witnesses in attendance have been examined (except those whom the party has given up). The court has to record reasons for deviating from the said course. Even that is forbidden when witnesses are present in court, as the requirement then is that the court has to examine them. Only if there are "special reasons", which reasons should find a place in the order for adjournment, that alone can confer jurisdiction on the court to adjourn the case without examination of witnesses who are present in court. 13. Now, we are distressed to note that it is almost a common practice and regular occurrence that trial courts flout the said command with impunity. Even when witnesses are present, cases are adjourned on far less serious reasons or even on flippant grounds. Adjournments are granted even in such situations on the mere asking for it. Quite often such adjournments are granted to suit the convenience of the advocate concerned. We make it clear that the legislature has frowned at granting adjournments on that ground. At any rate inconvenience of an advocate is not a "special reason" for bypassing the mandate of Section 309 of the Code. 14.If any court finds that the day-to-day examination of witnesses mandated by the legislature cannot be complied with due to the non-cooperation of the accused or his counsel the court can adopt any of the measures indicated in the sub-section i.e. remanding the accused to custody or imposing cost on the party who wants such adjournments (the cost must be commensurate with the loss suffered by the witnesses, including the expenses to attend the court). Another option is, when the accused is absent and the witness is present to be examined, the court can cancel his bail, if he is on bail (unless an application is made on his behalf seeking permission for his counsel to proceed to examine the witnesses present even in his absence provided the accused gives an undertaking in writing that he would not dispute his identity as the particular accused in the case). * * * It is no justification to glide on any alibi by blaming the infrastructure for skirting the legislative mandates embalmed in Section 309 of the Code. A judicious judicial officer who is committed to his work could manage with the existing infrastructure for complying with such legislative mandates. The precept in the old homily that a lazy workman always blames his tools, is the only answer to those indolent judicial officers who find fault with the defects in the system and the imperfections of the existing infrastructure for their tardiness in coping with such directions." (Emphasis supplied)
(3.) CONSIDERING stage of trial, this application for bail is dismissed, however, with directions to the trial court to proceed with trial strictly in accordance with judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, portion of which is extracted hereinabove.;