- (1.) We have heard Sri A.K.Srivastava, learned A.G.A. on the merits of the present government appeal and Sarva Sri Sunil Kumar and Sri Sunil Vashisth learned counsel appearing for respondents.
(2.) We have perused the lower court records. There is no dispute in it that after the case was committed, it was transferred to Fast Track Court No.2, Ghaziabad by the learned Sessions Judge for trial. Thus, the Presiding Officer of Fast Track Court received the records of Sessions Trial No. 745 of 2001 and framed the charges on the first day of appearance of the accused persons, i.e., on 30.7.2001. It appears from the perusal of different orders passed by the trial court that neither summons nor warrant of arrest was issued for procuring the presence of witnesses by the trial court and by another order of transfer dated 211.2001, the case was made over to Fast Track Court no. 3, Ghaziabad and again we do not find any mention in the order sheet that any process had ever been issued by the court or directed to be issued by any authority for ensuring the attendance of witnesses except as appears from order passed on 5.2.2002 on which date 27.2.2002 was fixed for evidence on which date no witness was in attendance, as a result of which the next date was 14.3.2002 and on that date, the learned Trial Judge passed the order that in view of the non production and non attendance of the witnesses for the prosecution in spite of warrant of arrest against the witnesses having been handed over to the prosecution party (order does not specify the name either of the person or the authority), no witness had been produced and that the learned Presiding Judge was satisfied that the prosecution was either not interested in procuring the attendance of the witnesses or the witnesses themselves were not interested in coming to support the charge. The trial court shut down the evidence of prosecution and passed a one-line order acquitting the respondents for the charges under Section 307 and 452 IPC.
(3.) Speedy trial is one of the fundamental rights of the accused, but that right which was initially recognized in several cases including Common Cause-I vs UNION OF INDIA, 1996 4 SCC 33 was subsequently reconsidered in Common Cause-II reported in 1996 4 SCC 775. Both the cases and other cases, like, that of Raj Deo Sharma Vs. State of Bihar,1999 7 SCC 607 were reviewed in P.Ramchandra Rao Vs. State of karnataka, 2002 4 SCC 578 by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court and the ultimate directions of the Court were laid down in paragraph 29 of the said judgment, which are reproduced as under:- "29-.For all the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that in Common Cause case (I) (as modified in Common Cause (II) and Raj Deo Sharma (I) and (II) , the Court could not have prescribed periods of limitation beyond which the trial of a criminal case or a criminal proceedings cannot continue and must mandatorily be closed followed by an order acquitting or discharging the accused. In conclusion we hold:- (1) The dictum in A.R. Antulays' case is correct and still holds the field. (2) The propositions emerging from Article 21 of the Constitution and expounding the right to speedy trial laid down as guidelines in A.R. Antulays' case , adequately take care of right to speedy trial. We uphold and re-affirm the said propositions. (3) The guidelines laid down in A.R. Antulay's case are not exhaustive but only illustrative. They are not intended to operate as hard and fast rules or to be applied like a strait-jacket formula. Their applicability would depend on the fact-situation of each case. It is difficult to foresee all situations and no generalization can be made. (4) It is neither advisable, nor feasible, nor judicially permissible to draw or prescribe an outer limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings. The time-limits or bars of limitation prescribed in the several directions made in Common Cause (I), Raj Deo Sharma (I) and Raj Deo Sharma (II) could not have been so prescribed or drawn and are not good law. The criminal courts are not obliged to terminate trial or criminal proceedings merely on account of lapse of time, as prescribed by the directions made in Common Cause Case (I), Raj Deo Sharma case (I) and (II) . At the most the periods of time prescribed in those decisions can be taken by the courts seized of the trial or proceedings to act as reminders when they may be persuaded to apply their judicial mind to the facts and circumstances of the case before them and determine by taking into consideration the several relevant factors as pointed out in A.R. Antulay's case and decide whether the trial or proceedings have become so inordinately delayed as to be called oppressive and unwarranted. Such time-limits cannot and will not by themselves be treated by any Court as a bar to further continuance of the trial or proceedings and as mandatorily obliging the court to terminate the same and acquit or discharge the accused. (5) The Criminal Courts should exercise their available powers. such as those under Sections 309, 311 and 258, of Code of Criminal Procedure to effectuate the right to speedy trial. A watchful and diligent trial judge can prove to be better protector of such right than any guidelines. In appropriate cases jurisdiction of High Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution can be invoked seeking appropriate relief or suitable directions. (6) This is an appropriate occasion to remind the Union of India and the State Governments of their constitutional obligation to strengthen the judiciary quantitatively and qualitatively-by providing requisite funds, manpower and infrastructure. We hope and trust that the Governments shall act.";