SUDHIR NARAIN, J. - (1.) The petitioners seek to quash Notifications dated 3-3-2000 and 1-3-2001 issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (in short the Act) and further a declaration that the Act is ultra vires to the Constitution of India as it is violative of Article 21 of the Constitution.
(2.) The facts leading to the filing of this writ petition is that Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. submitted a plan to set up a Petroleum Refinery in Uttar Pradesh in order to satisfy the growing demand of petroleum products like petrol, M.S. Diesel, Kerosene, cooking gas etc. to the State Government and requested for acquisition of land near Shankargarh in Allahabad District of Uttar Pradesh which was classified as backward area. The State Government approved the proposal and issued notification under Section 4 read with Section 17(4) of the Act which was published in official gazette on 3-3-2000 indicating that the land was required for planned industrial development. Bharat Petroleum Corporation respondent No. 2, was required to deposit balance of 80% of the amount of the estimated cost of acquisition. The Corporation deposited a sum of Rs. 7.185 crores vide demand draft dated 23-1-2001. The Government issued notification under Section 6 of the Act published in the official gazette on 1-3-2001 acquiring 2036 acres of land situate in eight villages.
(3.) The petition has been filed by petitioners No. 1, 2 and 3 as public interest litigation and petitioners 4 to 43 are tenure holders of the land which has been acquired under the notification. The main thrust of the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that after the petitioners are evicted from the land, they will be deprived of their land, house in which they are living and will be jobless. This amounts to deprivation of life provided under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It is contended that meaning of life under Article 21 of the Constitution includes the right to livelihood as held in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, AIR 1986 SC 180. The Court observed as under :- "..........the right to life includes the right to livelihood. We see only one answer to that question, namely, that it does. The sweep of the right to life conferred by Art. 21 is wide and far-reaching. It does not mean merely that life cannot be distinguished or taken away as, for example, by the imposition and execution of the death sentence, except according to procedure established by law. That is but one aspect of the right to life. An equally important facet of that right is the right to livelihood because, no person can live without the means of living, that is, the means of livelihood. If the right to livelihood is not treated as part of the constitutional right to life, the easiest way of depriving a person of his right to life would be to deprive him of his means of livelihood to the point of abrogation. Such deprivation would not only denude the life of its effective content and meaningfulness but it would make life impossible to live. And yet, such deprivation would not have to be in accordance with the procedure established by law, if the right to livelihood is not regarded as part of the right to life. That, which alone makes it possible to live, leave aside what makes life livable, must be deemed to be an integral component of the right to life. Deprive a person of his right to livelihood and you shall have deprived him of his life........";