Janardan Sahai, J. - (1.) A suit for rent and ejectment was filed by the Respondent in the Court of Judge Small Causes. The suit was decreed. The Plaintiffs' case was that Act No. 13 of 1972 is not applicable as in the previous proceedings under Section 21(8) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 instituted by the Plaintiff Respondent the applicant tenant who was the Defendant in that case took the plea that the Act is not applicable. The Plaintiff alleged that the tenancy of the Defendant was terminated by a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act dated 8.6.1998 and as the Defendant did not vacate the premises despite notice, hence the suit. The defence was that the notice under Section 106 Transfer of Property Act was invalid; that after the notice the landlord accepted the rent as such the notice was waived; that the suit was not maintainable as it was filed by an incompetent person, the Plaintiff being mentally retired (retarded) person and lastly that the allegations in the plaint were not proved. The Judge Small Cause framed the points for determination, including the points whether Act No. 13 of 1972 is applicable to the building in dispute and also as to whether the notice was invalid and whether the suit was filed by incompetent person. All the points were decided against the applicant and in favour of the landlord. The suit was decreed.
(2.) I have heard Sri Manish Goel counsel for the applicant and Sri. B. D. Mandhyan counsel for the Respondent.
(3.) Four points were raised by Sri Goel. First that the notice was invalid. He placed before me the copy of the notice, which has been annexed as Annexure-1 to the affidavit accompanying the stay application in this revision. The submission of Sri Goel is that there was in it no intention to terminate the tenancy. He relies upon para 3 of the notice and submits that that paragraph contains an admission that Act No. 13 of 1972 is applicable. He also relies upon the last para of the notice which gives opportunity to the tenant to enter into a fresh contract of tenancy. I am unable to accept the contention. In para 7 of the notice it is stated that in view of the tenant's admission U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, is no more applicable and the tenancy is liable to be terminated by notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and the same "is hereby determined by this notice." In para 8 the tenant has been called upon to deliver the possession of the premises in his tenancy after expiry of 30 days from the service of notice. Sri Goel submitted that the effect of the words "hereby determined" is the determination of tenancy in the praesenti. He relied upon the decision of this Court in Haji Ziaul Islam v. Mohd. Rafi alias Rafi Ahmad 1971 AWR 121 , in which it has been held that the notice terminating the tenancy in the praesenti is invalid and is in breach of the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Reliance was also placed upon the Division Bench decision of this Court in Abdul Jalil v. Haji Abdul Jalil, AIR 1974 All 402 , and upon the Full Bench decision in Bradley v. Atkinson, ILR 1885 (7) All 899 . The question is whether on the terms of the notice referred to above the intention was to determine the tenancy in the praesenti. This intention can be gathered from the fact that possession has been demanded after the expiry of 30 days. A notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is not to be read in a pedantic manner but the intention has to be gathered by reading the notice as a whole vide Smt. Samundari Devi v. Spl. and Additional District Judge, Azamgarh and Ors., 1999 (1) AWC 224 : 1998 ALR 762 . In Abdul Jalil it was stated that a notice has to be liberally construed. The intention is to be gathered from the reading of the language as a whole. The term 'hereby' in the notice indicates merely what was being done by the notice, namely that the tenancy was being determined by it. It does not signify the determination of tenancy in the praesenti but only the determination by means of the notice. The fact that possession was demanded after thirty days rather indicates that the intention was to determine the landlord tenant relationship after 30 days. In my opinion, the notice in this case is of class E categorised in Abdul Jalil where the notice used the words "your tenancy is terminated by this notice" and it was held that such a notice is valid. In Haji Ziaul Islam the notice terminated the tenancy 'with effect from today'. It was thus a notice to terminate the tenancy in praesenti. In Badley's case the tenancy was not determined at all. It is also submitted that no specific date has been given on which date the tenancy stood terminated. This contention has no force. From the very fact that the tenancy has been determined and the demand for possession has been made just after the expiry of 30 days it is evident that the tenancy was determined after 30 days only, tenant required to hand over possession immediately after the period of 30 days was over.;