- (1.) ANJANI Kumar, J. By means of present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the order passed by the Licensing Authority under the provision of Section 17 (3) of the Arms Act, thereby suspending the arms licence of the petitioner pending enquiry asking him to show cause as to why the fire-arm licence of the petitioner should not be cancelled/revoked for the reasons stated in the order impugned in the present writ petition.
(2.) HEARD learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel for the Respondents. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner argued that the Licensing Authority does not have any power to suspend the petitioner's fire-arm licence, pending enquiry for indefinite period. Learned Counsel for the petitioner brought to the notice of this Court the provision of Section 17 of the Arms Act, 1959 for the purposes of present controversy, which is reproduced below: "17. Variation, suspension and revocation of licences - (1) The licensing authority may vary the conditions subject to which a licence has been granted except such of them as have been prescribed and may for that purpose require the licence-holder by notice in writing to deliver up the licence to it within such time as may be specified in the notice. (2) The licensing authority may, on the application of the holder of a licence, also vary the conditions of the licence except such of them as have been prescribed. (3) The licensing authority may be order in writing suspend a licence for such period as it thinks fit or revoke a licence - (a) if the licensing authority is satisfied that the holder of the licence is prohibited by this Act or by any other law for the time being in force, from acquiring, having in his possession or carrying any arms or ammunition, or is of unsound mind, or is for any reason unfit for a licence under this Act; or (b) if the licensing authority deems it necessary for the security of the public peace or for public safety to suspend or revoke the licence; or (c) if the licence was obtained by the suppression of material information or on the basis of wrong information provided by the holder of the licence or any other person on his behalf at the time of applying for it; or (d) if any of the conditions of the licence has been contravened; or (e) if the holder of the licence has failed to comply with a notice under sub-section (1) requiring him to deliver up the licence. " Learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance of some decisions/judgments in support of his contention and contended that the aforesaid provision has been considered firstly by a Full Bench decision of this Court in the case reported in 1984 (10) A. L. R. Page 223, Chhanga Prasad Sahu v. State of Uttar Pradesh, and thereafter another Full Bench in the case reported in 1985 (22) A. C. C. Page 353, Kailash Nath and others v. State of U. P. and others, and in the case reported in 1994 JIC 72 (All) ; 1995 (Suppl.) A. C. C. Page 235, Rana Pratap Singh v. State of U. P. Learned Counsel for the petitioner further contended that the effect of the aforesaid Full Bench decisions have been considered by learned single Judge of this Court in the case reported in 1998 (37) A. C. C. , Page 830 Sadri Ram v. District Magistrate, Azamgarh and others, wherein the learned single Judge after realising the provision has held that the question whether the licensing authority is clothed with the powers to suspend the licence in the midst of proceedings for suspension or revocation under Section 17 (3) of the Arms Act, 1959 was posed for consideration before another Full Bench of this Court in the case of Balram Singh v. State of U. P. and others, reported in 1991 JIC 102 (All) ; 1989 (26) A. C. C. Page 31. The Court noticed therein the decisions referred to above and held: "the ratio in C. P. Sahu's case that there is no power to suspend pending enquiry stands completely demolished by Kaliash Nath's case. "
(3.) THE learned single Judge has further observed that whenever a proceeding under sub-section (3) is initiated for suspending or revoking 'a licence' and the 'licensing authority' deems it necessary for security of public peace or for public safety to suspend or revoke 'the licence', the said authority can in exercise of that power suspend the licence during pendency of these proceedings without any hindrance from other provisions in the Act, as laid down in Balram Singh's case. The learned Counsel further contended that the order impugned herein is not an order of suspension for specified duration within the meaning of Section 17 (3) of the Act. It is a case of suspension of arms licence pending enquiry into cancellation thereof which cannot legally be done as per exposition of law laid down in C. P. Sahu's case. The satisfaction arrived at by the licensing authority in the instant case that it was necessary for the security of the public peace and public safety to revoke/suspend the licence derogates from its worth owing to the fact that the licensing authority in the same breath has called upon the petitioner to show cause why the licence be not rescinded/revoked. As propounded by the Full Bench in C. P. Sahu's case if there was material before the licensing authority and it was really satisfied on the basis of the material placed before it that possession of arms by the licence was going to imperil public peace and safety, it, could have straightway revoked or suspended the licence after recording reasons therefor, with room to the licensee to ventilate his grievance before the appellate authority. There requisite satisfaction on the basis of which the licence has been suspending enquiry into its cancellation detracts from all its worth and merit in the eyes of law, owing to the reason that the licensing authority by the same order required the petitioner to show cause why licence be not revoked. The ground of revocation or suspension for specified duration are common as visualised by clauses (a) to (e) of sub-section (3) of Section 17 of the Act and so long as the enquiry is pending, it cannot be said that the licensing authority was satisfied about existence of the grounds or ground visualised by clauses (a) to (e) of Section 17 (3) of the Act and this is what has been aptly expounded in C. P. Sahu's case in the following words: "the object of the enquiry that a licensing authority may, while proceeding to consider the question as to whether or not an arms licence should be revoked or suspended, like to make, clearly is to enable the licensing authority to come to a conclusion as to whether or not the facts stated in clauses (a) to (e) of Section 17 (3) exist and as already explained, it is not obliged to before considering that a case for revocation/suspension of licence has been made out, associate the licensee in such enquiry. In this view of the matter, it can safely be taken that where a licensing authority embarks upon such an enquiry it is till then not convinced about existence of the conditions mentioned in clauses (a) to (e) of Section 17 (3) of the Act. So long as it is not so convinced no case to make an order either revoking or suspending an arms licence as contemplated by the Section will be made out. ";