M. Katju, J. - (1.) -Heard learned counsel for the parties.
(2.) THE petitioner is a bus operator on the Vidhuna-Kachauraghat Route, which is within the jurisdiction of R.T.A., Kanpur. THE petitioner has challenged the validity of circular dated 13.6.2003, Annexure-2 to the petition. By that circular the number of permits on the routes of the State have been increased by the Trade Commissioner, U.P. by 20%. This order was passed in pursuance to the decision of a meeting under the Chairmanship of the Chief Secretary, U.P. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Trade Tax Commissioner has no jurisdiction to issue the said circular, as he has no such power to do so under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, or any other Act. In our opinion, this is not a fit case for exercise of our discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution and hence it is not necessary to go into the question whether the Trade Tax Commissioner had jurisdiction to issue the said circular or not. It must always be remembered that writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction and hence the High Court is not bound to interfere even if there is violation of law or even if the impugned order is without jurisdiction. The impugned circular has not prohibited the petitioner from running his bus. It has merely increased the number of permits by 20% on all routes. No doubt the impugned circular will increase the competition for the petitioner and other existing operators, but in our opinion it is in the public interest since more buses will be available for the travelling public and they can take the bus of their choice. Competition is in the public interest because it compels the businessmen to provide high quality goods at reasonable prices.
(3.) IT may be mentioned that under Section 47 (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 the R.T.A. could fix the strength of a route. There is no provision similar to Section 47 (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. IT is well known that under the Motor Vehicles Act the existing operators fought tooth and nail to prevent more operators from entering their routes, and often litigation went upto the Supreme Court. This adversely affected the interest of the travelling public who naturally wanted more buses, and hence Section 47 (3) was deleted in the 1988 Act. In Mithilesh Garg v. Union of India, AIR 1992 SC 443, the Supreme Court observed : "The petitioners are permit holders and are existing operators. They are plying their vehicles on the routes assigned to them under the permit. They are in the full enjoyment of their fundamental right guaranteed to them under Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India. There is no threat of any kind whatsoever from any authority to the enjoyment of their right to carry on the occupation of transport operators. There is no complaint of infringement of any of their statutory rights. Their only effort is to stop the new operators from coming in the field as competitors. We see no justification in the petitioner's stand. More operators mean healthy-competition and efficient transport system. Over-crowded buses, passengers standing in the aisle, clinging to the bus-doors and even sitting on the roof-tops are some of the common sights in this country. More often one finds a bus, which has noisy engine, old upholstery, uncomfortable seats and continuous emission of black-smoke from the exhaust pipe. IT is, therefore, necessary that there should be plenty of operators on every route to provide ample choice to the commuter-public to board the vehicle of their choice and patronise the operator who is providing the best service. Even otherwise the liberal policy is likely to help in the elimination of corruption and favouritism in the process of granting permits. Restricted licensing under the old Act led to the concentration of business in the hands of few persons thereby giving rise to a kind of monopoly, adversely affecting the public interest." In the same decision the Supreme Court also referred to the earlier decision of the Supreme Court e.g. Rice and Flour Mills v. N. T. Gowda, AIR 1971 SC 246, wherein it was held that a rice mill owner has no locus standi to challenge under Article 226, the setting up of a new rice-mill by another even if such setting up be in contravention of law. The same view was taken in Jashbhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, AIR 1976 SC 578.;