- (1.) Heard Sri Rajesh Tandon, Senior Advocate along with Sri Som Narain Mishra, Advocate on behalf of the petitioners (tenants) and Sri R. B. Singhal, Advocate on behalf of the contesting respondents (landlord).
(2.) Above Writ Petitions have been listed, before us on a reference made by a learned single Judge. Referring order dated September 10, 2002 is extracted: "I have heard the learned counsel for both sides. Order 15, Rule 5, C.P.C. as added in U. P. requires that the tenant/defendant should deposit the arrears of rent which is admitted by him to be due with interest at the first hearing. He should also deposit future rent month to month during the pendency of the suit. Failing such deposit the defence in the suit is liable to be struck off. In this particular case, the tenant/petitioner in his written statement has denied the relationship of the landlord and tenant, and therefore obviously no rent could be said to be admittedly due. He did not deposit any amount towards rent. His defence was struck off on the finding that relationship of the landlord and tenant existed. Learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon the clear words of Order 15, Rule 5 as interpreted by a decision of this Court in the case of Rakesh and Company v. Heera Lal reported in (2001) 44 All LR 840 for the proposition that only such amount is liable to be deposited which is admitted to be due. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondents, Sri R. B. Singhal submits that words "rent admitted by the tenant to be due" used in Order 15, Rule 5, C.P.C. should be interpreted to mean "rent found by the Court to be due although not admitted by the tenant to be due." Prima facie the Rules of interpretation of statutes do not permit of doing such violence to the words of the statute, as to make their meaning just reverse of what the language suggests. Exceptions may be possible (a) where the language used in a statute is ambiguous or capable of two interpreations or (b) where but for such interpretation absurdity or serious anomaly would result. However, learned counsel for the respondent relies certain single Judge decisions in support of his contention. The decisions are as follows: (i) 1995 All WC 56, Jai Chand Gangwar v. IIIrd A.D.J. (ii) (1984) 2 All Rent Cas 144, Guru Charan Lal v. III A.D.J. (iii) (1983) 2 All Rent Cas 453, Kishan Lal v. lst A.D.J. (iv) 1979 All Rent Cas 183 : (1979 All LJ 425), Thakur Prasad v. Guru Prasad. Of the above the case of Guru Charan and the case of Kishan Lal do not deal with the issue directly. The other two cases namely Jai Chand Gangwar and Thakur Prasad do support the respondent. However the only reason that can be spelt out in support of the conclusion or Interpretation of Order 15, Rule 5, appears to be the anxiety on part of the learned Judges that the tenant may not deny the liability to pay rent and drag on the proceeding of arrears of rent, and (2) secondly regarding the current rent. Both these can be avoided only by denial of the landlords title, which is highly risky for any tenant as it gives another ground for eviction. Besides as stated above the language of the statutory provision does not permit of the interpretation. And none of the two decisions aforesaid have considered the said language while giving the interpretation. To my mind the aforesaid anxiety would not be sufficient justification on part of the Court to adopt an interpretation which is just reverse of the statutory language. In the circumstances being unable to agree with the decision in the two cases of Jai Chand Gangwar and Thakur Prasad, I refer the following question for consideration by a larger Bench: "Whether the defence can be struck off under Order 15, Rule 5, C.P.C. for non-deposit of rent which is not admitted to be due despite the express words to the contrary in that statutory provision?" Let the papers of this case be placed before the Honble the Chief Justice for appropriate orders. Further proceedings in SCC Suit No. 2 of 2002 will remain stayed till further orders."
(3.) To answer the referred question we take Kunwar Baldaveji v. XI A.D.J. and others.;