A.N.Varma, J. - (1.) Against the order dated 30.5.1997 passed by opposite party No. 5 cancelling the petitioner's licence for a fair price shop, he preferred an appeal before opposite party No. 2 on 29.5.2001. As the appeal was time barred, he also preferred an application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal along with an affidavit. The cause indicated for not coming to the Court within the time prescribed was sufficiently explained in the affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay. In paragraph 5 it was averred that he had no knowledge of any meeting or order cancelling of the licence and, therefore, he could not appear and it was only through District Supply Officer's office that he came to learn that his licence was cancelled. Immediately thereafter on 29.5.2001 he preferred an appeal.
(2.) I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as learned standing counsel and have also gone through the order dated 3.7.2003 passed by opposite party No. 2. Learned standing counsel submitted that the order passed by opposite party No. 2 does not suffer from any infirmity inasmuch as he recorded the reasons for rejecting the appeal as time barred. According to him, immediately after the cancelling the licence, the shop was allotted to another person and thereupon the petitioner was made aware of the order of the cancellation.
(3.) The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, 1999 (1) AWC 15 (SC) : (1998) 7 SCC 123. The Apex Court in paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 of the said judgment observed as follows : "9.. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the Court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammeled by the conclusion of the lower court. 10. The reason for such a different stance is thus : "The primary function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time limit fixed for approaching the Court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause." 11. Rules of limitation are not meant of destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the Courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.";