- (1.) S. N. Srivastava. J. This application has been preferred for review of the judgment dated 8-4-1999 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 32939 of 1992, U. P. State Electricity Board Shakti Bhawan Lucknow and others v. Presiding Officer Industrial Tribunal U. P. Allahabad and others, in which subject matter of impungment was the award of the Tribunal dated 4th February, 1992 rendered on parity of the reasoning given in the judgment of the Court (D. B.) passed in Writ Petition No. 6858 of 1985. Learned Single Judge while disposing of the Writ Petition in 32939 of 1992 modulated the Tribunal's order dated 4-2-1992 and the order in so far as it bears relevance to the matter at issue in the review application is excerpted below : "sri Tarun Agarwal has then contended that list of successful candidates for the year 1977 and 1979 may be declared in near future. Respondents No. 3 and 4 have been promoted from the dates indicated in the order of the Tribunal to comply with the order of the Tribunal but they cannot claim seniority from that very date. He submits that the order of the Tribunal be modified to the extent that the Respondents Nos. 3 and 4 shall be entitled to seniority in accordance with the merit list as may be declared in near future. Learned Counsel for the Respondents No. 3 and 4 further submits that the petitioners were claiming appointment/promotion since 1977 and 1979 and they are entitled to seniority from the dates on which they could have been appointed. As already observed above, the Tribunal has directed that the Respondents 3 and 4 shall be deemed to have been appointed from the subsequent date i. e. a date on which two months period from the date of publication of award ends. The final list of successful candidates for the years 1977 and 1979 is yet to come. There may be candidates who may find positions higher to the petitioners in the merit list for the years 1977-79. At this stage in the absence of those who may be placed higher in the merit list, the petitioners cannot be given seniority from the date of the appointment/promotion to the post of Junior Engineer. In the interest of justice, therefore, it would be expedient to modify the order of the Tribunal to the effect of seniority of the Respondents 3 and 4 and other promotees shall be decided in future in accordance with the merit list. However, it is made clear that in case the names of the Respondents 3 and 4 do not find place in merit list for the years 1977-79, they shall not be reverted and they will continue to work as Junior Engineers on the post on which they have been working and will continue to get all the benefits they are getting. . . . . . . "
(2.) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner began his submission stating that the parties had agreed that irrespective of the fact that Respondents 3 and 4 were not arrayed as parties in the Writ Petition No. 6858 of 1985 decided on 19th August, 1989, the judgment extended its coverage to the respondents as well. This fact is borne out from para 6 of the judgment of the Tribunal in which the Tribunal has recorded a finding that Vinod Kumar Tiwari and Santosh Kumar Gupta, respondents had in no inarticulate terms stated that order passed in the said writ petition would operate for application to their case as well. He further submitted that the judgment of this Court was pronounced on the solitary ground that the petitioner's Counsel could not apprise the Court that judgment dated 29-8-1989 had not been observed in compliance, though the fact remained that the order had been fully complied with and fresh list of successful candidates was prepared and published on 3rd March, 1997 as a consequence of the directions embodied in the judgment of the Lucknow Bench dated 29th August, 1989 passed in Writ Petition No. 6858 of 1985 and other connected writ petition reported in 1991 UPLBEC 314, the explanatory plea in vindication of this submission was that the Counsel concerned was not aware of the necessary facts and as such, the same could not be pressed into service before the Court at the relevant point of time. He further submitted that a perusal of the list prepared and published in compliance of the judgment of the Court (supra) manifested that the respondents had not been declared successful and as a necessary consequence thereof, were not entitled to be given promotion in terms of directions contained in the order passed by learned Single Judge. He further submitted that under the Rules, merit was the only criterion and as a result, promotion could be made only on the basis of merit and as a necessary consequence, the promotion of the Respondents 3 and 4, proceeds the submission, being one based on consideration other than merit, the direction of the learned Single Judge that the petitioner would be deemed to be promoted and would not be reverted even though the Respondents 3 and 4 did not find place in the merit list of the years 1977-1979, is one in obtrusive antagonism of the requirements of Rules. He further submitted that in view of the above, the error is too patent to be ignored and apparent on the face of the record and review petition is clearly maintainable. To prop up his submission, the learned Counsel copiously placed in the cases reported in AIR 1963 SC 1947 (Para-8), AIR 1979 SC 1049 (Para 3), AIR 1992 SC 248 (Para 84), 1996 SCC Vol. 5 550 (Para 23), and 2000 SCC Vol. I 666, and canvassed that in view of the fact that the respondents could not be promoted they having failed in the selection made in accordance with the Service Rules based on merits, the order requires review. In opposition, Sri Radhy Shyam learned Counsel contended that the notification dated 3rd March, 1997 was in the keeping of the petitioners and they having not invited attention of the Court to the said notification on the date of hearing, the order would be deemed to have been passed in accordance with law. He further urged that the petitioner's department acted perfunctorily and negligently and further that it was not the case of the department that the document was not traceable inspite of due diligence on the date of judgment and therefore review application is not maintainable. He further contended that no ground is made out for recall of the order and that the case did not come within the periphery of the Order XLVII, Rule 1, C. P. C. To shore up his above contentions, the learned Counsel relied upon the decisions reported in AIR 1987 SC 1160. I have scanned the tenability of this decision in the present case. It was a case emanating from a second appeal wherein judgment was pronounced on merits in review. THE other learned Judge considered the whole thing afresh and set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge on different construction of a document while in the present case, the error is apparent on the face of record and the High Court, as observed by the Apex Court in AIR 1967 SC p. 1 and AIR 1993 SC 1014, is fully competent to correct its own error. THE other decisions cited are reported in 2002 Vol. 6 SCJ, ALR Vol. 46 2298 and AIR 1987 SC 1160, and it has been canvassed that the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge cannot be reviewed by another Single Judge. I have considered the ratio flowing from the decisions cited above in all its pros and cons. I do not consider it necessary to refer to them to avoid swelling the judgment except to acknowledge that I have derived considerable assistance from them. Before coming to grips with the analytical examination of the submissions made across the bar, I would prefer to go into the tenability of the submissions on the question of maintainability of review petition. In this context, Order XXXVII, Rule 1 of the CPC may be excepted below : "1. Application for review of judgment.- (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved - (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred, (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order. (2) A party is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court the case on which he applies for the review. Explanation.-The fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior Court in any other case shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment. " The sheet-anchor case on the point of power of review under Article 226 of the Constitution is Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1909. The Supreme Court in that case observed that the power of review to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors inhered in High Court of plenary jurisdiction and that there was nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude the High Court from exercising it. Yet another case germane to the controversy is the decision in M. M. Thomas v. State of Kerala, (2000) 1 SCC 666, and the relevant observations are contained in para 14 of the decision which are excerpted below : "the High Court as a Court of record, as envisaged in Article 215 of the Constitution, must have inherent powers to correct the records. A Court of record envelops all such powers whose acts and proceedings are to be enrolled in a perpetual memorial and testimony. A Court of record is undoubtedly a superior Court which is itself competent to determine the scope of its jurisdiction. The High Court, as a Court of record, has a duty to itself to keep all its records correctly and in accordance with law. Hence, if any apparent error is noticed by the High Court in respect of any orders passed by it the High Court has not only power, but a duty to correct it. The High Court's power in that regard is plenary. In Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharastra, a nine-Judge Bench of this Court has recognised the aforesaid superior status of the High Court as a Court of plenary jurisdiction being a Court of record. " As would appear, the decision was rendered considering with approval the nine Judge Bench decision in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar, AIR 1967 SC 1. The observation made in the said case may also be quoted below for ready reference : "the High Court in India are superior Courts of record. They have original and appellate jurisdiction. They have inherent and plenary powers. Unless expressly or impliedly barred, and subject to the appellate or discretionary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the High Courts have unlimited jurisdiction. . . . . " It would thus crystallise that the point is no longer open to doubt or debate and the contentions of the learned Counsel for the Opp. Parties do not commend to me for acceptance.
(3.) I have perused the record and have analytically examined the submissions made across the bar. It would transpire that the impugned judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No. 32939 of 1992 was passed on the assumption that the judgment of this Court dated 19th August, 1989 in Writ Petition No. 6858 of 1985 and in the petitions knit together with the said petition had not been observed in compliance. From the materials on record in review petition, it is apparent that the judgment of the Court rendered in Writ Petition No. 32939 of 1992 had already been complied with and in accordance with the directions as embodied in the said judgment, a fresh list was prepared and office memorandum was issued on 3-3-1997. It is also evident from the said office memorandum that the respondents in the instant case were not declared successful in the impugned selection proceedings. Nothing has been squeezed out to indicate that the petitioner had canvassed the validity of the order dated 3-3-1997. In any forum including invoking the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. From the materials on record, it is crystal clear that the directions of the Court made in Writ Petition No. 6858 of 1985 had been fully complied with and as a consequence list was also prepared in which the name of the respondents did not figure in the list of the successful candidates and as such, the judgment in the case appears to have been induced by ignorance of material facts and evidence. The factum of discovery of evidences which go to the root of the matter and which could not be adduced and produced before the Court at the time of hearing would furnish foundation for review of the judgment and in the facts and circumstances stated supra, I am of the view that it is an error apparent on the face of the record and lends justification for review of the impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge. At this stage, learned Counsel for the respondents canvassed that it has come in the affidavit filed in support of the review petitioner that the relevant document was in possession of the Electricity Board and in case the document was not entrusted to the Counsel representing the Electricity Board in the said petition, proceeds the submission, this cannot be a ground for discovery of new evidence and review petition is liable to be dismissed. He further submitted that the statement given by the learned Counsel that the judgment rendered in Mandeep Singh's case cannot be taken aid of to be applied and the judgment rendered as a consequence of this statement cannot be reviewed. Learned Counsel for the petitioner canvassed that the matter was lingering for decision before this Court since long and as such there was want of awareness in relation to compliance of the directions in the judgment of Mandeep Singh and preparation of fresh list of selected persons and therefore this was a bona fide mistake. He further submitted that the relevant document was not within his possession and when the order was sent thereafter, it was intimated that the order has already been complied with and the statement of the learned Counsel for the petitioners that it was not complied with was given in ignorance of the material facts. The learned Counsel embarked upon clarificatory details stating that as the order was passed on the hypothesis that judgment rendered in Mandeep Singh's case had not been complied with and therefore contesting respondents were not entitled to be extended the benefit of promotion albeit the fact that the order had already been complied with and contesting respondents were not selected and found fit for promotion. He further submitted that the matter commends itself for review on this ground as well.;