B.K.Rathi - (1.) -The petitioner was working as Professor and Head of the Department in Gorakhpur University and retired on 30th June, 1990, after attaining the age of superannuation. He did not vacate the official residence allotted to him. Therefore, his provident fund and other pensionary benefits were withheld. The petitioner, therefore, filed a Writ Petition No. 30428 of 1997 which was allowed by the Division Bench of this Court by the judgment and order dated 17.8.1998. The following direction was given as mentioned in the last two paragraphs of the judgment which is quoted below : "Thus, withholding of the pension of the petitioner for the period between Ist July, 1990 and 30th September, 1997 and of the other retiral benefits, such as the provident fund is clearly illegal. Further in view of the illegal withholding of the retiral benefits the petitioner would be entitled to penal interest of 18% on the amount due to him. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The respondents generally, and the respondent No. 4 in particular, are directed to pay or cause to pay to the petitioner the entire pension and provident fund due to him together with penal interest at the rate of 18% within a period of two months to be computed from today. There is no order as to costs."
(2.) ADMITTEDLY, after the order, the pension and provident fund due to the petitioner has been paid. The dispute in this contempt petition is whether the interest is payable at the rate of 18% from the date the amount became due till the date of the payment. The petitioner claims the same, which comes to Rs. 3,41,635 according to the calculation chart filed by the petitioner. However, the opposite parties have paid interest amounting to Rs. 53,730 only. It is alleged that it is amount at 18% awarded. It is not disputed that the other amounts of provident fund and retiral benefits, etc. awarded by the judgment have been paid. The only dispute is regarding the payment of the interest and the question for decision is whether the same has not been paid in accordance with the judgment. I have heard Dr. R. G. Padia, learned senior advocate for the petitioner and Shri Dilip Gupta for the opposite parties. It has been argued by Dr. R. G. Padia that the law provides that interest is payable on any amount, which has not been paid from the date when it became due. That the direction in the judgment was to pay the amount with interest at the rate of 18% within two months. The appeal preferred by the respondents against the said judgment was also dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to the certain judgments and has argued that it has been repeatedly held that the interest is also payable from the date the amount becomes due. The first case referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner is between K. Manick Chand v. E. Saleh Mohammed, AIR 1969 SC 671. The Apex Court in this case has held that arrears of interest mean interest calculated up-to-date of decree. The other case referred to is the decision of Apex Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Gangadhar Vishwanath Ranade, AIR 1990 SC 185. It was held that the interest under Section 38 of the Insurance Act is payable from the date of maturity. If there is delay in the payment, the interest is payable from the date of maturity of the policy.
(3.) THE next case referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner is the decision in the case of O. P. Gupta v. Union of India and others, AIR 1987 SC 2257. In this case, there was delay in the payment of pension. It was held that it is settled practice to allow 12% interest on the amount from the date it became due for the delayed payment. THE last case referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner is the decision of the Apex Court in Vijay L. Mehrotra v. State of U. P., (2000) 2 UPLBEC 1599. In this case, it was held where there is delay in payment of retiral benefits, the State is bound to pay simple interest at the rate of 18% per annum. In my opinion, there is no dispute regarding principles of law laid down in the above cases. However, the petitioner cannot be awarded any amount in this contempt petition on the basis of above decisions nor it could be seen as to what should have been awarded by the Court according to law in the writ petition. I am not required to examine the correctness of the judgment and to record finding as to what should have been awarded in the writ petition. I also cannot grant anything, which has not been granted in the writ petition on the ground that law requires that it should have been granted. Only it is to be seen as to what has been granted in the writ petition.;