- (1.) D. P. Singh, J. Heard Sri Sameer Sharma, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Ms. Suman Sirohi, for the respondents.
(2.) THIS writ petition is directed against an award dated 25th July, 1983 directing the reinstatement of the respondent workman with full back wages and continuity of service. Brief facts necessary for decision of this writ petition are that respondent No. 3 was appointed as temporary conductor for a fixed term w. e. f. 21-2-1973 to 28-2-1973. This engagement was extended from time to time and remained valid uptil 31st of October, 1974. Always a condition remained in the said appointment letter,which is annexed alongwith the writ petition "that the services are purely temporary and can be terminated of any time without any notice and assigning only reason thereof. " On an over all assessment of his work, the temporary engagement of the workman was terminated on 4-9- 1974 after giving one month's notice/pay. The workman approached the Civil Court challenging his termination in suit No. 322 of 1974. While the suit remained pending U. P. Public Services Tribunal's Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as Services Tribunal Act) came into force and in view of Section 6 (2) the suit stood transferred to the Tribunal and was registered as claim No. 668 of 1976. Before the Tribunal, an objection with respect to jurisdiction was raised by the petitioner when the workman added grounds with regard to retrenchment etc. However,the said objection of the petitioner was rejected in view of a decision of this Court and also the claim of the workman was dismissed vide order dated 27th April, 1977. Aggrieved the workman filed writ petition before this Court against the order of the Tribunal but the said writ petition was dismissed vide order dated 3-1-1978. It is urged that in the writ petition specific ground of violation of the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act was also taken. Having failed in the first innings, the workman approached the Conciliation Officer challenging the termination in spite of objections on behalf of the petitioner, the Conciliation Officer submitted a failure report and the State Government referred the dispute under Section 4-K to the labour Court which registered the same as adjudication case No. 58 of 1952. After filing of the respective statement and documents and recording of evidence, the labour Court struck four issues which were to the following effect : " (1) Whether the instant case is barred on the principles of res judicata in view of the decision of the Public Services Tribunal in case No. 668 (ii)/76 and of the Hon'ble High Court in Civil Misc. Writ No. 781 of 1977? (2) Whether the reference is bad in law as alleged in para 16 of the written statement of the employers? (3) Whether the reference is barred by limitation? If so, its effect? (4) To what relief, if any, is workman entitled?
(3.) THE labour Court on issue No. 2 held that in view of Section 2-A the dispute is deemed to be an Industrial Dispute irrespective of the fact that no demand was raised or notice given to the petitioner. While deciding Issue No. 3, it found that since the workman was agitating the matter before different forum, therefore, the reference was not hit by laches. While disposing of Issue No. 4 it came to the conclusion that since it was an Industrial Disputes, therefore, only the labour Court could grant any relief as common and, general law questions were not involved. THEreafter, the labour Court went on to hold that termination of the workman amounted to retrenchment and as the conditions were not complied with, the termination was illegal. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the labour Court erred in holding that in view of Section 2-A of the Act, the termination was deemed to be an Industrial Dispute, because Section 2-A was not on the statute book on the date when the termination took place, thus it would not apply to the present case. The contention is bound to be rejected. The apex Court while considering somewhat in similar situation, in the case of Ruston and Hamsby v. T. B. Kadam, 1976 (3) SCC 71, held that if on the date of reference Section 2-A was in the statute book, it would apply even though the termination took place prior to this date.;