S.N.SRIVASTAVA, J. - (1.) PETITIONER in the instant case being in the service of Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti as Class 4 employee at Azamgarh, has instituted the present petition for the relief of a writ of certiorari quashing the impugned notice of retirement dated 16.6.2003 and further for a relief of mandamus to issue a notification in terms of notification dated 27 -6 -2002 thereby extending the age of superannuation from 58 years to 60 years in relation to employees working in the U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti U.P.
(2.) IT has not been repudiated that the petitioner a Class 4 employee in the Krishi Mandi Samiti Azamgarh is governed by statutory regulations known as U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti (Centralised) Service Regulations, 1984 from a perusal of which it transpires that the age of retirement envisaged in the regulations is 58 years. It also brooks no dispute that the aforestated Regulation has not undergone any amendment unto this date. The learned Counsel has founded his submission on Notification No. G -2 -605/X -5341 dated 27 -6 -2002 (Annexure 1 to the petition) which purports to have been issued by the State of U.P. thereby amending the Fundamental Rules as a consequence of which the age of retirement has come to be enhanced from 58 years to 60 years and canvassed that the petitioner nurtured a legitimate expectation that being a public servant, he will also be able to continue in the service of Mandi Samiti and will be superannuated upon attaining the age of 60 years. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the respondents counteracted the submissions stating that the separate Rules and Regulations have been framed for application to the employees of the U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti and thus their service conditions are governed by U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti (Centralised) Service Regulations, 1984 and Regulation 46 (1) and as such, the provisions of amended Fundamental Rules cannot be imported for application to the employees of Mandi Samiti. The learned Counsel further canvassed that there is no question of legitimate expectation operating in this regard inasmuch as proceeds the submission, there was no legitimate basis for nursing such legitimate expectation. It is no doubt true that the Mandi Samiti created by or established under the Uttar Pradesh Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam is 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and the terms and conditions of service of an employee of Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti are governed by statutory regulations framed under the Act. The petitioner being an employee of Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, was governed by the terms and conditions of service including appointment, disciplinary proceeding and age of superannuation prescribed in the said Regulations framed under the Act. The regulations so framed impose statutory obligation on the U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti as well as on the petitioner not to deviate from the terms and conditions of the service. It would thus transpire that the petitioner being governed by the U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti (Centralised) Service Regulations, 1984, cannot reap dividend from the amendment made in the U.P. Fundamental Rules by means of notification dated 27.6.2002. The Court was seized of similar controversy in various decisions rendered including Writ Petition No. 34555 of 2002, Lal Bahadur v. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Kanpur, 2003 (50) ALR 303, and Writ Petition No. 6804 of 2002, Ram Naresh Nigam v. Director, Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad U.P. Lucknow and Others, and in all these petitions, the controversy has been given quietus by prolix discussions on the point.
(3.) THE second contention of the learned Counsel that the petitioner owing to amendment in the Fundamental Rules, had a legitimate expectation that he would continue in the service of the Mandi Samiti upto the age of 60 years. In connection with this proposition, it is necessary that whether the petitioner was justified in nurturing legitimate expectation as consequence of amendment in the Fundamental Rules. The sine qua non for legitimate expectation is that it must be legitimate and there should be legitimate hope and desire of a person to obtain a favourable order. In R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex -parte Ruddock, 1987 (2) All. ER 518, Taylor, J. held as under: The doctrine of legitimate expectation in essence imposes a duty to act fairly. Whilst most of the cases are concerned as Lord Roskill said, with a right to be heard, I do not think the doctrine is so confined. Indeed, in a case where ex -hypothesi, there is no right to be heard, it may be thought the more important to fair dealing with a promise or undertaking given by a minister as to how he will proceed should be kept. Of course such promise or undertaking must not conflict with his statutory duty or his duty as here in the exercise of a prerogative power. In the instant case, the petitioner was fully aware that his service conditions are governed by the U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti (Centralised) Service Regulations, 1984 and the amendment in the Fundamental Rules does not amount to automatic amendment in the Service Regulations, 1984 nor the Counsel has drawn attention of the Court to any such promise or undertaking of the Government warranting expectation that the Mandi Samiti Service Regulations, 1984 would also undergo amendment as a consequence of the amendment in the Fundamental Rules. As a matter of fact, there was no visible legal right accruing to the petitioner as a result of amendment in the fundamental Rules involving legitimate expectation. In State of Kerala v. K.G. Madhavan Pillai, AIR 1989 SC 49, the ratio flowing from the said decision was that a person obtaining a right by reason of an intermediate order, may seek protection of his legitimate expectation. In the instant case, the Court has not been called upon to refer to any decision, assurances or promise preceding the impugned order which could furnish foundation for such legitimate expectation. In the above conspectus there is no element which could legitimize the expectation of the petitioner and as such the contention of the learned Counsel has no cutting edge. No further argument of substance has been propounded in this regard and as such, it does not commend to me for acceptance. ;