N.L.Ganguli, J. - (1.) This petition is for issuing a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to produce resignation letter dated October 7, 1991 and quash the same, besides the relief that the respondents be directed not to deny duty and wages of the post to the petitioner without complying the provisions of law and to pay entire salary to the petitioner w.e.f. December 1, 1991. According to the petitioner's allegations itself, the petitioner was initially appointed as a labourer in the U.P. State Textile Corporation Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation). In December, 1986, he was promoted to the post of Helper, after 8 months of his initial appointment. No letter of appointment was issued to him. He continued to work as 'Karigar' (operative) with the respondents. A copy of the attendance card issued by respondent No. 2 in the month of October, 1991, has been filed as annexure. It is stated that the petitioner was elected Vice-President of the Union of the workmen of the Corporation in the year 1991. Though there was no strike or industrial unrest, the respondents became annoyed on the legitimate action of the petitioner. On October 7, 1991, Sri Suresh Sharma, Senior Mill Engineer and Sri. B.N. Chaturvedi, Security Officer, forced the petitioner to write resignation letter. The petitioner under coercion had written the resignation letter. Of course, on October 8, 1991, he submitted a complaint to the Dy. Labour Commissioner, Haldwani, Nainital, against the aforesaid persons for getting resignation letter written under coercion and threat. The petitioner, after the resignation, is not being permitted to enter the premises of the mill in question. He made various representations to the S.D.M., Minister concerned, Chairman of the Corporation etc. for redress, but without success, hence the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, for the reliefs already mentioned.
(2.) Admittedly, the petitioner had been working in an industrial organisation and he has challenged the illegal termination/removal by obtaining resignation letter from him under coercion. The question posed by the Court was about the maintainability of the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in respect of a matter directly covered and cognisable under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) before the Labour Court as held in the Full Bench case of Chandrama Singh, (1991 Lab IC 2413). The learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out paragraph 18 of the writ petition, which is being quoted as under: "That the petitioner through Union has remedy of raising an Industrial Dispute which is much dilatory and reference of dispute to the Labour Court cannot be claimed as matter of right by the petitioner because the same is within the sole discretion of the State Government hence the remedy of raising the industrial dispute could not be said to be efficacious remedy. Since the respondents have violated the fundamental right of petitioner, guaranteed under the Constitution of India, hence the present writ petition is being filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India being more efficacious remedy." The petitioner admitted that he has remedy of raising industrial dispute under the Act, but the relief is a dilatory one. He also stated that the reference to the dispute to the Labour Court cannot be claimed as a matter of right by the petitioner because the same is within the sole discretion of the State Government, hence the relief cannot be said to be an efficacious remedy. After hearing the petitioner, the Court was not satisfied about the statement that the dispute cannot be referred at the instance of the workmen as it was the sole discretion of the State Government. The petitioner is not correct in saying that the discretion of the State Government is without a remedy. It is always expected that the State Government would exercise the discretion vested in it by law in a legal manner. Further, factual aspects stated by the petitioner in the writ petition are such which would require evidence and appreciation of evidence, which cannot possibly be done in proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. The petitioner had not been able to satisfy the Court that the remedy under the Act was not adequate alternative remedy available to the petitioner, hence this court indicated that it was not inclined to interfere in the alleged illegal termination of the petitioner's employment in the Corporation. The Court was of the view that the petitioner has not been able to establish that the bar of alternative remedy has been shown to be removed by the petitioner by showing such facts and circumstances in the petition.
(3.) The court was proceeding to dismiss the writ petition on the ground of alternative remedy but the learned counsel for the petitioner requested that he shall submit written argument and place certain case laws to overcome the legal hurdle posed before him by the recent Full Bench judgment in Chandrama Singh's case (supra). He submitted a written argument reiterating the facts already stated in the writ petition. It was pointed out that: (1) A workman has no right to raise an industrial dispute in service matter. Except when his service is terminated or dismissed, then he can move application to reconciliation under Rule 2 of the U.P. Conciliation Order of 1948 and in other matter, he is dependent on the mercy of the Union and if the Union refuses to entertain his case, then he has no remedy available; (2) The workman cannot approach the Labour Court directly for settlement of or adjudication of grievances, unless he moves for conciliation to the Conciliation Officer under the Act which is a time consuming process; (3) It is the Conciliation Officer who may send the report under Rule 4 of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Rules, 1957, to the State Government under Section 4-K of the Act. He further pointed out that it is the discretion of the State Government to make a reference under Section 4-K; (4) The Labour Court has no power to pronounce its award. The award has to be sent to the State Government for publication; (5) The Government has power to publish the award or withhold the publication and no time limit has been fixed under Section 63 of the U.P. Act; and (6) The Government is empowered under Section 6-A(1) of the U.P. Act not to enforce the award under Section 6-A(2), (3) of the Act. Thus, the State Government is empowered to annul the award. The award after publication is enforceable after 30 days of the award. Thus the argument of the learned counsel is that the provisions of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act cannot be said to be quick and efficacious remedy.;