P.P.Gupta - (1.) BY this petition, the petitioner Hira Lal who is an elected Pradhan of Gaon Sabha Aurangabad, Block Orai, Tehsil Gyanpur district Varanasi has prayed for a writ of certiorari quashing the suspension order dated 6th April 1991 (Annexure 3 to the writ petition) passed by Sub Divisional Officer, respondent No. 3.
(2.) THE petitioner was elected Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha continuously for two terms. At the instance of the Addl. District Magistrate (Administration), Gyanpur the respondent no. 3 suspended him on 6th October, 1990 This order was challenged by the petitioner in a writ petition which was allowed by this Court on 9th November 1990 and the suspension order dated 6th October, 1990 was quashed. A copy of the said order of the court is Annexure 2 to the writ petition. Again by an order dated 6th April 1991, the respondent no. 3 suspended the petitioner. Annexure No 3 is the copy of suspension order. THE contention of the petitioner is that he has been suspended on similar grounds without affording an opportunity of hearing and further the respondent no. 3 has relied on the enquiry made by the A.D.M. (Administration) Gyanpur and without application of mind has suspended him by the impugned order. With the consent of the parties, the petition was heard finally at the stage of admission. The first submission made on behalf of the petitioner was that he was not afforded order. Unlike under clause (g) there is no parallel provision under section 95 (1) (gg) of the U. P. Panchayat Raj Act to give an opportunity of hearing before passing the suspension order against a Pradhan. This view has been taken in an earlier case Salig Ram v. Collector, 1985 ALJ 1267 and recently also in the case of Gopi Singh v. State of U. P., 1991 ALJ 85. Thus there is no force in the argument and the impugned order does not vitiate on the ground that no opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner before passing the impugned order.
(3.) THE second contention of the petitioner is that the impugned order is not based on any prima facie satisfaction of the existence of grounds under clause (g) of section 95 (1) of the Act but is based on the enquiry made against the petitioner by the A.D.M. (Administration). I have gone through the impugned order which is Annexure No. 3 to the writ petition. It mentions that the S DO. himself went to the spot and made an enquiry regarding the charges levelled against the petitioner. On the basis of this enquiry he was prima facie satisfied that the ground for his removal under clause (g) exist. It was only after that prima facie satisfaction, that the order of suspension was passed against the petitioner. On the face of this order, it cannot, therefore, be said that the impugned order has been passed on the basis of the enquiry made by the ADM. (Administration). The last submission made on, behalf of the petitioner was that there was no material before the respondent no. 2 to base his prima facie satisfaction regarding the existence of grounds under clause g) of section 95 (1) of the Act. Suspension under section 95 (1) (gg) of the Act is passed during pendency of the enquiry against the Pradhan. As against such an order of suspension revision lies which, in my opinion, is also an efficacious remedy Whether there was actual prima facie satisfaction of the Prescribed Authority or not before passing the impugned order can more appropriately be decided by revisional court where whole record is available and both factual and legal controvercies are decided. In view of the fact that the petitioner has an alternative remedy of filing a revision under the Act itself, there is no exceptional or extra ordinary circumstances of the case, calling for interference in the matter without relegating the petitioner to follow alternative remedy of filing revision.;