S.P.Srivastava - (1.) BEING aggrieved by the decision of the appellate authority, affirming the order passed by the Prescribed Authority, where under the accomodation in dispute had been released in favour of the landlord respondent in the proceedings initiated by biro in the year 1978 under section 21 (1) (a) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act') the petitioner tenant has cow approached this court by means of the present writ petition for redress seeking the quashing of the aforesaid orders.
(2.) THE accommodation in dispute which is being utilised by the petitioner tenant for business purposes was sought to be released for satisfying the need of the landlord's son to establish him independently in the lawyer's profession for which according to the landlord he bonafide needed the space for chamber end library. THE release application was contested by the petitioner tenant on various grounds denying the allegations made in the release application and asserting thai the need set up by the landlord was not a bonafide one as the landlord had at his disposal sufficient accommodation which could very well be utilised for satisfying the alleged requirement It was also asserted that the tenant petitioner who had been running his business in the accommodation in dispute for a period of 25 years will be put to a greater hardship in the case of the grant of release as compared to the hardships likely to be suffered by the landlord in the event of the rejection of the said application. The Prescribed Authority after carefully considering the evidence and the materials on the record came to the conclusion that the tenant was carrying op the business of mating silver in the accommodation in dispute for the past about 20 years and that the son of the landlord for whose requirement the release was sought was an Advocate with a standing of five or six years and his requirement for establishing a chamber and a library was genuine. The prescribed authority further recorded a finding that the tenant had acquired a piece of vacant land near the Nagar Palika road and there were several shops which were available to him where he could easily continue his business. The prescribed Authority further found that the tenant was a famous person and wellknown to the bullion merchants who were his customers and taking into consideration the nature of business carried on by him which was only the melting of the silver, there was no likelihood of his business being adversely affected in the event of the change of place In as much as, the tenant will carry his reputations with him. The prescribed authority further recorded a finding that the landlord did not have at his disposal any other accommodation which could satisfy the requirement for which the release was sought. While considering the question of relative hardships, the prescribed authority had accepted the case of the landlord that the tenant No. 1 had wound up his business In district Deoria and had shifted to Bombay. In this connection, the prescribed authority had taken into account the fact that the tenant petitioner no 1 had never put in appearance on any of the date fixed in the case and had also not filed any affidavit. The prescribed authority had placed reliance on the affidavit of Ranglal, tenant petitioner no. 2 where in he had admitted that Sri Subharao tenant petitioner no. 1 had started business in Bombay. The prescribed authority had also took note of the fact that the tenant petitioners had taken no step to obtain the vacant shops which bad become available, in view of the aforesaid findings, the prescribed authority allowed the application for release of the accomodation in dispute as claimed. The findings recorded by the prescribed authority were affirmed by the appellate authority. The appellate authority found that the son of the petitioner was independently practising as an Advocate and In connection with his profession as an Advocate, be did bonafide require a chamber and the library and the need for the purpose as set up by the landlord was genuine and bonafide. The appellate authority further found that the landlord did not have at his disposal any such accommodation which could satisfy the requirement of his son. The appellate authority also took into account the fact that taking into consideration, she extent of accommodation required for satisfying the need of the son of the landlord the nature and extent of the alternative accommodation suggested by the tenant, which according to him could be utilised for the purpose, was wholly insufficient and could not therefore meet the requirement. On the question relating to comparative hardships, the appellate authority came to the conclusion that for want of chamber and library the son of the landlord could not establish himself in the profession chosen by him and will be put to a greater hardship as compared to the tenant. It was found that the hardships likely to be suffered by the landlord in the event of the rejection of the application will be much greater as compared to the hardship likely to be suffered by the tenant in the event of the grant of the release application. The appeal filed by the learnt was therefore, dismissed.
(3.) I have heard Sri T. P. Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioner Shri Shashi Nandan, learned Counsel, representing the landlord respondent and have carefully perused record. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the finding returned by the authorities below on the question relating to the bonafide requirement of the landlord is perverse and stand vitiated on account of errors apparent on the face of the record. In this connection, it has been asserted that the landlord had voluntarily vacated a shop In his tenancy which accomodation If retained could very well satisfy the alleged requirement It has been urged that the mere fact that the landlord voluntarily gave up the possession of a business accomodation, which could be utilised for satisfying the alleged need was more than sufficient to indicate that the need for the accommodation in dispute was not genuine and had been set up with a purpose to oust the tenant and not for satisfying the need of his son. In this connection the learned Counsel has heavily relied upon an application dated 29-11-1980 filed by Tarkeshwar Prasad, landlord respondent in P. A. Case no. 7 of 1980, the proceedings where of were initiated by Krishna Mureri Chhabariya seeking release of the accommodation in the tenancy of Tarkeshwar Prasad. A perusal of the aforesaid application shows that Tarkeshwar Prasad had admitted the genuineness of the need set op by Krishna Murary Chhabariya for the release of the accommodation and had admitted that the requirement for the release was a bonafide one. From the aforesaid application, ft is also clear that Tarkeshwar Prasad had vacated the said accommodation. There is so dispute that Krishna Murari Chhabariya had initiated the proceedings seeking release of an accommodation which was in the tenancy of the present landlord and was being utilised for the business purpose. There is nothing on the record to indicate that the prescribed authority had granted the release sought for by Krishna Murari Chhabariya without determining the question relating to the bonafide requirement and the relative hardships. The petitioner tenant cannot derive any advantage out of the aforesaid application in as much as, it is not expected that tenant will unnecessarily put In a false contest. If the tenant was satisfied that the claim of the landlord for the release of an accomodation under his tenancy is genuine and he will suffer greater hardship, it is open to the tenant to come forward with the truth and no contest is needed in that event. The release of an accommodation as envisaged under section 21 (1) (a) of the Act is granted when the requisite conditions contemplated there under are satisfied. Since It is admitted that the accommodation which was the subject matter of P.A. Case No. 7 of 1980 had been released, the mere fact that Tarkeshwar Prasad had not put in any contest thereunder cannot lead to an inference that the requirement set op in the present proceeding was not a bonafide one. In this connection it may be noticed that the prescribed authority as well as the appellate authority have clearly recorded a finding that the proceedings of the P.A. Case No. 7 of 1980 were not collusive at all. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has further contended that the wife of the landlord had her house near the accomodation in dispute which was situated just across the road and there was sufficient alternative accommodation which could be utilised for the purpose of satisfying the alleged need of the son of the landlord. In this connection, it may be noticed that the accommodation which can be deemed to be available to a landlord for satisfying the requirement which is the foundation for seeking the release must be an accommodation which is at the disposal of the landlord in respect whereof he has an immediate right of possession. The accommodation which is owned and occupied by another person cannot be taken to be such an accommodation which is at the disposal of the landlord. In such a circumstance, the house owned by the wife of the landlord cannot be deemed to be an accommodation which could be said to be at the disposal of the landlord.;