S.P.Srivastava - (1.) THIS writ petition is directed against the order passed by the respondent no. 1 whereunder allowing the revision filed by the landlord-respondents, the suit filed by them for ejectment of the petitioner from the premises In dispute has been decreed reversing the decree passed by the trial court to that extent and modifying the said decree for recovery of arrears of rent by reducing the decretal amount from Rs. 1719.50 P., to Rs. 1666/- only. The petitioner-tenant has approached this Court challenging the aforesaid decree passed by the revisional court and has sought for the quashing thereof so far as it relates to the eviction from the accommodation in question.
(2.) THE facts giving rise to the present writ petition which are not in dispute are that initially the building in question had been let out to Municipal Board, Farrukhabad. THE tenancy of this tenant was terminated vide the composite notice envisaged under section 20 (2) (a) of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction), Act, 1972 (U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972) dated 27-11-71 which was served on the defendant on 9-12-71. In the notice it has been alleged that the tenant had committed default In paying the rent for the period 1-3-67 to 31-10-71. THE suit was filed on 26-3-72 on the assertions that inspite of the service of the notice the tenant had neither paid arrears of rent nor vacated the premises hence the suit. During the pendency of the suit section 18-A was added in the U. P. Basio Education Act, 1972 It appears that in view of the amendment brought in the U. P. Basic Education Act, 1972. the plaintiff respondents got amended the plaint and added the U. P. Board of Basic Education, Lucknow as defendant no. 2 and sought for the same relief even against this defendant which had initially been claimed against the originally impleaded defendant no. 1. The trial court while considering the question as to whether the suit was bad for want of valid notice of demand and quit came to the conclusion that the notice relied upon by the plaintiffs was illegal and bad In law on the ground that the plaintiffs had not specifically required the defendant to pay the arrears of rent within 30 days from the date of service of notice. The trial court, therefore, was of the view that forwant of valid notice the plaintiffs were not entitled to a decree for eviction as claimed. The trial court recorded a finding that the defendants had not. paid rent at the rate of Rs. 45/- per month for the period 1-3-67 to 31-10-71 as well as for the period 1-11-71 to 31-3-72 Inspite of the claim of the plaintiff about the defendants being in arrears of rent for a period of more than four months and inspite of the fact that their tenancy had been terminated, the suit far eviction was dismissed on the ground indicated above. The revisional court reversed the finding recorded by the trial court on the question relating to the validity of the notice holding that it was not necessary that the notice should say that rent should be paid within 30 days of its service and the tenant will become a defaulter within the meaning of section 20 (2) (a) of the Act if he does not make the requisite payment within 30 days of the service of the notice. The revisional court was of the view that the composite notice terminating the tenancy and demanding the payment of arrears of rent was valid. I have heard Sri S. N. Upadhyay, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Prakash. Krishna, learned counsel appearing for the respondent landlord.
(3.) THE sole ground on which the learned counsel for the petitioner has challenged the impugned decree of eviction passed against the petitioner tenant is that the defendant no. 2, the pre*ent petitioner, had become tenant of the accommodation in dispute by virtue of section 18-A which was inserted In the U. P. Basic Education Act, 1972 (U. P. Act no. 34 of 1972) by section 31 of U. P. Act no 5 of 1972 and was to be deemed always to have been inserted as such. Consequently, it was urged that the composite notice issued by landlord against the originally Impleaded defendant no 1, who had ceased to have any tenancy rights in the accommodation in dispute could not be utilised for maintaining the suit against the defendant no. 2 and passing a decree of eviction against him on its basis. It has been asserted that in the circumstances the tenancy of the defendant no. 2 could not be deemed to have been terminated at all and in the absence of any notice contemplated under section 20 (2) (a) of the U. P. Act no. 13 of 1972 having been issued against the defendant no. 2, the suit for its ejectment was liable to be dismissed. In support of his argument, the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon heavily on the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yasodai Ammal, AIR 1979 SC 1745. The learned council for the landlord respondent has urged that section 18-A as inserted in the D. P. Basic Education Act, 1972 has no such effect as alleged. It has farther been asserted that in the present case the notice terminating the tenancy of defendant no. 1 had been issued and served on the defendant no. 1 much before the passing of U. P. Act no. 34 of 1972 and the suit having been filed on 26-3-72, the provisions contained In order XXII rule 10 of the CPC. stood clearly attracted. It has been assarted that on the application filed by the plaintiffs the trial court had permitted the impleadment of the defendant no 2 and the requisite leave of the court to continue the suit against defendant no. 2 stood granted as envisaged under the aforesaid provision. In the circumstances, therefore, it is urged that there is no infirmity in the order passed by the revisional court which may justify any Interference therein. The learned counsel has further asserted that the case of V. Dhanapal Chettiar (supra) was considered in a later decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Gian Devi (supra) and taking into consideration the latter decision of the Apex Court it is apparent that the decision in the case of V. Dhannpal Chettiar has no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case.;