S.R.Singh - (1.) HEARD Smt. Ramo Devi Gupta for the petitioners and Sri P. K. Jain, learned counsel appearing for the respondents.
(2.) PETITION in hand is directed against an order dated 6-2-1991 whereby the Prescribed Authority rejected the: application moved on behalf of the petitioner for issuance of commission for local inspection. The order in question being an interlocutory order, I am not inclined to interfere with it. The petitioner shall be at liberty to urge its necessity before the appellate court if an occasion arises for that in appeal against the final order of the Prescribed Authority for in the matter of issuing commission for local inspection, the powers of appellate authority are as wide as that of the Prescribed Authority. In Rent Control matters arising out of proceedings under U. P. Act 13 of 1972 it would not be a sound exercise of discretion to interfere In interlocutory matters under Article 226 of the Const, except in cases where non-interference may result in miscarriage or failure of justice. The case in hand is not a case; of that type. Smt. Ramo Devi Gupta however, contended before me that the petitioners apprehend that as soon as an order is passed by the Prescribed Authority for release under Section 2.1 of the Act, the petitioners shall be vulnerable to being dispossessed. This apprehension of the learned counsel proceeds upon an unfounded fallacy inasmuch as according to Section 21 (6) of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972, the tenancy would stand terminated only after expiry of 30 days from the date of order under sub-section (1) or sub-section (1-A) or sub-section (2) of the said section. Having due regard to this provision, there should be no apprehension as to the fact that as soon as the order is passed by the Prescribed Authority against the petitioner, they would be evicted forthwith. Smt. Ramo Devi Gupta then contended before me that in the District Ghaziabad, the tenants as a practice, are evicted after the appellate judgment without affording them any reasonable time for seeking remedy before the High Court by way of a writ petition. In the background of this apprehension, it was urged by Smt. Gupta that appeal being a continuation of the original proceedings, the period of one month contemplated by Sub-section (6) of Section 21 of the Act for determination of tenancy would in the event of appeal being filed and decided, be reckonable from the date of appellate order as in that event the order of the Prescribed Authority stands merged in the appellate order.
(3.) HAVING considered the submissions made by Smt. Gupta, I am of the opinion that at the moment I find no justification to say anything about the aforesaid apprehension being nourished by the petitioners. Rather the apprehension seems to be imaginary one based on ignorance. However, at urged by the learned counsel, I may explain the legal position in this regard which may help dispel the petitioners.' apprehension. In cases where release of the building Is allowed in favour of landlord for the first time by the appellate court, the period prescribed for statutory determination of tenancy under section 21 (6) of the Act would begin to run from the date of appellate order and the tenant would be entitled to remain in occupation of the building, as of right, for a period of one month from the date of appellate order until the tenancy gets statutorily determined on expiry of thirty days' period from the date of the appellate order of release. There is therefore, no danger of being thrown out of the building immediately on passing of the release order by the lower appellate court in the above situation. In case, however, the release under section 21 of the Act is allowed by the prescribed Authority, the tenant may file appeal and obtain stay of his eviction under Section 22 read! with section 10 of the Act. Section 10 (2) of the Act empowers the appellate court to stay the operation of the release order and since the appeal lies on questions of fact and law both, the appellate court, it may be assumed, invariably stays the operation of the release order and with the operation of the release order being stayed. The running of thirty days' period prescribed for statutory determination of tenancy would get arrested and it would begin to run again from the point of its arrest only on the stay order being vacated and as stated above, the stay order is normally not vacated until the disposal of appeal and, therefore, the tenant way have still some time left out of the period prescribed for determination of his tenancy. During this left out period the tenants' occupation in the premises is secured and he may seek his remedy against the appellate Order in the meantime.;