R. A. Sharma, J. - (1.) MUNICIPAL Board Vrindaban district Mathura (hereinafter referred to as the Board) was constituted in November. 1988 President of the Board convened a meeting of the Board for March 4. 1989 for electing Senior and Junior Vice Presidents. According to the petitioners the said meeting was adjourned on account of the death of a respectable citizen, after passing resolution of condolence. According to the respondents no 2 and 3 the meeting was held and they were elected as Senior and Junior Vice Presidents of the Board. President of tide Board, however, convened another meeting for April 7, 1989 for electing the Senior and Junior Vice Presidents, Before the above meeting could be held the respondents 2 and 3 filed a civil suit in the court of learned Munsif, Mathura, for injunction so as to restain the Board from holding the meeting for sleeting the Senior and Junior Vice Presidents. In that suit the applications No-7-C and B-C were also moved by the plaintiff-respondents 2 and 3, for interim injunction restraining the holding of the meeting and further restraining the defendants therein from interfering with the working of the plaintiffs. Learned Munsif granted exparte interim injunction as prayed for. The above interim injunction was served According to the petitioners they left venue of the meeting after coming to know of the interim injunction It. however, appears that inspite of the interim injunction granted by the Civil Court the meeting was held by the Chairman in which respondents 2 and 3 were again elected as Senior and Junior Vice Presidents. Petitioners, who are the members of the Board, have filed this writ petition for quashing the resolutions of the Board dated March 4, 1939 and April 7. 1989, electing the respondents 2 and 3 as Vice Presidents and for a writ of mandamus restraining the respondents 2 and 3 from working as Vice Presidents of the Board. By means of amendment application further prayer in the nature of quo warranto calling upon the aforesaid respondents to show-cause as to under what authority they are holding the office of Senior and Junior Vice Presidents, has also been made. The respondents have filed counter-affidavit and the petitioners have filed rejoinder-affidavit in reply thereto. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties.
(2.) SECTIONS 54 and 54-A of the U. P. Municipalities Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) provide for procedure for election of the Senior and Junior Vice Presidents of a Board. A Full Bench of this Court in the case of Kalyan Dutt Kaushik v. District Magistrate 1991 (2) UP LB EC 911, has while interpreting SECTIONS 54 and 54-A of the Act, laid down that if a Vice President is not elected within a period of three months, pre cribbed under Sub-section (4) of the section 54, he must be got elected by the District Magistrate in accordance with t!he procedure prescribed under Subsections (2) to (9) of Section 54- A. Consequently if a Vice President is elected in accordance with Sub-section (4) of section 54, after three months from the date of constitution of the Board, such an election is void. Subsection (4) of Section 54 and Sub-sections (2) to (9) of Section 54-A provide different procedure for election of Vice President. Under Sub-section (4) of Section 54 Vice President has to be elected at a meeting which is convened and presided over by the President of the Board, where as under Section 54-A the meeting is required to be convened by the District Magistrate which has to be presided over by a Civil Judicial Officer. President of the Board looses the right to convene and preside over the meeting of the Board for electing the Vice Presidents after expiry of three months from the date of constitution of the Board. In the instant case, as mentioned herein before, the Board was constituted on 24-11-1988 and three months expired on 24-2- 1989, The meeting of March 4. 1989 as well as April 7, 1989, which were convened and presided over by the President of the Board were as such without jurisdiction. Any election of Vice President held in those meetings is without authority of law and cannot be sustained. On the basis of the resolutions passed in the above meetings respondents 2 and 3 cannot legally hold the office of Vice Presidents of the Board. That apart, the respondents 2 and 3, who claim to have been elected as Vice Presidents in the meeting of the Board dated 4-3-1989, have got themselves elected again in the meeting of 7-4-1989. If they were really elected in the meeting of 4-3-1989 there was no question of their getting elected again in the subsequent meeting of 7-4-1989. The contention of the petitioners that meeting was not held on 4-3-1989 due to the death of a respectable citizen of Vrindaban appears to be correct. During the course of argument by learned counsel for respondents reliance has been placed on the resolution dated 7-4-1989 for justifying their holding of the office of Vice Presidents. The resolution dated 7-4-1989 was, as mentioned herein-before, passed in utter dis-regard of the injunction passed by the Civil Court restraining the Board from holding the meeting for election of the Vice Presidents. This interim injunction was obtained by the respondents 2 and 3 themselves, who were plaintiffs in that suit. It is surprising that they in utter disregard of the interim injunction, got themselves elected as Vice Presidents. Any action taken or any order passed in defiance of the Court's order, cannot be sustained and has got to be set-aside, being without any authority of law. In this connection reference may be made to a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Satyendra Pal v. The Regional Transport Authority, 1982 ALJ 310, wherein it was laid down as under : "In fact, there is another principle of law still more puissant and not less irrevocable, viz. that he who chooses to defy the order of a Court must face the Nemesis the wages of disobedience is penalty. It follows as a corollary that if a person is able to secure any advantage by flouting an order of the Court, he must be made to disgorge such gain. Likewise, proceedings taken by an authority in flagrant disregard of the order of a Court are nullity and the Court should have no compunction in putting the hand of the clock back and restoring the status quo ante. Where an order of a Court is disobeyed, a writ must be issued to redress the injury suffered by a person on account of the disobedience of such order. To borrow the words of Chinnappa Reddy, J. in Capt. Dushyant Somal v. Smt. Sushma Somal, (1981) 2 SCC 277 ; AIR 1981 SC 1026 at 1029 :- "Where what is complained of is an impudent disregard of an order of a Court, the fact certainly cries out that a prerogative writ shall issue." For the reasons given above this writ petition is allowed with costs. The resolutions of the Board dated 4-3-1989 and 7-4-1989 are quashed. The respondents 2 and 3 are restrained from working as Vice Presidents of the Board. The District Magistrate will now take immediate action for electing the Vice President of the Board in accordance with Sub-sections (2) to (9) of section 54-A of the Act. Petitioner allowed.;