S.P.Srivastava - (1.) THIS writ petition of a tenant-petitioner arises out of a suit filed by the landlord respondent no. 3 praying for a decree for the ejectment of the petitioner from the permises in dispute and for recovery of the arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation pendente-lite and future at the rate of Rs. 41/- per month and also for the recovery of water- tax and house tax. The trial court decreed the suit and the said decree was affirmed in revision by the respondent no. 1 Feeling aggrieved from, the aforesaid decree, the tenant-petitioner has now approached this Court for redress
(2.) THE suit referred to above had been filed on 21-3-79. Initially the plaintiff-landlord had come up with the allegations that the tenant-defendant defaulter within the meaning of section 20 (2) (a) of U. P. Act no. 13 of 1972 and had further sub-let the accommodation and was liable to be evicted therefrom on the ground contemplated under section 20 (2) (e) of the said Act. During the pendency of the suit certain events took place which required to.be brought to the notice of the trial court and necessitated the amendment of the plaint. THE subsequent events provided a fresh ground for the decree sought for inasmuch as; it attracted the ground contemplated under section 20 (2) (d) of the U. P. Act no 13 of 1972. In these circumstances an application seeking amendment In the plaint was moved by the plaintiff-landlord which was allowed by the trial court on 29-50-82 and became final. With the order allowing the amendment the necessary pleadings attracting the ground for ejectment contemplated under section 20 (2) (d) of the U. P. Act no. 13 of 1972, thus, became part of the pleadings of the plaintiff. THE defendant was allowed to file an additional written statement and on the pleadings of the parties the trial court framed a specific issue on the amended pleadings which was issue no 4 and the parties were afforded full opportunity to lead evidence on this issue. This issue no. 4 covered the controversy as to whether the defendant was liable to ejectment on the ground that he had without the consent in writing of the landlord used the demised premises for a purpose other than the purpose for which he had been admitted to the tenancy of the building and the act of converting a portion of building in dispute for residential user being inconsistent with the use which has been permitted was sufficient for the grant of a decree of his eviction from the premises in dispute. While considering the question of default in the payment of rent, the trial court recorded a finding that although the defendant tenant was a defaulter within the meaning of section 20 (2) (a) of the Act yet he was entitled to the benefits available under section 20 (4) of the said Act and consequently no decree for ejectment could be passed against him on that ground. On the question of subletting also the finding returned by the trial court was in favour of the defendant-tenant. However, while deciding the issue relating to the inconsistent user attracting the ground envisaged under section 20 (2) (d) of the Act the trial court came to the conclusion that the premises in dispute had been let out for its utilisation for business purposes exclusively and conversion of the upper storey of the accommodation in dispute for residential user clearly amounted to user for an inconsistent purpose as envisaged under section 20 (2) (d) of the Act and consequently inspite of the findings on the question of default and creation of sub-tenancy having been returned against the plaintiff the defendant was liable to be evicted from the premises in dispute. The suit was, therefore, decreed for ejectment and for recovery of arrears of rent and pendente-lite and future damages at the rate of Rs. 41/- per month and for an amount of Rs. 31.57 p. towards the arrears of water tax. The decree passed by the trial court referred to above was challenged by the defendant-tenant in revision filed under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act without any success. Before the revisional court it was urged that it was incumbent on the plaintiff to specifically ever in the notice terminating the tenancy issued by him the facts attracting the ground envisaged under section 20 (2) (d) of the Act and since the aforesaid notice which preceded the filing of the suit did not contain such averments no decree for eviction of the defendant could be passed on that ground. The revisional court repelled the above contention and took the view that it was not necessary to aver in the notice the facts attracting the grounds of eviction contemplated under section 20 (d) of the Act. The revisional court upheld the finding returned by the trial court and the question of inconsistent user of the premises in dispute and contravention of section 20 (2) (d) of the Act and upheld the decree passed by the trial court.
(3.) I have heard Sri Ajit Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri B. C. Mandhyan, learned counsel for the landlord-respondent and have perused the record. This court in its decision In the case of Dr. Bhupeshwar Sahi v. State of U. P., 1988 (1) ARC 134, while noticing the effect of the provisions contained in section 20 (2) of the 0. P. Act no 13 of 1972 had clarified that the said provision provided tor the conditions where under a suit for eviction of the tenant could be filed. It was observed that the said provision only contemplated that it could be done after the determination of the tenancy of the tenant It was further observed that the notice required under section 20 (2) of the Act was only for determination of tenancy and nothing further. In this connection it may also be noticed that section 20 of the Act relates to a suit for eviction and such a suit filed under sub-section (2) thereto is an ordinary suit and not any special proceeding created under the Act is governed by the Code of Civil Procedure except that, being a suit of Small cause, nature those provisions of the Code are not to apply to it, the application whereof has been excepted by section 7 thereof and Order 'L' in the first Schedule thereto. It is, therefore, obvious" that if the suit is based on any of the grounds mentioned in section 20 (2) of the Act, it is necessary for the plaintiff to aver in his plaint the facts attracting the grounds mentioned in section 20 (2) of the Act on the basis whereof he seeks the decree for eviction. But the scheme of the Act does not contemplate any such requirement to be complied with while issuing a notice contemplated under section 20 (2) thereof. The notice envisaged therein is clearly a simple notice determining the tenancy and in case the suit is based on the ground contemplated under section 20 (2) (a) of the Act a further notice demanding the payment of the arrears of rent. Section 20 (1) of the U. P. Act no 13 of 1972 imposes a bar prohibiting filing of a suit for eviction of a tenant from a building notwithstanding the determination of his tenancy. This bar stands lifted if any of the grounds envisaged under section 20 (2) of the Act are satisfied Section 20 (2) (a) of the Act, however, contemplates that even though the bar contemplated therein stands lifted on the fulfilment of the requisite conditions contemplated therein yet the suit could be instituted even after the determination of the tenancy of the tenant only if a further notice of demand requiring payment of the arrears of rent is issued and served on the tenant and the same is not complied with within the time allowed, Since in such circustances it is for the plaintiff to make out a case under the Rent Act for eviction of the tenant on the grounds contemplated under section 20 (2) of the U. P. Act no. 13 of 1972 it becomes obligatory upon him to aver in the plaint the necessary facts in this regard and proved them. There is no such obligation on any landlord-plaintiff requiring him to aver the facts in regard to the fulfilment of the conditions contemplated under section 20 (2) of the Act in the notice determining the tenancy which notice has to precede the filing of the suit. The view taken by the revisional court does not, therefore, suffer from any such infirmity as suggested by the counsel for the petitioner,;