S.R. Singh, J. - (1.) The above mentioned are the seven petitions by Sarvsri Rajendra Rai, V.K. Misra, Irfan Hussain, Banwari Lal Srivastava, P. K. Khare, Nirmala Devi and S.K. Pandey respectively invoking extraordinary Jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for challenging the orders of termination/retrenchment of their services by giving one month's pay in lieu of one month's notices and retrenchment compensation to each one of the petitioners vide order dated 1-2-1992. Since all the petitions involve common question of law and fact, I purpose to dispose of the same by a common order. The writ petition filed by Sri Rajendra Rai in which affidavits have been exchanged between the parties, shall be treated as the leading case.
(2.) The factual matrix of the case in all these writ petitions is that the petitioners wire ministering in the establishment of Nagar Mahapalika, Allahabad on daily wage basis in different capacities on the basis of their appointments/engagements made on different dates. The petitioner Rajendra Rai was employed as Pump Operator, Yoegesh Kumar Misra and Irfan Hussain also claimed to be working as Class 4 employees and Banwari Lal Srivastava claimed to have been appointed as a Tracer while Prera Prakash Khare and Nirmala Devi claimed *to have been serving the establishment in clerical cadre Lastly, Sri S.K. Par.dey, claimed to have been working as Junior Engineer in the establishment of the Nagar Mahapalika.
(3.) From a perusal of the facts on record, it would transpire that the question as to regularisation of daily rated workers of Nagar Palikas was tsken up by the State Government and as a sequal to a compromise arrived at between all concerned, it was decided that the services of those daily rated workers, who had put in three years of continuous service on October 11, 1989 with 240 days of service in each year, should be regularised. A letter being letter No. 4088/XI-6-1989 Nagar Vikas Anubhag, Lucknow 25th October 1989 (Annexure-6 to the writ petition) was addressed by Special Secretary to the State Government to all the District Magistrates of the State with a directive to them to submit a proposal in Form ka attached to the letter delineating therein tho details of the additional posts which the establishment may require so that requisite number of posts may be created as to enable regularisation of the services of such daily rated workers. It was also quipped therein that the Government orders providing for reservation in favour of BC/SC/ST and other categories were to be borne in mind in such regularisation. It transpires from the letter No. 6/958/23-General/90 Lucknow dated 29-7-1991 issued by Director Local Bodies (Annexure-2 to the Suppl affidavit in Santosh Kumar Pandsys' writ petition) that appointments in local bodies on daily wage/work charge basis were banned excepting appointments on compassionate ground of a dependent of an employee dying in harness and the heads, Mukhya Nagar Adhikaris and Executive Officers of the local bodies were informed accordingly by letter No. 462/NBM/11-6-1990 dated 25-9-1990 issued from the State Government and letter No. 6/584/23-Samanya/90 dated 10-1-1971 issued from the Directorate The main reason underlying the imposition of ban on appointments, was the abolition of octroi (Chungi) which was a prima source of the income to the coffer of local bodies. The financial condition of the local bodies which was said to be in shambles aggravated further due to abolition of octroi. But it would be evident from a conspectus of various government orders on record that appointments of daily rated workers on large scale went on unabated even after 11-10-1789 further strait-jacket ting the financial coffer of the local bodies besides impinging upon citizen9'fundamental right to equality of opportunity in the matter of employment. Therefore, the Government had to come out with certain directions contained in D. O. letter No. 9415/y-l-199l Nagar Vikas Anubhag-I Lucknow dated November 28, 1991 in respect of the daily rated/work charge employees appointed subsequent to 11-10-1989. The relevant portion of the D. O. letter is quoted below with a view to high-light the deepening crisis under which the State Government was constrained to issue a G. O., it being G.O. No. 249/IX-1-91-48 Misc. 1991 Nagar Vikas Anubhag-1 Lucknow dated 6th December 1991 putting an embargo upon appointments etc. of workers on daily wage/work charge basis : ...[VERNACULAR TEXT OMITTED]... 4. A copy of the aforesaid Government order dated 6th December 1991, is annexed as Annexure-4 to the writ petition. By manes of the aforesaid Government order dated 6th December 1991 which purports to have been issued by the State Government in exercise of its powers under the Uttar Pradesh State Control over Public Corporation Act, 1975, not only the appointments on Daily wage/work charge basis were banned, but it was postulated that the officers of the local bodies making such appointments on daily wage or work charge basis, would be personally liable for payment of wages to such employees. The impugned orders of retrenchment/termination dated, 1-2-1992 and 2-2-1992 were passed by Mukhya Nagar Adhikari and Additional Mukbya Nagar Adhikari respectively on the premise of the aforesaid Government order dated 6-12-1991. In fact, the decision for retrenchment/termination was taken on 10-1-1992 and the Mukhya Nagar Adhikari had issued an order/Memo dated 20-1-1992 pursuant to which tho impugned orders were issued. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. Sri Shashi Nandan appearing for the petitioner Rajendra Rai urged before me that the retrenchment/termination of the petitioner's services is vitiated firstly for the reason that it was done at the behest of the State Government which, according to the learned counsel, had no authority in law to issue any such direction under the U.P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959 in the matter of creation of posts or appointments in the establishment of Nagar Mahapalika. Elaborating his contention, Sri Shashi Nandan urged before me that the power of Creation of posts and appointments thereon, is regulated by Sections 106/107/108-A/109 of the U.P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959 (in short the Adhiniyam) and the U.P. Nagar Mahapalika sewaniyamawali, 1962 (in short the Sewaniyamwali), which do not vest the State Government with any power to regulate the exercise of power vested in the Nagar Mahapalika in regard to appointment of its employees and therefore, the argument proceeds, the Government order dated 6-12-1991 pursuant to which the petitioner's services were terminated/retrenched was wholly unauthorised and void. 6. Sri Rakesh Dwevedi, learned counsel appearing for the Nagar Mahapalika, refuted the contention of Sri Shashi Nandan and urged that the Government order dated 6-12-1991 was in fact issued by the State Government in exercise of its powers under Section 2 of the Uttar Pradesh State Control Over Public Corporation Act, 1975, which provides that every statutory body (by whatever name called) established or constituted under any Uttar Pradesh Act, excepting the Universities governed by the Uttar Pradesh State Universities Act, 1973, as 1973 as re-enacted and amended by the Uttar Pradesh Universities (Re-enactment and amendment) Act, 1974, shall, in the discharge of its function, be guided by such directions on the questions of Policies as may be given to it by the State Government not with and that no such power has expressly been conferred on the State Government under the law establishing or constituting such statutory body. the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the Government order dated 6-12-1991 in fact contained policy directions for the guidance of Nagar Mahapalika and other local bodies in discharge of their functions under the appropriate act in the matter of appointments on daily wages/work charge basis beyond their economic means (within the meaning of the U. P. State Control Over Public Corporation Act, 1975) and, therefore, it cannot be assailed as unauthorised and without authority of law. In rejoinder, Sri Shashi Nandan contended that Section 2 of the State control over the Public Corporation Act, 1975, is ultra vires the constitution for the reason that it suffers from the taint of excessive delegation of legislative functions in that it lays down no norms and guide lines for the exercise of the power vested in the State Government for issuing directions on question of policies. Recruitment Order, 1963 was assailed on the premise that it was not referable to any provision in the adhiniyam'. 7. Having given my sedulous consideration to the afore ad submissions. I an of the opinion that thcugh the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam does not contain any express provision similar to those contained to Sections 70 and 71 of the Municipalities Act conferring power upon the State Government to issue general or special directions for the guidance of the local bodies in regard to creation of posts or appointment of staff needed for the discharge of functions and duties of Nagar Mahapalika, but the U.P. State Control Over Public Corporation Act, 1975 makes good the gap on questions of policies regarding appointments in the establishment of a local body and that apart the power to issue an order or e 'statutory instrument' regarding services under a Nagar Mahapalika is implicit in Sections 106 and 109 read with Clauses (54) and (55) of Section 2 of the Adhiniyam and Section 4 (42-B) of the U.P. General Clauses Act, 1904 and the State Government has infact, issued an order known as the Uttar Pradesh Nagar Mahapalika Services (designation, scale of pay, qualifications, conveyance allowances and method to Recruitment) Order, 1963, (in short the Recruitment Order, 1963) in exercise of its powers under Sections 106 and 109 of the U.P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959 by means of the notification No. 16 Ma/XI-C-28-Corp 1962 dated Lucknow March 1, 1963 published in the extra-ordinary Government Gazette of Uttar Pradesh on March 1, 1963, Paragraph 5 of the Recruitment Order, 1963 provides that no post other than the posts mentioned in the schedule appended to the Order, shall be created by Mahapalika unded Clause (W) of sub-section (1) of Section 106 except with the prior sanction of the Government and on such terms and conditions as Government may notify in that behalf. Paragraph-6 of the order provides the manner and procedure for creation of posts in the establishment of Nagar Mahapalika. Qualifications, scale of pay and designation etc. of various posts are mentioned in the schedule. Paragraph-9 of the Order provides that the method of recruitment for different class of posts in service, shall be as given against it in the last column of the schedule. 8. The Government order dated 6-12-1991 in fact, contains a policy direction to be followed by the local bodies in the matter of appointments in their establishments. There is no gain saying the fact that large scale appointments on daily wage or work charge basis without following the procedure prescribed for creation of posts and appointments thereon in the Sewaniyamwali, 1962 and the Order referred to above are violative of Citizens' fundamental rights to equality of opportunity in the matter of employment guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the constitution of India. The practice of making Adhoc temporary/daily rated appointments without following proper procedure in accord with Articles 14 and 16 of the constitution and without any regards to merit, has been deprecated by the Hon. Supreme Court and it would be worth while to quote the opinion expressed by their Lordships in this regard in Delhi Dev. Horticulture Employees' Union v. Delhi Admn., JT 1992(1) SC 394, 8 AIR 1992 SC 789 as under : "Apart from the fact that the petitioners cannot be directed to be regularised for the reasons given above, we may take note of the pernicious consequences to which the direction for regularisation of workmen on the only ground that they have put in work for 240 or more days, has been leading. Although there is Employment Exchange Act which requires recruitment on the basis of registration in the Employment Exchange, it has become a common practice to ignore the Employment Exchange................... and the persons registered in the Employment Exchanges, and to employ and get employed directly those who are either not registered with the Employment Exchange or who though registered are lower in the long waiting list in the Employment Register. The courts can take judicial notice of the fact that such employment is sought and given directly for various illegal considerations including money. The employment is given first for temporary periods with technical breaks to circumvent the relevant rules and is continued for 240 or more days with a view to give the benefit of regularisation knowing the judicial trend that those who have completed 240 or more days are directed to be automatically regularised A good deal of illegal employment market has developed resulting in a now source of corruption and frustration of those who are waiting at the employment exchanges for years. Not all those who gain such backdoor entry in the employment are in need of the particular jobs. Though already employed elsewhere they join the jobs for better and secured prospects. That is why most of the cases which come to the courts are of employment in Government Departments, public undertakings or Agencies. Ultimately it is the people who bear the heavy burden of the surplus labour. The other equally injurious effect of indiscriminate regularisation has been that many of the agencies have stopped undertaking casual or temporary works though they are urgent and essential for fear that if those who are employed on such works are required to be continued for 240 or more days have to be absorbed as regular employees although the works are time bound and there is no need of the workmen beyond the completion of the works undertaken. The public interests are thus jeopardised on both counts." It also goes without saying that over staffing in the establishment of Nagar Mahapalika is bound to adversely affect its depleting coffer. Unnecessary appointments in large number against no vacancies or posts in a Government Department or in the establishment of a local body are bound to affect the nation's fiscal discipline, which cannot be enforced without observing austerity measures at all levels from top to bottom. Any such directions as are intend ed to aoonomize on unproductive and avoidable expenditure and to curb extravagance in any department of the Government or in the local bodies would be a step towards steam lining Nation's aconoray and its derailed fiscal discipline. Accordingly, the directions contained in the Government order, dated 6-12-1991 to my mind, is a policy direction within the periphery of Section 2 of the Uttar Pradesh State Control Over Public Corporation Act, 1975 and these are intended to sub-serve larger national and public interests besides the interest of the local bodies by enforcing economic discipline rule of law in the matter of appointments under local bodies. 9. The argument of Sri Shashi Nandan that Section 2 of the State Control Over Public Corporation Act, 1975 is ultra vires the constitution by virtue of excessive delegation of legislative functions shown on proper guidelines, is not acceptable to me. In enacting Section 2 of the State Control over public Corporation Act, 1975, the Legislature has not delegated any essential legislative function in favour of the State Government. It has only conferred upon the State Government power to issue directions on questions of policies for the guidance of the local bodies in discharge of their functions. The power of the State legislature under Entry 5, List 2 of the 7th schedule of the constitution to make law on local Government i.e. the constitution and powers of the Municipal Corporations, Improvement trusts, District Boards, Mining Settlement Authority and the Local authorities for the purposes of local self Government or village administration" includes power to make law empowering State Government to issue directions on questions of policies for guidance of local bodies in discharge of their functions. The expression 'powers of Municipal Corporation" occurring in Entry 5 of List 2 of the 7th Schedule permits not only an enactment conferring powers upon the local bodies but it also empowers the State Legislature to enact a law laying down the manner in which the power may be exercised and/or to enact a law empowering the State Government to issue direction on question of policies for guidance of the Local Bodies in discharge of their functions. The power is more in the nature of an advisory function than a legislative one, of course, it may be in the nature of an administrative power to same extent. By issuing directions under Section 2 of the Act on question of policies for the guidance of the local bodies in discharge of their functions, the State Government in fAct, acts as advisory body. There is no doubt an element of regulation and control of the functions of the local bodies in regard to matters of policies but such a control to my mind is a control of very feeble ilk for the reason that consequences of non-compliance with the directions are not provided in the Act though it may be implicit in the sense that the Government may withhold financial grant or aid to local bodies, if they fail to comply with thedi section B issued by the State Government on questions of policies. Policies to be pursued have, no doubt, to be congruous with the aims and objects of the Act constituting the local bodies and Articles 14, 16 and 41 of the constitution. If any direction issued by the State Government in the garb of giving policy directions is violative of any constitutional provision or any specific provisions in the adhiniyam' or any statutory rule, it would not be binding upon the Mahapalikas nor would it be a valid direction to be abided by the local bodies. Vasan Lal Magan Bhai v. State of Bombay, AIR 1961 SC 4, M/s. Devi Das v. State of Punjab. AIR 1967 SC 1896 and B.B. Rajwansht v. State of U.P., AIR 1988, SC 1089 were cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners in support of his contention that excessive delegation of legislative functions is not permissible under the constitution. There is no controversy about the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases, but as discussed above, the Legislature has not delegated its essential legislative functions by conferring power upon the State Government to issue directions on questions of policies for the guidance of the local bodies in discharge of their functions. The Section as such does not suffer from the vice of any excessive delegation, it has not been urged before me that the Government order, dated 6-12-1991 is in any way violative of any provision in the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam/Sesaniyamwali/Order. In this view of the matter, I am not prepared to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the Government order, dated 6-12-1991, is without authority of law. The Government have not only the powers to issue direction on question of policies for the guidance of the local bodies in exercise of its powers under Section 2 of the U. P. State Control over public Corporation Act, 19759, but it owes an obligation to enforce fiscal discipline in the local bodies besides an obligation to make them work in accordance with the rule of law. Large scale appointments on Adtoc/daily wage/work charge basis as stated supra, militate against citizens' fundamental rights to equality of employment guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the constitution. Any direction issued by the State Government placing embargo upon appointments beyond the economic means of the local bodies and in a manner impinging upon fundamental rights to equality of opportunity in the matter of employments or violating the statutory rules regulating appointments, would, in my opinion, be a direction on the questions of policies within the meaning of Section 2 of the U.P. State Control Over Public Corporation Act, 1975. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioners then contended before me that Section 2 of the U. P. State Control Over Public Corporation Act, 1*75 and the directions contained in the Government order, dated 6-12-15991 abnegate the power of the local bodies to manage its affairs as a local Self-Government. This contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is not tenable by reason of the fact that Entry 5 List I of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution which empowers the State Legislature to make law regarding establishment and constitution of the local bodies, is wide enough to confer ample power upon the State Legislature to legislate on the powers of the local bodies as w ell. Section 2 of the U.P. State Control Over Public Corporation Act, 1975 in my opinion, intends to regulate the functions of the local bodies in discharge of their functions under the appropriate Act in so far as the questions #of policies are concerned and as such, the same is not destructive of the concept of local self-government for which purpose the local bodies are established/constituted under appropriate Acts. The expression power' occurring in Entry 5 justifies the enactment of the Act and belies the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the U.P. State Control Over Public Corporation Act, 1975, is ultra vires the constitution. 11. The G.O. dated 6-12-1991 pursuant to which impugned orders were passed is justifiable on yet another ground Section 139 of the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959 provides for the establishment of a fund known as Mahapalika fund which includes all moneys received by and on behalf of Mahapalika from the Government or public bodies, private bodies or persons by way of grant, gifts or deposit subject to the conditions, if any, attached to such grants, gifts or deposits. Section 140 lays down the purposes for which the Mahapalika fund has to be applied. The section clearly provides that money credited to the Mahapalika fund from time to time shall, in the first place, be applied for payment of salaries and allowances of Safai Mazdoors and then in order of preference indicated in the section. Clauses (c) (d) and (c) of Section 140 clearly indicate that the Mahapalika fund is utilised for purposes of payment of salaries, allowances to Mahapalika officers and servants other than Safai Mazdoors, Sections 139,140 of the Adhiniyam make it clear that the Government contributes to the Mahapalika fund which is primarily meant for disbursement of salary and other emoluments to Safai Mazdoors, officers and other servants of Mahapalika in order of preference indicated in the Adhiniyam'. This justifies the power of the State Government to require the local bodies to have such number of servants and employees as may be within their means If the Government gives grant and aid to the local bodies its power to regulate the appropriation of the grant and aid in a proper manner cannot be abnegated. The Government was, therefore legitimately justified in issuing directions of the type contained in G.O. dated 6-12-1990. 12. The Recruitment Order, 1963 purports to have been issued under Sections 106 and 109 of the Adhiniyam. Sub-section (2) of Section 106 provides that qualifications of persons to be appointed to posts created under sub-section (1) shall be such as may be prescribed by the State Government. The word prescribed' as defined under Section 2 (55) of Adhiniyam means prescribed' by the Act or by rule or Order made therein or by or under any other enactment. It is true that some of the provisions of the Adhiniyam such as those contained in Sections 31, 32 and 49 conferred specific power upon the State Government to issue Order with no such specific power in Sections 106 and 109, but the two sections read together alongwith sub-Beo-tion (51) and (55) of Section 2 would make it abundantly clear that the Recruitment Order, 1963 is referable to Sections 106 and 109 of the Adhiniyam and the Recruitment Order, 1963 also purports to have been issued in exercise of those powers It is, therefore, not correct to say that the Recruitment Order, 1963 is not referable to any provisions in the Adhiniyam. 13. Sri Shashi Nandan then urged that the petitioners, who were employed on daily wage or work charge basis are paid out of the contingencies and their services have been quite illegally terminated at the dictates of the Government without applying mind as to w aether or not the Nagar Mahapalika was over-staffed and financially over-burdened due to employment of the petitioners. It is true that the orders of retrenchment/termination have been passed on the basis of the Government order dated 6-12-1991 and not on the basis of independent exercise of discretion as to the requirement for extra hands vis-a-vis the financial position of the Nagar Mahapalika, but as held above, the Government Order dated 6-12-1991 being an order containing sound directions on question of policies and it being not the petitioners' case that their retrenchment was mala fide or that it amounted to unfair labour practice, I am not inclined to interfere with the impugned orders of termination/retrenchment passed in pursuance of the said directions issued by the State Government which are intended to achieve the three fold objectives of enforcing fiscal discipline on the one hand and rule of law on the other besides securing citizens' fundamental right to equality of opportunity in the matters of public employment guaranteed by Articles 14 and 16 of the constitution. If the Nagar Mahapalika considers the imperativeness of the extra hands to be employed in connection with the execution of any scheme or any work, it would be at liberty to create posts in the manner prescribed in paragraph-6 of the Recruitment Order, 1963 and make appointments thereon in conformity with the rule of law with due advertisement so that all eligible persons may apply for such posts and persons of merit may be appointed. 14. Sri Shashi Nandan lastly contended that the G. O. dated 6-12-1991 defeats the objective sought to be achieved by Article 41 of the Constitution. The expression within the limits of its economic capacity and development' occurring in Article 41 gives complete answer to the submission of the learned counsel based on the directive principle of State Policy enshrined in Article 41 of the Constitution. 15. Sri Shyam Narain and Sri K.M, Sinha, urged before me that the provisions of Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 were not complied with, in that one month's notice or pay in lieu of one month's notice as required under Clause (a) and retrenchment compensation as required in Clause (b) of Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 were not paid before retrenchment/termination. Emphasising the significance of the word until' occurring in Section 6-N (1) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, the learned counsel contended that the payment of a month' salary in lieu of notice and retrenchment compensation must precede the order of retrenchment/termination in order to make it a valid order of retrenchment/termination. Sri Rakesh Dwevidi, learned counsel appearing for the Nagar Mahapalika, refuted the above submissions. Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act is in pari materia with Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (Central). In National Iron and Steel Co. v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1967 (SC) 1206 the Supreme Court has held that if a workman entitled to the protection of Section 25-F is asked to go forthwith, he is to be paid one month's notice in lieu of notice and retrenchment compensation at the time when he is asked to part with and cannot be asked to collect his dues afterwards. Paragraph-9 of the decision being relevant to the point is quoted below. The third point raised by the Additional Solicitor General is also not one of substance. According to him, retrenchment could only be struck down if it was mala fide or it was shown that there was victimisation of the workman etc. Learned counsel further argued that the Tribunal had gone wrong in holding that the retrenchment was illegal as Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act had not been complied with. Under that section a workman employed in any industry should not be retienohed until he bad been given one month notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice had expired, or the workman had been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice. the notice in this case bears the date Nov. 15, 1958. It is to the effect that the addressee's services were terminated with effect from the 17th November and that he would get one month's wages in lieu of notice of termination of his service. The workman was further asked to collect his dues from the cash office on November 20, 1958 or thereafter during the working hours. Manifestly, Section 25-F had not been complied with under which it was incumbent on the employer to pay the workman the wages for the period of the notice in lieu of the notice. That is to say, if he was asked to go forthwith he had to be paid at the time when he was asked to go and could not be asked to collect his dues afterwards, As there was no compliance with Section 25-F we need not consider the other points raised by the learned counsel. This conclusion receives support from the observations of this court in Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of Bombay, (1964) 6 SCR 22 at PP-31 32 (AIR 1964 SC 1617 at P. 1623). 16. Sri Rakesh Dwevedi learned counsel for the Nagar Mahapalika placed reliance upon the observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 9Gurmail Singh v. State of Punjab, 1991 (1) SCC 189. In that case, the services of certain tubewell operators were terminated w.e.f. 31-8-1983 due to transfer of the State Tube wells to Punjab State Tube well Corporation. Individual drafts for the amounts of retrenchment compensation due to them were forwarded to the Divisional/Sub-Divisional Officers, sufficiently in time to be made available to be taken by them by August 31, 1983. The Hon'ble Supreme Court upheld the submission made on behalf of the tube-well operators that the tender of compensation under Section 25-F in order to be valid, should be of the precise amount and should be made simultaneously with termination of the service, but it turned down the submission that the payment should be made at the door of the concerned employees. The Hon'ble Supreme Court dealt with the submissions on the question in para 9 of the report as below : "It is submitted that the tender of compensation under Section 25-F in order to be valid, should be of the precise amount and should be made simultaneously with termination of the service, This, of course, is correct but the High Court has satisfied itself by looking into the original records, that drafts in respect of individual employees were dispatched in time so as to reach divisional/sub-divisional offices by August 31, 1983. An attempt was made before us to suggest there was some discrepancy between two affidavits filed by the State Government in this behalf. We have perused the said averments and we find no inconsistency as alleged. It is true that the amounts were not actually paid or tendered to the workers by the Corporation directly but the corporation had evolved a method of disbursement of compensation in the interest of the workers' convenience. Instead of making the appellants spread out all over the state, to come to the head office to collect the compensation and to avoid the inconvenience and difficulty of the corporation making available the compensation at the door-step of each employee, the Corporation made arrangements whereby the tube well operators could go to the nearest divisional/sub-divisional office and collect the amount of compensation due to them. It appears that the appellants were not interested in taking the compensation amount. None of them appears to have ascertained whether these amounts had reached the sub-divisional office and whether they were for the correct amounts. No instance has been pointed out to us to show that they were not for the correct amounts. We do not think we need elaborated further on this aspect since the relevant records where brought before the High Court and the High Court was satisfied that the individual compensation drafts were sent to the various subordinate offices ready for distribution to the concerned workers on or before the relevant date. In the circumstances of this case, we agree with the High Court that when individual drafts for the amounts of compensation due to the various tube well operators were forwarded to the divisional/sub-divisional offices, sufficiently in time to be available to be taken by them by August 31, 1983, there was sufficient compliance with the provisions of Clause (b) of Section 25-F." 17. In view of the aforesaid pronouncements of the Supreme Court it may be taken as settled that if the payment contemplated under Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 does not precede the retrenchment, it must at least be simultaneous with the retrenchment in order to avoid the retrenchment order to be held invalid. 18. However, the question that requires consideration in the instant case is as to whether wages in lieu of notice and retrenchment compensation payable to each of the petitioners were processed and cheques issued to them on 1-2-1992 as requited by the retrenchment order dated 1-2-1992. 19. A perusal of the impugned order indicates that the amount payable to each employee under Section 6-N of the Act was to be worked out and the office Superintendent (General) was directed to complete that formality and inform the concerned employees by a notice on tho Notice Board of Nagar Mahapalika. In para 3 and 7 of the counter affidavit filed in Rajendra Rai's case, it is averred that cheques were issued on 1-2-1992 and by a notice on the Notice Board the concerned employees were asked to collect their cheques from the office. Retrenchment order dated 1-2-1992 purports to have been passed in continuation of the office memo dated 20-1-1992 and there was sufficient time to work out the details of the amount to be paid to the concerned workmen under Section 6-N of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. 20. It is evident from the order dated 1-2-1992 that the Office Superintendent (General) was directed to display the list of concerned employees on the Notice Board so that they may receive their cheques. The letter dated 1-2-1992 (Annexure-CA 2) written by the Mukhya Nagar Adhikari Nagar Mahapalika Allahabad to the secretary to Government, Uttar Pradesh recites that workmen were given on 1-2-1992 one month's in lieu of notice under Clause (a) of Section 6-N of the Act. The letter dated 2-2-1992 written by Additional Mukhya Nagar Adhikari Nagar Mahapalika, Allahabad (Annexure-CA 6) to the petitioner, Rajendra Rai indicates that in compliance of the office memo dated 20-1-1992 of the Mukhya Nagar Adhikari and his order dated 1-2-1992, the petitioner was notified vide notice on the Notice Board of the Nagar Mahapalika to collect his cheque but he did not turn up to collect the same. Details of the amount to be paid to the petitioner, Rajendra Rai and cheque number and the date of cheque are all mentioned in the letter dated 1-2-1992 alongwith which the cheque dated 1-2-1992 was hereto him. It is stated that similar letters were written to each of the petitioners. In paragraph 3 of the counter affidavit filed in writ petition of Rajendra Rai, it is averred that retrenchment order was passed by Mukhya Nagar Adhikari on 1-2-1992 ami a copy of the order alongwith list containing the names of the petitioners was pasted on the Notice Board of Mahapalika on 1-2-1992 itself. It is further averred that in the order it has been made clear that the petitioners may collect their cheques for wages in lieu of one month's notice and compensation for the period as prescribed under Section 6-N of the Industrial Disputes Act Intimation about retrenchment was also sent to the State Government on 1-2-1992. In Paragraph 7 of the Counter affidavit, it is averred that the order dated 1-2-1992 passed by Mukhya Nagar Adhikari was affixed on the Notice Board alongwith a list of employees who had been retrenched and request had been made specifically to such employees for collecting their cheques. It is further averred in the said paragraph of the counter Affidavit that the petitioners and other affected employees did come to the Nagar Mahapalika, but on learning about retrenchment, they simply walked away without receiving tho cheques which are said to have been despatched to each one of them alongwith covering letter dated 20-2-1992. The letter (Annexure-CA 6) however, mentions the date as 2-2-1992. From the reverments made in the counter affidavit, it transpires that the list of employees to be retrenched, was prepared on 20-1-1992 and the order was passed by Mukhya Nagar Adhikari on 1-2-1992. In order to ascertain the truth of the respondent's stand that the cheques were ready to be delivered to the concerned workmen on 1-2-1992, it was thought expedient to traverse upon the original records. Since the necessity to scan the original record was felt after the arguments bad concluded and judgment had been reserved, 1 directed these cases to be listed again. Sri Rakesh Dwivedi, learned counsel appearing for the respondents produced the original records before me on 16-4-1992 and stated before me that he had personally checked the factum in individual cases and found that cheques were ready for delivery to the concerned workmen on 1-2-1992. I also perused the record and have not been able to elicit anything as to impeach the stand taken by the respondents that cheques were ready for delivery on 1-2-1992 and that the concerned workmen were informed by notice on the Notice Board to collect their cheques. There was thus a valid tender of wages in lieu of notice and retrenchment compensation within the meaning of Section 6-N. I may point out that though it was not argued before me that payment by cheque would not be a valid payment, but so far as I am concerned, I have held, though in a different context in Ranblr Singh v. Board of Revenue, and C. 1992 All CJ 266 that such a payment would be a valid payment. 21. Sri Shyam Narain then urged that since his client, Yogesh Kumar Misia was a disabled person, his services ought not to have been terminated merely on the basis of the G. O. dated 6-12-1S91. The submission of the learned counsel carries no Bubstance. It is to be noticed that while there seems some exception in the case of a person appointed as dependent of an employee dying in harness as per G.O. dated 24-9-1991 (Annexure-2 to the Suppl. Affidavit filed in the writ of Santosh Kumar Pendey), there is no exception in case of disabled or physically handicapped person. 22. Having regard to the above discussions, the petitions are not sustainable and are liable to be dismissed. 23. In the result, the petitions fail and are accordingly dismissed. Parties shall bear their on costs. Petition dismissed.;