- (1.) The Petitioner was appointed as Secretary of the society and he was suspended on 25-4-84 and thereafter dismissed by the order dated 5-9-86 Against the said order the Petitioner filed an appeal which was allowed by the order dated 31-7-87 (Annexure 2 to the writ petition). A perusal of the said order dated 31-7-87 shows that the appellate authority has taken into consideration the fact that the same officer who made a complaint against the Petitioner had been appointed the Enquiry Officer and the rules of principle of natural justice have been violated. The appellate authority remanded the matter to the District Administrative Committee for deciding the matter afresh in accordance with law. Although there is no express mention in the order dated 31-7-87 that the dismissal order dated 5-9-86 is set aside yet that is unplicit in the appellate order since the matter has been remanded by the appellate authority. The suspension order dated 25-5-82 had merged in the dismissal order, and when the dismissal order was set aside by the order dated 31-7-87, the suspension order did not automatically revive. No doubt a fresh suspension order could have been passed by the appointing authority but the appellate authority has no power to pass a suspension order.
(2.) In the impugned order dated 31-7-87 it has been mentioned that the Petitioner will be treated as being under suspension. In my opinion the appellate authority has got no power to make such an observation treating the Petitioner to be under suspension The power of suspension is only in the appointing authority.
(3.) In these circumstances, I quash the said direction contained in the impugned order dated 31-7-87 and direct that the Petitioner will not be treated as being under suspension. However, if the appointing authority passes any fresh suspension order then of course the Petitioner will be treated under suspension from that date.;