Markandey Katju, J. - (1.) PETITIONER filed a suit No. 608 of 1982 for specific performance of an agreement on the ground that one premlata had executed a registered agreement dated 18 -12 -1981 to sell her property which is in dispute, This suit was compromised and a compromise decree was passed on 8 -11 -1982. Subsequently Premlata filed an application on 2.4.1983 praying for setting aside the compromise decree dated 8 -11 -1982. In this application she alleged that she had not signed the vakalatnama and compromise, and a fraud was played upon her. The learned. Civil Judge, before whom this application was filed, went into' the matter in detail. Both the parties led evidence before him including expert evidence. After considering the evidence, the learned Civil Judge passed an order dated 10.8.84 (Annexure 3 to the writ petition) in which he held that the signatures of Premlata on the vakalatnama and compromise were genuine. Subsequently a writ petition has been filed against this order which is pending Thereafter Premlata filed a suit praying for setting aside the compromise decree dated 8.11.1982 on the ground that she had not signed the vakalatnama or the compromise and therefore fraud was played upon her. Thereupon a temporary injunction was granted in favour of the plaintiff but in appeal it was set aside by the impugned order dated 6 -9 -91 (Annexure 11 to the writ petition). Aggrieved, the petitioner has filed this writ petition. After hearing counsel for the Parties and considering the record. I am of the opinion that the suit being suit No. 322 of 1986 was itself not maintainable as it was barred by the order of the Civil Judge dated 10 -8 -84 (Annexure 3 to the writ petition) by the principle of res -judicata. It may be noticed from a perusal of the order of the Civil Judge dated 10.8.84 that the learned Civil Judge has considered the precise question which was raised in the suit No. 322 of 1986 viz, whether Premlata had signed the vakalatnama and compromise. The order of the Civil Judge dated 10 -8 -84 has decided this precise controversy after considering the evidence adduced in great detail and therefore it cannot be raised again by way of a separate suit. Even if Section 11 C.P.C. in terms does not apply the general principles of res -judicata will apply. This being the position, the writ petition deserves to be allowed. Shri S.N. Misra, learned counsel for the respondent relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in P.V. Subha Rao v. Jagannada Rao : AIR 1967 SC 59. This decision does not help the respondent because it merely says that a compromise decree does not operate as res -judicata. The decision is distinguishable because a compromise decree is not a decision on merits. In the present case after the compromise decree was passed an application was filed to set aside, and that application was decided by the order of the Civil Judge dated 10 -8 -84. This order dated 10 -8 -84 was on the merits of the controversy, and hence it is res -judicata.
(2.) THE principle of res -judicata is a principle of high public policy on the basis of the Latin Maxim interest republicant sit finis litium i.e. it is in the interest of the public that there should be an end to litigation. I am therefore, not agreeable to the contentions of Sri Misra that the suit No. 322 of 1986 is not barred by res -judicata. Shri Misra then urged that the only way to set aside the compromise decree was by a suit. I do not agree to this contention. An application under Section 151 Civil Procedure Code is also maintainable on the ground that the applicant had never agreed to a compromise and had ryot signed the vakalatnama. In fact, Premlata herself resorted to this remedy, and she cannot, after getting a decision on her application on merits, turn around and say that only a suit was the remedy.
(3.) IN view of the above, the suit No. 322 of 1986 is held to be non -maintainable and the proceedings in the suit are quashed. The impugned order dated 6th September, 1991 is hence also quashed .;