B. L. Yadav J. - (1.) BY means of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the petitioner has challenged the order dated.16-2-89 passed in proceedings under section 10 (2) of the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, (for short the Act), and the order dated 30-9-83 passed by the Prescribed Authority.
(2.) THE factual matrix of the case is that the petitioner has made an application under section 11 (2) of the Act to set aside 'the earlier exparte order alleging that he has purchased the land from one Vijai Rikh, the tenure holder, by a sale deed dated 30-5-72, hence he was required to be served with notice and the land covered by the sale deed need not be declared as surplus, as he was protected by the provisions of sub section (6) of section 5 of the Act THE Prescribed Authority in earlier .proceedings rejected the contention of Vijai Rikh, the original tenure holder, and against that order the appeal of tenure holder was dismissed on 30-9-77. THEreafter the present petitioner and some other persons filed an objection under section 11 (2) of the Act alleging that they had no knowledge of the earlier proceeding and no notice was served upon them, ana they were purchasers from tenure holder by a sale deed dated 30-5-72. THE Prescribed Authority rejected the contention of petitioner holding that the notice was served upon him and the sale deed was relied upon by another tenure holder. THE tenure bolder filed an appeal and after dismissal of the same he also preferred v*rit Petition No. 268 of 1978. decided on 30-10-78 (Annexure-2), and the sale deed was held not to be bona fide transaction Consequently, this Court has already decided that the purchaser would not be entitled to the benefit of sub-section (6) of section 5 of the Act THE appeal preferred by the petitioner was also dismissed on 16-2-89. Against these orders the present petition has been filed Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that no notice was given to the petitioner and he was entitled to the benefit of subsection (6) of section 5 of the Act, and that the transfer was made in good faith and for adequate consideration. Reliance was placed on Brijendra Singh v. State of U. P., AIR 1981 SC 636. As regards the first point urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that he was not served with any notice, I have perused the impugned orders and I am satisfied that findings have been recorded to that effect vide Annexure- 4 to the petition that notice was served on petitioner, and even in earlier proceedings which was fought by the tenure holder himself, he was served with notice. The original tenure holder has set up a case that he has executed the sale deed, bat his allegation was not accented to be correct. He has even filed a writ petition In this Court which failed. The proceedings were initiated by the petitioner, the vendee, by filing an application under section 11 (2) of the Act and he has led evidence. But the findings of fact are that the petitioner was served with notice
(3.) THERE Is another aspect also that the same sale deed was relied upon by the tenure holder while he had filed the writ petition and be has also led evidence, but the sale deed was not held to be bona fide. Under these circumstances, the vendee cannot set up the same sale deed again and file the objection. Any way, after opportunity of hearing his objection was rejected and his appeal also failed I am of the opinion that the orders are correct and under the impugned judgment a finding has been recorded that the sale deed set up by the petitioner was not bona fide transaction and was not in good faith and nor the petitioner was entitled to the benefit of section 5 (6) of the Act. Brijendra Singh v. State of U. P. (supra), relied upon by the learned counsel for petitioner, was a case based on different facts, Inasmucn as in that case the scope of section S (1) and sub-section (6) and proviso (v) and the expression 'good faith' were considered, and there the finding was recorded that the expression good faith may vary in the context of different statute, subject and situation. But in the context of proviso (v) as in that case the appellant Brijendra Singh was Brigadier in the Army and has sold a part of land in August 1971 as he required money for building his own house in Delhi. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court ruled that transfer could not be ignored on the ground that it was not for personal need. In the present case I am of the opinion that the facts or the present case are entirely different. Consequently that case was based on different facts would be of no assistance to petitioner.;