M.P.Mehrotra, J. - (1.) THIS petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution arises out of the proceedings under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. The facts, in brief, are these.
(2.) THE petitioner was issued a notice under Section 6 (2) of the said Act and a true copy of the same is annexure 1 to the petition. THE petitioner filed her objections against the said notice before the Competent Authority, Aligarh, a true copy whereof is annexure 2 to the petition. THE Competent Authority rejected the said objections by his order dated 10-8-81, a true copy whereof is annexure 3 to the petition. THEreafter the petitioner filed an appeal and the same was dismissed by the appellate court by its judgment dated 24-2-82, a true copy of which is annexure 5 to the petition. A certified copy of the said judgment has also been placed on the record. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner has now come up in the instant petition and in support thereof, I have heard Sri Sudhir Chandra, learned counsel for the petitioner. Learned counsel contended that the Competent Authority did not have the jurisdiction to issue the notice under Section 6 (2) of the Act and, therefore, the same should be treated as without jurisdiction and no further proceedings could be taken in pursuance of the said notice. It was emphasized that in the notice it had been mentioned that certain lands mentioned in the said notice were held by the petitioner or her family and it was stated in the notice that the area of the said lands exceeded the ceiling limit permissible in the case of the petitioner. Learned counsel emphasized that the said land detailed at the foot of the notice was agricultural land and it could not be treated as vacant land under Section 2 (q) of the said Act. Learned counsel further submitted that there was no dispute that the land was agricultural and was being used for agricultural purposes and that the only reason why it was sought to be treated as vacant land was that a Master Plan was alleged to have come into operation in the Aligarh agglomeration with effect from 24-2-80 and that the land mentioned in the notice was included in the said Master Plan. Learned counsel in this connection invited my attention to annexure 3 where the Competent Authority has stated to the said effect. It was next contended that before the appellate court the learned DGC (Civil), who apppeared on behalf of the State, had taken time to produce the relevant notification whereby the alleged Master Plan was enforced in the Aligarh agglomeration but ultimately no such notification was produced before the court. It was contended that the basic controversy between the parties was whether there was a valid and good Master Plan in operation in the Aligarh Agglomeration and that controversy would be decided without much of evidence and it was a fit case where the petitioner should not be compelled to pass through the gamut of several proceedings prescribed under the Act. Learned counsel in this connection placed reliance on a Supreme Court pronouncement in Calcutta Discount Co. v. I. T. Officer, AIR 1961 SC 372. Support was also sought to be drawn from the following observations made in Barium Chemical Ltd. v. Company Law Board, AIR 1967 SC 295 :- "Therefore, the words, "reason to believe" or "in the opinion of" do not always lead to the construction that the process of entertaining "reason to believe" or "the opinion" is an altogether subjective process not lending itself even to a limited scrutiny by the court that such "a reason to believe" or "opinion" was not formed on relevant facts or within the limits or as Lord Radcliffe and Lord Reld called the restraints of the statute as an alternative safeguard to rules of natural justice where the function is administrative."
(3.) LASTLY, the learned counsel placed reliance on a Division Bench pronouncement of this Court in Aftab Ahmad v. State, 1979 AWC 644. In the Division Bench pronouncement it was emphasized that existence of Master Plan alone was not sufficient but that it should satisfy the statutory requirements underlying its preparation and enforcement. I have given my due consideration to these submissions but, in my view, it will not be a proper exercise of my discretion in the proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution to admit this petition. It should be seen that the basic proposition is that where the Legislature has prescribed a clear scheme under the statute, including the hierarchy of authorities, both original and appellate for redress to be sought under such statute, this Court will normally not entertain petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution which result in the short circuiting of the normal processes prescribed by the Statute. This is not to suggest that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain petitions despite the existence of alternative statutory remedies. That position is well understood but the point is whether in the facts of a particular case, any deviation from the normal rule is called for.;