R. S. Singh, J. - (1.) THE petitioner has invoked jurisdiction of the Hon'ble Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for quashing the order of the Board of Revenue dated 4-3-1975 by which the suit for ejectment of respondent no. 2 under section 209 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was dismissed.
(2.) THE facts of the case, in brief, are that Ram Pal Singh was the tenure-holder of the land in dispute who died issueless on 15-6-1965. Smt. Prabhuraj Kuer, respondent no. 2, claimed the land in dispute as an heir of Ram Pal Singh being the widow of his son Ram Narain Singh. In the village consolidation of holdings proceedings were going on When Ram Pal Singh died. In mutation proceedings the name of respondents no. 2 was ordered to be mutated in the consolidation of holding proceedings. THE order was challenged in revision by the petitioner. By the time the village was denotified and the matter was again taken up under the Land Revenue Act. THE name of respondent no. 2 was ordered to be mutated by the Revenue Court. THE mutation order was challenged by the petitioner but it was confirmed by the Additional Commissioner by order dated 3-4-1962. Both the parties again fought out for possession over the land in dispute in a proceeding under section 145 CrPC but it resulted in favour of respondent no. 2 who was given back possession of the land in dispute after attachment and the petitioner was forbidden from disturbing the possession except by an order of a court of competent jurisdiction. This order of the criminal court was passed on 31-5-57. THEreafter Raj-Bahadur Singh, the petitioner, finally instituted a suit on 24-4-1962 under Secs. 229-B/209 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act for the ejectment of Respondent no. 2 on the allegation that he is the nephew of Ram Pal Singh and Respondent no. 2 was the concubine of Ram Narain Singh. THErefore, her possession being unlawful, she is liable to ejectment. The suit of the petitioner was decreed by the trial court on the finding that the petitioner is the legal heir of Rampal Singh and the possession of Respondent no. 2 is that of trespasser as she was not the widow of Ram Narain Singh. On the plea of limitation raised on behalf of Respondent no. 2 the suit was held to be within time and a decree for ejectment was passed. The decree of the trial court was affirmed by the Additional Commissioner in first appeal and also by the Board of Revenue in Second Appeal filed by Respondent No. 2. The order of the Board of Revenue was challenged by Respondent no. 2 in writ petition before this Court being Civil Misc Writ petition No. 821 of 1968. Smt. Prabhuraj Kuer v. Board of Revenue, which was allowed on 14-7-71 and the order of the Board of Revenue was quashed. Form the perusal of the order of this Court dated 14-7-71 (Annexure '1' to the writ petition) it appears that the only point of limitation canvassed before this Court according to the present petitioner was that the Board of Revenue rightly decided the appeal and held that the suit was well within time whereas according to the present Respondent No. 2 the question of limitation had been wrongly decided by the Board of Revenue. After an elaborate discussion this Court recorded a finding that the suit was filed beyond time and it was wrongly held by the Board of Revenue as within time. Consequently the order of the Board of Revenue was quashed with the following directions : "............The Board shall readmit the appeal to its original number and decide the appeal on the basis of the law of limitation as disclosed in the findings given above." The case again came up for consideration before the Board of Revenue. The question of limitation was again raised by the petitioner and it was contended that on excluding the period during which the village was under consolidation of holdings operations the suit was clearly within time. The Board of Revenue considering the finding recorded by this Court in the aforesaid order passed in writ petition as binding, held the suit to be time barred. The petitioner has now challenged the aforesaid order of the Board of Revenue in writ jurisdiction before this Court. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that this Court while deciding previous writ petition took the view that Rampal Singh died on 15-6-1955 and the limitation under section 209 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was counted from 1st July, 1955 (from the 1st July following the date of unauthorised possession) and the suit filed on 24-4-1962 was held to be time barred. But the period during which the consolidation of holdings operation proceedings were in operation which should be excluded was not taken into consideration and on proper exclusion of that period the suit was well within time.
(3.) IN reply it was contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that the Board of Revenue was justified in holding the suit as time barred relying on the finding recorded by this Court in the previous writ petition between the parties in respect of the land in dispute. The only question for determination in this case appears to be whether it was open to the Board of Revenue to decide the second appeal solely relying on the finding recorded by this Court in the previous writ petition or was it open for the Board of Revenue to take a different view on the fresh arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In this connection it is necessary to consider the nature of the order which is passed in writ jurisdiction and its binding effect. The High Court while deciding appeal or revision exercised powers under Code of Civil Procedure and it has full jurisdiction to substitute its own order or decree while allowing the same. But when any order of any subordinate Tribunal or authority is challenged in writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India it is decided by the High Court under an extra ordinary jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution of India. Unlike the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court has no jurisdiction or power to substitute its own order while allowing the writ petition but it has only jurisdiction to quash the order of the subordinate authority or tribunal if some apparent error in the impugned order is found. The High Court while deciding the writ petition may record certain finding on some points or leave all the points to be decided by the subordinate authority or tribunal. This depends on the nature of the order passed in writ jurisdiction. In case no specific finding has been recorded and after quashing the impugned order the subordinate authority or tribunal is directed to decide the case afresh according to law, in that case the subordinate authority or tribunal will be justified to decide the case according to law in recording its own finding in respect of the matter in controversy. But when the High Court has recorded a specific finding and after quashing the order there is a specific direction to decide the case in the light of that finding, in that case it will not be open for the subordinate authority or tribunal to record a different finding on the points already recorded by the High Court in writ jurisdiction unless some change of law warrants otherwise. See Prem Sagar V. Mis. Standard Vacuum Oil Company, Madras, AIR 1965 SC 111.;