- (1.) P. N. Goel, J. This is an application under Section 10 of the Contempt of Court Act. The undisputed facts, sufficient for the disposal of this case, are these: By order dated 22. 2. 1980, the District Magistrate, Ballia, appointed applicant Kuldip Narain Lal as Officiating Collection Amin. This order was communicated to him by the Sub Divisional Magistrate. When by order dated 21. 6. 1981, he was made Seassonal Collection Amin. The applicant challenged the order dated 21. 6. 1981 by filing an application before the Services Tribunal, Lucknow dated 8. 7. 1981. The applicant moved an application for an interim order to the effect that the order dated 21. 6. 1981 should not be given effect to and that the operation of this order be stayed. On 19. 9. 1981 after hearing parties counsel, the Tri bunal passed order reading: "parties are present. The Opposite Parties has no objection to the grant of status-quo as on today. Fix 12. 10. 1981 for hearing of the stating matter. Till then status-quo as on today shall be maintained. . . " The above order was confirmed/made absolute on 21. 10. 1981. The grievance of the applicant is that on 7. 11. 1981 the District Magis trate (O. P. No. 1) issued a letter to the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Rasra that the applicant is working in the capacity of a seasonal Amin and that his services be deemed effective on the basis of the stay order dated 19. 9. 1981 and 31. 10. 1981 as Seassonal Collection Amin and that his services be terminated like other Seassonal Collection Amins after 30. 9. 1981 (Vide para 10 of the application) and as such disobeyed the orders of the Public Services Tribunal. In Para 13 the applicant further stated that the order 7. 11. 1981 had not been given effect to and that the applicant was not receiving his salary regularly. The contempt petition was filed on 8. 12. 1981. The opposite party No. 1 filed counter affidavit stating that he had not committed any disobedience of the orders of the Tribunal and that in pursu ance of the order dated 21. 6. 1981, the applicant worked from 1. 7. 1981 as Seassonal Collection Amin and drew Salary in the said capacity, that the ap plicant worked as Seassonal Collection Amin upto 30. 9. 1981, that after obtaining the sanction for appointment of Seassonal Collection Amins, the applicant was again offered appointment, but he did not join. The opposite party No. 2 filed another counter affidavit. He adopted the facts stated in the counter affidavit of Opposite Party No. 1. He added that the applicant was paid salary for the months of July and August, 1981 as Seassonal Collection Amin that one Shivanand was appointed Collection Amin and that in the month of September, 1981, the applicant proceeded on leave without any prior sanction and therefore he was not paid salary for the month of September 1981. The applicant filed rejoinder affidavit. In para 23 of this affidavit he stated that he received less salary in the months of July and August, 1981 and that therefore he moved an application before the Sub Divisional Officer asking him to indicate as to why his salary had been deducted and that the sub Divisional Officer had given no reply. In para 12 of this affidavit he stated that it was necessary to call the record of the applicant for perusal and that the record would show that his status was that of an officiating Collection Amin. Learned Counsel for the parties have been heard at length. The Chief Standing Counsel raised 3 preliminary points. 1. The Services Tribunal is not a Court and as such this application for contempt of Court is not maintainable.
(2.) THE tribunal was not competent to pass an interim order. The applicant should have moved the Tribunal under Section 5 (7) of the U. P. Public Services (Tribunal) Act, 1976 (hereinafter called the Act ). These objections are disposed of first one by one. 1. Notwithstanding the fact that the learned Standing Counsel urged at the commencement of the case that the Services Tribunal is not a Court, he did not press this point further and did not indicate as to why the Services Tribunal is not a Court. The various provisions of the Act clearly indicate that the Services Tribunal is a Court. Prior to the coming into force of this Act, the dispute between public servants and their employers were subject of a number of civil suits. Section 6, clause (1) of the Act lays down that no suit shall lie against the State Government or any local authority or any statutory corporation or company for any relief in respect of any matter relating to em ployment at the instance of any person who is or has been a public servant. According to Section 4 of the Act, the claims of the employees in respect of any matter relating to employment has been referred to the Tribunal. Then clauses (2) and (3) of Section 6 provide that all suits, all appeals, revisions, applications for review and other incidental or, ancillary proceedings in respect of any matter relating to employment shall stand transferred to the Tribunal But all appeals pending before the High Court shall continue to be heard. It will then be noticed that Section 5 clause (9) clearly lays down that any proceeding before the Tribunal shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding. Reference may here be made to Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. This section lays down that every High Court shall have authority in respect of contempts of Courts subordinate to it. Article 227 of the Constitu tion clearly provides that every High Court shall have superintendence over all Courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exer cise jurisdiction. As the function of the Service Tribunal is judicial in nature and as the Services Tribunal decides cases of civil nature between the public servants and their employers, it is obviously under the superintendence of the High Court. For what has been stated above I am of the opinion that the Services Tribunal is a Court and for the disobedience of its orders, the High Court can take action under the Contempt of Courts Act. The applicant's counsel referred to the case of S. K. Sarkar v. Vinay Chandra Misra (A. I. R. 1981 S. C. 723 ). In this case the expression "courts subordinate to it" occurring in Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act was considered and it was held by the Supreme Court that this expression is wide enough to include all Courts which are judicially subordinate to the High Court, even though the adminis trative control over them does not vest in the High Court. The Supreme Court then held that the Court of Revenue Board was a Court subordinate to the High Court within the contemplation of Section 10. The principle laid down in this case clearly goes to show that the Services Tribunal is a Court subordinate to the High Court and as such the High Court can take action for the disobedi ence of the order passed by the Services Tribunal. In view of the above the first contention of the Chief Standing Counsel is without substance. 2. The Chief Standing Counsel referred to Sections 5a and 5b of the Act and urged that the Tribunal had no right to pass an interim order by way of stay or in any other manner. The learned counsel for the applicant urged that in this contempt petition it cannot be seen by this Court whether the Tri bunal was or was not competent to pass an interim order In this case this Court has only to see whether the order of the Tribunal has been disobeyed. He has referred to the case of Narain Singh v. Hardayal Singh Harika (A. I. R. 1958 Punj, 180 ). The relevant observation of this case runs:- "an argument raised on behalf of the respondent is that the order of the Civil Court was erroneous in so far as the site in question had vested in the Municipal Committee of Patiala and petitioner had encroached Upon it. This argument is entirely without merit. So long as the in junction order has not been vacated or modified by the Court granting it, or has not been reversed on appeal, no matter how unreasonable and unjust the injunction may be, the order must be obeyed. Violation of the order of injunction cannot be excused on the ground that though the Court acted within its jurisdiction but the order that it passed was errone ous". In my opinion the position of the Court dealing with contempt petition is like that of an executing Court and therefore, this Court cannot go into the legality or otherwise of the interim order passed by the Tribunal in case there has taken place defiance of the order of the Tribunal which is a Court, this Court has to punish or deal appropriately with the contemner. In the result there is no substance in the contention of the Chief Standing Counsel. 1 The Chief Standing Counsel referred to clause (7) of Section 5 of the Act. This clause reads as follows:- " (7) Where the Tribunal makes any other order in favour of the claim ant against his employer. . . . . . . . . and such order remains uncomplied with for a period of 3 months, the Tribunal may, on his application, issue a certificate for recovery of the amount awarded, or as the case may be, for other relief granted by it, and any person in whose favour such certi ficate is issued may apply to the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in Uttar Pradesh. . . . . . . . . for execution of the order of the Tri bunal, and such Court shall thereupon execute the certificate or cause the same to be executed in the same manner and by the procedure as if it were a decree for like relief made by itself in suit. " The learned counsel for the applicant urged that the above clause is ap plicable after the Tribunal has finally decided the case and that it is not applic able to interim orders passed by the Tribunal. The Chief Standing Counsel lays emphasis on the words "makes any other order". He urges that these words include even an interim order. Sub-clause (7) is preceded by sub-clause (6) which runs as follows:- " (6 ). A declaration made by the Tribunal shall be binding on the claimant and his employer as well as on any other public servant who has in respect of any claim affecting his interest adversely, been given an opportunity of making a representation against it, and shall have the same effect as a declaration made by a Court of law. " It will be noticed that clauses (5a) and (5b) relate to interim orders. Clause (6) obviously and undisputedly related to the final decision taken by the Tribunal. Therefore looking to the sequence of the various clauses it is apparent that clause (7) also relates to the final order passed by the Tribunal in the case. Moreover, the Tribunal is required to issue a certificate for recovery of the amount awarded or for other relief granted by it. These words also indicate that the Tribunal has finally decided the case. Lastly, the word used in clause (7) is decree and on the basis of the certificate issued by the Tribunal the Civil Court has to execute it as if the civil Court is executing its own decree. Taking into account all what has been said above, there is considerable force in the contention of the applicant's counsel that clause (7) relates to the final order passed or the decision taken by the Tribunal in the case and not to ad interim orders. The contention raised by the Chief Standing Counsel is not correct. Having disposed of the 3 preliminary points raised by the Chief Standing Counsel, it is now to be considered whether the opposite parties disobeyed the interim order was passed by the Tribunal. The interim order was passed on 19. 9. 1981. It was confirmed on 31. 10. 1981. The applicant had moved the Tribunal on 8-7. 1981. It is undisputed that originally the applicant was appointed officiating Collection Amin by order dated 22. 8. 1980. It means that he was appointed temporary Collection Amin. He was not appointed Seasonal Collection Amin whose services could be terminated at any time, perhaps, without notice. About 10 months after the initial appointment, the District Magistrate reduced his status by order dated 21. 6. 1981 and from that date the District Magistrate and his subordinates treating him as Seasonal Collection Amin. It is evident from the above that on the date of the passing of the interim order, the applicant was considering himself as an officiating Collection Amin and the District Magistrate and his subordinates were considering him as a Seasonal Collection Amin. It is undisputed that upto the end of June, 1981, the applicant received his salary and allowances as an officiating Collection Amin because the order dated 21. 6. 1981 was served upon the applicant on 30. 6. 1981. The records of the office of the opposite parties were perused and they indicated that for the months of July and August, 1981, the applicant was treated as seasonal Col lection Amin and he was paid salary and allowances like other seasonal Collection Amins i. e. a little less than the salary and allowance payable to an officiating Collection Amin. The applicant did accept the less amount but he moved an application as to why he had been given less pay and allowances. Suffice it to say that the records maintained in the office of the opposite parties indicated that in the months of July and August, 1981, the applicant was treated as seasonal Collection Amin and not officiating Collection Amin. The Tribunal will decide whether the applicant was rightly appointed as seasonal Collection Amin in June, 1981. The order which the Tribunal passed on 19. 9. 1981 was passed after hear ing the parties. On behalf of the opposite parties it was said that they had no ob jection if the status quo as on date of the order was maintained. Consequently the Chairman of the Tribunal passed order accordingly. This order as said above was confirmed on 31. 10. 1981 As the opposite parties were treating the applicant as Seasonal Collection Amin, they asserted before the Tribunal that they had no objection if the status quo on the date of the order was main tained. It means that the opposite parties agreed before the Tribunal that the applicant's status as a Seasonal Collection Amin be maintained. In this way it cannot be said in the instant case that the opposite parties later on disobe yed the order of the Tribunal by terminating the applicant's services as Seasonal Collection Amin. Correctly speaking the order of the Tribunal is wholly vague. Tribunal should have specified what it meant by using the word "status quo". This word gave a wrong impression to the parties about the status of the applicant on the date of the order. In view of the above I am of the opinion that in the unfortunate circum stances of the case and the vague orders passed by the Tribunal, it cannot be held that the opposite parties in any way disobeyed the interim order passed by the Tribunal. In the result the application is dismissed. In the unusual circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs of this petition. .;