R.M.Sahai, J. - (1.) ORDERS dated 27th September 1971 and 26th July 1972 passed by Deputy Director of Consolidation deciding the revision in terms of compromise and rejecting restoration application because petitioner's son appeared to have entered into compromise are assailed in this petition.
(2.) WHAT happened that long after publication of statement of principles u/Sec. 19 and even after decision of appeals etc. arising out of objections filed u/Sec. 20 opposite parties filed a time barred objection which was rejected by Consolidation Officer. In appeal the opposite party produced an application purported to have been on behalf of petitioner accepting the claim of opposite party that a chak may be allotted to him near his house. As application was of a date prior to the date of decision by Consolidation Officer and petitioner had not appeared to verify it the appellate authority was not satisfied of its authenticity, therefore did not accept it. The appeal was also dismissed. But before Deputy Director the opposite party succeeded. The revision was allowed in terms of compromise. When petitioner came to know of it he moved an application for setting aside of the order as he had not entered into any compromise. This application was rejected because the compromise was signed by petitioner's son. And in the application filed for setting aside of order the signature of son was not denied. It also appeared to Deputy Director that as compromise was signed by petitioner's son he must have been looking after petitioner's case, therefore, it was not necessary to recall the order. None of the orders passed by the Deputy Director can be maintained. It being admitted that compromise was not signed by petitioner it was not binding on him. But if it can be held that it was entered on his behalf by his agent or the son can be deemed to be agent or authorised to enter into compromise on his behalf then the petition must fail. There is no such finding. Nor there is any material on record from which an inference can be drawn that the son had any express or implied authority. Learned counsel for opposite party placed various provisions of Contract Act and urged that courts have inferred implied agency and held master bound for the act of his servant. According to learned counsel on same principle the petitioner should be held bound for the act of his son and an inference of implied agency may be drawn. The analogy of master and servant apart from being unapplicable the argument proceeds on misconception of the authority to enter into compromise. It is doubtful if even a lawyer who undoubtedly is an agent of the client can enter into compromise without any authority. The Deputy Director committed manifest error of law in inferring agency or authority only because son was looking after the case of his father. As regards argument of substantial justice suffice it to say that learned counsel has based his argument on averments in the application of compromise without its adjudication by any of the authorities. The allegation cannot be accepted as correct unless any of the authorities has gone into this question. The argument that allotment of chak should not be disturbed after 10 years has to be rejected. It cannot be held that as the matter relates to allotment of chak and the land involved is small the court should refuse to interfere. If the petitioner is aggrieved by allotment of chak and has filed writ petition and it was admitted by this court there appears to be no reason to reject it because the case could not be taken up for ten years for no fault of petitioner.
(3.) IN the result this petition succeeds and is allowed. The order passed by Deputy Director of Consolidation dated 27th September, 1971 and 26th July, 1972 are quashed. He is directed to decide revision on merits in accordance with law. Parties shall bear their own costs. Petition allowed.;