- (1.) THIS is a judgment-debtor's Second Appeal. Two objections were raised to the execution of the decree: First that the appellant. Kedar Nath was a minor when the suit was instituted and decreed against him. His age given in the plaint was twenty years. Summons of the suit must have been served on him. He did not raise any objection to the effect that be was treated to be a man above eighteen years in the plaint and the suit proceeded and was decreed. His father was also a party to the suit. He also did not raise any objection to the effect that Kedar Nath was a minor, and a guardian ought to have been appointed for him. No objection having been taken to the age of Kedar Nath, as given in the plaint, and the suit having thereafter proceeded on the basis that he was an adult and decreed accordingly the raising of the question whether Kedar Nath was an adult or a minor in the execution proceedings was barred by the Rule of constructive res judicata. At any rate. the lower Appellate Court has, on an appraisal of the evidence on the record. Dis-believed Kedar Nath and held that he was an adult. It has not been suggested that the finding suffers from any error of law except for saying that the whole basis of the finding of the learned Judge was in his words the "notorious fact that the age of the boy is understated when he is admitted in school". That, according to the learned counsel amounted to basing the finding on no evidence. It is apparent that there was no evidence before the learned Judge to prove that the age of a boy is generally under-stated when he is admitted in school. However, the learned Judge dispensed with the need of any evidence for he thought the fact was a notorious fact and he could accordingly take judicial notice of it. Whether the fact is notorious or not depends on the experience of life gathered by a person. Here the observation seems to have been based on the experience of life gathered by the learned Judge. I cannot say that his experience was unwarranted by the facts of life prevalent in our country so as to call for any interference on this basis, with the finding arrived at by him.
(2.) THE second objection raised was that the decree was in favour of the firm Rekh Chand Dasu Ram. It was put into execution after the dissolution of the firm by one of its partners Navrang Lal. It was urged that under Rule 15 of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the decree being a decree jointly in favour of the partners of the dissolved firm, one of them alone could not execute it without applying and obtaining the leave of the Executing Court under the provisions of that Rule. It is doubtful whether the provisions of R. 15 of O. 21 apply to the case of execution of a decree by a firm where the suit has been brought in the firm name and decreed as such. O. 30. R. 1 (2) provides that where persons sue or are sued as partners in the name of their firm under sub-rule (1), it shall, in the case of any pleading or other document required by or under this Code to be signed, verified or certified by the plaintiff or the defendant suffice if such pleading or other document is signed verified or certified by any one of such persons. Navrang Lal was indisputably one of the partners who carried an business as a partner in the firm named Rekh Chand Dasu Ram in which the suit was brought. An execution application is certainly a document, which is required to be signed under the Code by the decree-holder, and the decree-holder being the firm, it could be signed on its behalf by Navrang Lal. The question raised, however was that the firm having been dissolved, the authority of Navrang Lal to give a valid discharge on behalf of the firm ceased with the dissolution of the firm and he could, therefore, no longer, maintain the execution application in his name alone. All the partners of the dissolved firm ought to have been joined in making the execution application so as to given the judgment-debtor an effective and complete discharge. That argument is effectively answered by the provisions of S. 47 of the Indian Partnership Act. 1932, which provides that "after the dissolution of a firm the authority of each partner to bind the firm, and the other mutual rights and obligations of the partners, continue notwithstanding the dissolution, so far as may be necessary to wind up the affairs of the firm and to complete transactions begun but unfinished at the time of the dissolution, but not otherwise". The execution of the decree in question was surely not any new transaction. It was a decree in favour of the firm and being an asset of the firm it was the duty of the partners to collect it and Navrang Lal being one of the partners of the dissolved firm could surely perform that duty and had the necessary authority to do so under Section 47 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932. His actions were binding on the firm, that is to say on the partners of the dissolved firm. Mr. K. H. Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant, relied upon an old Division Bench decision of this Court in Lachman Das v. Chaturbhuj Das, ILR (1906) 28 All 252. That decision does not appear to have been a case of a decree in favour of a firm of partners. That was a case of a decree passed in favour of four persons who had obtained probate of the will of one Babu Raghunath Das. It has no application to the facts of the present case. Indeed, the appropriate decision applicable to the facts of the present case was the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Hanumanthappa v. Seethavva and Co. , AIR 1949 Mad 790, which has been referred to in the judgment of the lower Appellate Court.
(3.) IN the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed; but, as no one appeared for the respondents, there will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed. .;