K.N. Goyal, J. - (1.) THIS writ petition is directed against an order of the District Judge purporting to be passed Under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure setting aside an order of the Prescribed Authority constituted under the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act.
(2.) CERTAIN proceedings under the said Act were taken against the recorded tenure holder one Lal Saheb and also against his wife Smt. Kalawati. They were bhumidhars. They both died issueless during the pendency of the proceedings. The Petitioner applied for being brought on the record as legal heir of the tenure holder on the basis of a Will executed by Lal Seheb. The opposite -parties claim on the basis of succession as intestate heirs of Smt. Kalawati. There was a dispute between the parties as to whether Lal Saheb predeceased Smt. Kalawati, or the other way round. This issue was material because the khata was jointly held by husband and wife and whosoever survived, the other would inherit on the basis of survivorship. The Prescribed Authority upheld the claim of the Petitioner. Against that order the opposite parties preferred a revision Under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned District Judge held that the revision did lie and further directed that both the contesting claimants be substituted without prejudice to the merits of their claims and both be allowed to contest the proceedings under the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act. Aggrieved by this order the Petitioner has come to this Court. As regards the maintainability of the revision it was contended on behalf of the Petitioner before the District Judge that the case was covered by the authority of in which it was held that the order of the Prescribed Authority under the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 was not revisable Under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned District Judge summarily brushed aside this authority by saying that the two Acts were different and as such the analogy was not available. He did not discuss as to bow the ruling was distinguishable apart from the circumstances that the two Acts were different. The principle of the authority was that a Prescribed Authority under a special Act, even though presided over by a Civil Judicial Officer, cannot be treated as subordinate Civil Court for purposes of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That ratio was equally applicable irrespective of fact whether the Prescribed Authority was constituted under one or the other Act. Learned Counsel for the opposite -parties has tried to support the judgment of the learned District Judge by pointing out that the language of Section 34 of the Act No. XIII of 1972 was different from that of Section 37 of U.P. Act No. 1 of 1961. The difference In phraseology in the two Acts is of no consequence. Section 37 lays down that any officer or authority holding an enquiry or hearing an objection shall have the powers and privileges of a civil court, and follow the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure for the trial and disposal of suits. Likewise Section 38 lays down that in hearing and deciding an appeal under the Act, the appellate court shall have all the powers and privileges of a Civil Court and follow the procedure for the hearing and disposal of appeals laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure. None of these provisions contain any warrant for the assumption that the orders passed either by Prescribed Authority or by the appellate authority are revisable Under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. There is no inherent right of appeal or revision. Appeal and revision are creatures of statute. While U.P. Act No. I of 1961 provides for an appeal, it does not provide for a revision. As such the power of revision cannot be assumed. The order of the learned District Judge is clearly without jurisdiction and cannot be sustained.
(3.) LEARNED Counsel for the opposite -parties has further pointed out that irrespective of illegality of the impugned order, the same does not cause any injustice to the Petitioner. I am unable to agree. The Prescribed Authority decided the controversy on merits. That finding has been upset by the learned District Judge without considering whether the conclusion arrived at by the Prescribed Authority was correct on merits. It cannot therefore be said that the order of the learned District Judge does not cause any injustice to the Petitioner.;