M.N.Shukla, J. - (1.) WE have heard the counsel for the petitioner and Sri H. P. Gupta for respondents.
(2.) THIS is a writ petition challenging the validity of an increase in the levy of surcharge under the Electricity Supply Act, 1948. The main submission on behalf of the petitioner was that the authorities were not competent to levy a surcharge and at all events it was excessive and out of proportion to the relevant factors on which it was sought to be justified and further that it was also discretionary. We are of the opinion that these submissions are completely foreclosed by the decisions of the Supreme Court in M/s. Bisra Stone Lime Co. Ltd. & Orissa Textile Mills Ltd. v. Orissa State Electricity Board, AIR 1976 SC 127. It was ruled therein that where the agreement between the parties contained a provision for enhancement in the rate of supply of electricity the exercise of such power was not illegal. In the instant case a copy of the agreement, which has been filed, reserves to the department unfettered power of revision of tariff from time to time. It was strenuously urged on behalf of the petitioner that the levy of surcharge was distinct from enhancing the tariff. THIS contention is wholly untenable in view of the dictum in the case of Bisra Stone (supra) that the surcharge once levied becomes an integral part of the tariff. We are also not impressed by the argument that on factual considerations the surcharge was excessive and not commensurate with the reasons which had led to the enhancement of the surcharge. We are of the opinion that this is a matter depending entirely on investigation of facts which can be adequately done by an arbitrator. Admittedly, the agreement contains an arbitration clause and the arbitrator will be competent to enquire fully into all the factual aspects and the parties will have an opportunity of leading evidence and placing all the relevant materials before him. In the case of Bisra Stone (supra) the Supreme Court relegated the petitioners to the remedy of arbitration enshrined in the agreement. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that even light interpretation of the agreement could not be excluded from the forum of arbitration. As regards the charge of discrimination we are not satisfied on the material placed before us in the instant case that the levy of the impugned surcharge is hit by Article 14. The petition is accordingly dismissed in 'limine'. Petition dismissed.;