N.D. Ojha, J. - (1.) AGAINST the decree of the trial court dated 19th March, 1980 dismissing his suit the Plaintiff Respondent filed Civil Appeal No. 117 of 1980 before the District Judge, Azamgarh. His appeal was allowed by the IV Additional District Judge, Azamgarh, by judgment dated 21st November, 1980. Aggrieved the Defendants have preferred this second appeal.
(2.) THE Stamp Reporter has made a report that the appeal was in time upto 13th of April, 1981, i. e. was beyond time by 17 days when presented on 29th April, 1981. Counsel for the Appellants has raised an oral objection against the report of the Stamp Reporter and has urged that if the limitation was calculated properly the appeal was within time. In this connection it has been pointed out that even though the judgment was delivered by the lower appellate court on 21st November, 1980, the decree bears the date 28th November, 1980, and was actually signed on 16th December, 1980. Application for the certified copy of the decree was made on 26th November, 1980, and the copy was notified to be ready on 9th January, 1981. According to counsel since the application for copy of the decree had been filed on 26th November, 1980, i. e. before the date on which it was signed, 16th December, 1980 namely the date on which the decree was signed should have been treated by the Stamp Reporter as the starting point of limitation and not 28th November, 1980 as done by him, namely, the date of the decree as shown in the copy. In support of this submission reliance has been placed by counsel for the Appellants on Section 12 of the Limitation Act and the decision of the Supreme Court in Udayan, Chinubhai v. R.C. Bali, AIR 1977 SC 2319. According to counsel for the Appellants it has been held by the Supreme Court in Udayan Chinubhai's case (supra) that if an application for copy of the decree has been made before the preparation of the decree the period that lapsed between the pronouncement of the judgment and the signing of the decree has to be excluded in computing the limitation for an appeal. Having heard counsel for the Appellants I am of opinion that the objection raised by counsel for the Appellants against the report of the Stamp Reporter is unsustainable. Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963, does not prescribe the starting point of limitation for filing an appeal. It only deals with exclusion of certain periods specified therein while computing the period of limitation inter alia for an appeal. The relevant provision in regard to the starting point of limitation for filing an appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure is contained in Article 116 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and it is the date of the decree. The crucial question which arises for consideration is as to what date should be treated as the date of the decree. Order XX Rule 7 Code of Civil Procedure provides that the decree shall bear date the day on which the judgment was pronounced. In Order XX Code of Civil Procedure anew Rule being Rule 21 was added by this Court in exercise of the powers conferred on it under Section 122 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Rule 21 so added reads as follows: 21. (1) Every decree and order as defined in Section 2, other than a decree or order of a Court of Small Causes or of a Court in the exercise of the jurisdiction of a Court of Small Causes, shall be drawn up in the court vernacular, or in English, if the Court so orders. As soon as such decree or order has been drawn up, and before it is signed, the Munsarim shall cause a notice to be pasted on the notice board stating that the decree or order has been drawn up and that any party or the pleader of any party may, within six working days from the date of such notice, peruse the draft, decree or order and may sign it, or may file with the Munsarim an objection to it on the ground that there is in the judgment a verbal error or some accidental defect not affecting a material part of the case, or that such decree or order is at variance with the judgment or contains some clerical or arithmetical error. Such objection shall state clearly, what is the error, defect, or variance alleged, and shall be signed and dated by the person making it. (2) If any such objection be filed on or before the date specified in the notice, the Munsarim shall enter the case in the earliest weekly list practicable, and shall, on the date fixed, put up the objection together with the record before the Judge who pronounced the judgment, or if such Judge has ceased to be the Judge of the Court, before the Judge then presiding. (3) If no objection has been filed on or before the date specified in the notice, or if an objection has been filed and disallowed, the Munsarim shall date the decree as of the day on which the judgment was pronounced and shall lay it before the Judge for signature in accordance with the provisions of Rules 7 and 3. (4) If an objection has been duly filed and has been allowed, the correction or alteration directed by the Judge shall be made. Every such correction or alteration in the judgment shall be made by the Judge in his own hand writing. A decree amended in accordance with the correction or alteration directed by the Judge shall be drawn up, and the Munsarim shall date the decree as of the day on which the judgment was pronounced and shall lay it before the Judge for signature in accordance with the provisions of Rules 7 and 8. (5) When the Judge signs the decree, he shall make an autograph note stating the date on which the decree was signed. Sub rule (1) of Rule 98 of the General Rules (Civil) is also relevant in this behalf. It reads: (1) The decree or formal order shall be drawn up by the decree -writer ordinarily within seven days of the date of judgment and shall bear that date. After the decree has been examined and the provisions of Order XX Rule 21 have been complied with, it shall be signed by the Judge and the date of such signature entered by him immediately beneath the signature. Grammatically and also because Sub -rule (1) of Rule 98 of General Rules (Civil) requires compliance of the provisions of Rule 21 of Order XX Code of Civil Procedure, the words "that date" occurring in the first sentence of the said sub -rule necessarily mean the date of judgment. In view of Order XX Rule 7 Code of Civil Procedure, and Rule 21 of Order XX as added by this Court as also Sub -rule (1) of Rule 98 of General Rules (Civil) there seems to be no doubt that the date of the decree is to be the same as the date of the judgment. Appendix D to the Code of Civil Procedure prescribes the various forms in which decrees are to be prepared. A perusal of these forms will indicate that the date of the decree is to be stated under the caption "Given under my hand and the seal of the court this day of 19 ." In the gaps aforesaid is to be filled the date of the decree which is to be the same date as the date of the judgment. In view of Sub -rule (5) of Rule 21 of Order XX Code of Civil Procedure as added by this Court when the Judge signs the decree has to make an autograph note stating the date on which the decree was signed.
(3.) THE Supreme Court has also held in Udayan Chinubhai's case (supra) in paragraph 24 of the report that the date of the decree is the date of the judgment under Order XX Rule 7 Code of Civil Procedure. Constructing the Explanation contained in Section 12 of the Limitation Act and after considering the legislative history and the difference of judicial opinion in regard to the interpretation of Sub -section (2) of Section 12 before the Explanation was added there to it was held in paragraph 25 of the report as follows: When the Explanation was added to Section 12, Parliament sought to put a quietus to the long standing judicial controversy with regard to "the time requisite for obtaining a copy" by clearly explaining that when time is excluded, as provided for in Sub -section (2) of Section 12, the time that has elapsed from pronouncement of the judgment to the point of time prior to application for a copy of the decree shall not be excluded in computation of the time requisite for obtaining the copy. This is in accord with reason and sound common sense since a person does nothing in court for obtaining a copy prior to his making an application for a copy when there is nothing, in his way, not to. This was the reason underlying the Explanation which prompted the legislature not to permit exclusion of such idle time of the applicant while computing the time requisite for obtaining a copy for the purpose of computing the period of limitation. We have to give effect to this Explanation with its avowed intent. Reiterating the legal position in paragraph 26 of the report it was held: In order to enable a correct computation of the period of limitation under Section 12(2) with certitude, when it is provided, therein, that certain time has to be excluded, it is then clearly provided, at the same time, in the Explanation that a particular period of time shall not be excluded. As if the section and the Explanation say : You are permitted to exclude the time requisite for obtaining a copy but in computing that time which is requisite and which is allowed for exclusion under Section 12(2), you shall not exclude, while computing the period of limitation, the time that had elapsed from the date of judgment to the date of your application for a copy. The object seems clearly to be not to give premium to unmerited idleness and indifference of litigants in making application for copy.;