M. P. Mehrotra, J. - (1.) THIS petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution arises out of a suit for the eviction of the tenant by the landlord.
(2.) THE facts, in brief, are these. THE respondent no. 2 Hamid Husain filed a suit against the petitioner Mumtaz Nabi for the latter's eviction and other connected reliefs by way of arrears of rent etc. were also claimed. THE suit was decreed by the trial court and a revision filed against the trial court's judgment also failed. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner has now come up in the instant petition, and in support thereof, I have heard Sri Triloki Nath, learned counsel for the petitioner. The true copies of the impugned judgments have been filed along with the petition. Learned counsel for the petitioner raised three contentions before me. Firstly, it is contended that the revisional court did not itself go into the evidence and examine the same with a view to decide whether the trial court's findings were bad in law. In my view, the revisional court was justified in holding that the finding of the trial court regarding the tenancy could not be said to be perverse and the revisional court was right in holding that it had no jurisdiction to interfere with the said finding as the same was supported by the material and evidence on the record. It is well known that the scope of revision under section 25 Provincial Small Cause Courts Act is restricted. It may not be so restricted as the scope under section 115 CPC, nonetheless, the scope is limited in comparison to a regular first appeal, where the appellate court can examine the correctness of the finding recorded by the trial court by re-examining the evidence on the record.
(3.) THE learned counsel's next contention is that in the instant case, it should be held that section 24 (2) of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 stood attracted because the tenant seems to have allowed the reconstruction on the ground that the shop had become dilapidated and required reconstruction. THE learned counsel's point is that if the reconstruction is necessitated on account of the presence of the ingredients of section 21 (1) (b), then section 24 (2) should be held to be attracted even if there has been no proceedings under section 21(1)(b). I cannot accept this contention. In my view, the pre-condition for the applicability of Section 24 (2) is the existence of release order under section 21 (l)(b) and if such release order does not exist, then the special provision made under section 24 (2) will not come into play. I need not say anything about the aspect of the matter that it will always be a question of fact as to whether ingredients of section 21 (1) (b) were in existence or not when an agreement took place between the landlord and the tenant allowing an old structure to be reconstructed. Lastly, the learned counsel contended that the trial court disbelieved the version of the plaintiff and that of the defendant and culled out a new case which it was not entitled to do in law. In my view, this contention too is not tenable. It was open to the trial court to disbelieve the oral evidence led by both the parties regarding the relationship of tenancy between the parties. However, on a consideration of the clear circumstances of the case, the trial court came to the conclusion that the petitioner was a tenant and the plaintiff was the landlord. I do not think that there is any illegality in the said approach of the trial court. It cannot be said to be culling out a new case.;