- (1.) THIS petition is directed against an order passed by the Chancellor Sampurnanand Sanskrit Vishwavidyalaya, Varanasi dated 23. 4. 1981, quashing the selection and appointment of the petitioner to the post of Reader in the said University and directing re-advertisement of the post. The Chancellor of Sampurnanand Sanskrit Vishwavidyalaya, Varanasi, received certain complaints against the then Vice-Chancellor of the said University containing allegations relating to irregularities which were stated to have been committed in matters of appointment of certain teachers, it was alleged in those complaints that some of the teachers including the petitioner did not possess even the requisite mandatory minimum quali fications and that the appointments have been made on extraneous consi deration. The Chancellor caused a preliminary examination of those cases to be made. He obtained from the University details of the qualifications possessed by those teachers and the subject to teach for which they had been appointed, The preliminary examination disclosed, according to the Chan cellor, that some of the teachers, including the petitioner did not possess the minimum qualifications prescribed by the applicable Statutes. The Chancellor therefore, decided to initiate action suo motu under Section 68 of the U. P. State Universities Act. A show cause notice was thereupon served on the petitioner, a true copy of whereof Is Annexure '7'to the writ petition. In this notice it was pointed out that the petitioner did not hold Doctorate in Shanker Vedant, the subject concerned. It was further stated that under the relevant Statutes of the University a Ph. D. Degree in the subject in which the appointment was proposed to be made, was mandatory and that the Doctorate in Vyakaran possessed by the petitioner could not be regarded as compliance with the Statutes. The petitioner was therefore called upon to show cause as to why his appointment as a Reader in Shankar Vedant be not quashed. The petitioner filed a written reply to the show cause notice, wherein it was asserted that the Doctorate in Vyakaran held by him sought to be treated an equivalent to Doctorate in the subject concerned, namely, Shankar Vedant, inasmuch as study of Vyakaran necessarily implied a knowledge in Vedant, including Shankar Vedant. On receipt of the petitioner's reply and the comments of the Vice-Chancellor, which had also been Invited, the Chancellor in order to deter mine the controversy raised by the petitioner, appears to have constituted a panel of experts consisting of two professors. Both the experts gave independent opinions. They were unanimous in their view, namely, that the Doctorate possessed by the petitioner could not be regarded as a Doctorate in Shankar Vedant. They further asserted that a holder of a doctorate in Vyakaran would not be competent to teach Shankar Vedant. Thereupon the Chancellor passed the impugned order. He observed that t was apparent that the Doctorate possessed by the petitioner was not in the subject concerned, namely, Shankar Vedant, which was mandatory under the Statutes applicable to the respondent University. The Chancellor rejecting another contention raised on behalf of the petitioner in his written reply, held that the fact that the petitioner may have completed his thesis for D. Lit. in Shankar Vedant could not take the place of either a Docto rate in the subject concerned or a published work of high standard. The Chancellor observed that the mere submission of the thesis cannot be regarded as 'published work'. On these findings the Chancellor quashed the appointment of the petitioner and directed that the post be re-advertised. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order the petitioner has come to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution praying for a writ of certiorari qua shing the order passed by the Chancellor. The first submission raised on behalf of the petitioner was that the Selection Committee having satisfied itself as to the academic abilities of the petitioner, it must be deemed to have waived the statutory requirement of a Doctorate in the subject of study concerned or a published work of a high standard. Such a waiver is permissible under Statutes 11. 01 (1) and 11. 02. Having given the submission a careful consideration we find no merit in it. In order to appreciate the argument it will be necessary to have both the relevant statutes extracts here. Statute No. 11. 01 (1), in- so-far as the same is relevant, reads thus;- "11. 01 (1 ). In the case of the Faculties of Veda-Vedanga, Sahitya-Sanskrit, Darshana, Shramana Vidya and Adhunika Jhana-Vijnana, the following shall be the minimum qualifications for the post of a Lecturer in the University, namely- (a) a doctorate in the subject of study concerned or a published work of a high standard in that subject; and (b) consistently good academic record (that is to say, the overall record of all assessments throughout the academic career of a candi date), with first class or high second class (that is to say, with an aggregate of more than 54 per cent marks) Master's degree in the subject concerned or equivalent degree of a foreign University in such subject. (2) Where the Selection Committee is of opinion that the research work of a candidate, as evidenced either by his thesis or by his published work, is of a very high standard, it may relax any of the requirements specified in sub-clause (b) of clause (1 ). " The next Statute relevant for our purpose is 11. 02 which reads thus:- "11. 01 (1) No teacher appointed before the commencement of these Statutes shall be deemed to be qualified for appointment to the post of Reader or Professor if he does not possess the qualification prescribed in Statute, 11. 01, provided that where the Selection Committee is of opinion that the research work of candidate, as evidenced by his thesis or by his published work is of a very high standard, it may relax any of the requirements specified in sub-clause (h) of clause (1) of Statute 11. 01. (2) In addition, a candidate for appointment to the post of Reader or Professor shall fulfil any other qualification laid down in the ordinance of the University. A perusal of the aforesaid Statutes clearly shows that the qualifications which may be waived of relaxed, if in the opinion of the Selection Commit tee the research work of candidate, as evidenced by his thesis on published work is of a high academic merit, are those which are specified in clause (b) of Clause 1 of that Statute 11. 01 and not sub-clause (a) of Clause 1 of that Statute. The requirement of a doctorate in the subject of study con cerned or a published work of high standard in the subject occurs in sub-clause (a) of Clause 1 and not in Clause (b) of sub-clause (it ). If, therefore, the doctorate in Vyakaran could not legitimately be regarded as a doctorate in the subject of study concerned, namely, Shankar Vedant, it is apparent that the Chancellor was right in concluding that the appointment of the petitioner had been made in disregard of the mandate of the aforesaid Statutes of the University. It is necessary to point out that in the Calendar amongst the subjects prescribed for study of a Master's degree Shankar Vedant has been mentioned as a subject distinct; and diffe rent from the various branches of Vyakaran. The advertisement for the post also mentioned the subject of study in which the application were invited as Shankar Vedant. It is, therefore, evident that it was not open to the Selection Committee to relax the requirements of doctorate in the subject of study concerned which was Shankar Vedant, assuming that the Selection Committee did in point of fact purport to relax that qualification in the case of the petitioner. The first point, therefore, fails. The second point urged was that the Chancellor has quashed the peti tioner's appointment on the ground that the same has been made in violation of Statutes No. 11. 01 and 11. 01 (2 ). The petitioner's appointment had made in September, 1978, whereas the first Statutes of the University came into force on 26th December, 1978. Statutes No. 11-01 and U. 02 therefore could not possibly have any application to the apppointment of the peti tioner. We find no substance in this submission either. It is true that the Chancellor has referred to the Statutes Nos. 11. 01 and 11. 02. These Statu tes are the first Statutes of the University. Prior to this the appointments of teachers of the University were governed by the first Statutes framed under the U. P. State Universities Act. We would therefore assume that the petitioner's appointment would be governed by the first Statutes framed under the U. P. State Universities Act. Along with the counter-affidavit filed by the University extracts of Statutes Nos. 8 and 9 of the Statutes framed under the U. P. State Universities Act have been filed as Annexure '2'. A perusal of the said Statutes 8 and 9 would show that Statutes Nos. 11. 01 and 11. 02 (clause 1 and 2 of the first Statutes of the University are the exact and verbatim re-production of Statutes 8 and 9. The same requirements which are now incorporated in Statutes 11. 01 and 11. 02 were there even when the appointment of the petitioner was made in September, H78. The mere reference therefore to statutes 11. 01 and 11. 02 (2) in the Chancellor's order would not affect the substance of the matter. THIS basic consideration on account of which the Chancellor held the appointment of the petitioner to be unauthorised remains the same, namely, absence of a doctorate in the subject of study concerned. Further an examination of the statutes, both old and new, clearly shows that at material times for the appointment to the post of a Reader it was mandatory to have a doctorate in the subject of a study concerned. The second point, therefore, also fails. The next point urged in support of the petition was that the impugned order has been passed by the Chancellor in breach of the principles of natural justice in that the opinion of the exports was a material which was used by the Chancellor against the petitioner without making the same available to him. We find the submission without any merit. Admittedly the petitioner was served with a show cause notice in which it was pointed out that he did not possess the requisite mandatory qualification, namely, a doctorate in the subject of study concerned. In his written reply to the show cause notice, however, the petitioner raised a plea that the doctorate which he possessed in Vyakaran was equivalent to a doctorate in Shankar Vedant, the subject of study concerned. It was further claimed that the study of Vyakaran necessarily implied acquisition of sufficient proficiency and learning in all branches of Vedant including Shankar Vedant. The plea raised by the petitioner was indisputably one pertaining to pure academic. The Chancellor had to deal with this plea. He could have disposed of that plea himself by consulting the authorities and texts on the subject. Instead of embarking upon that exercise himself, he thought it, in our opinion quite properly, to consult a few expert on the subject. Such an exercise undertaken by the Chancellor was neither more nor less than consulting the treatises and texts written by the authorities on the subject to enable him to arrive at a just and proper decision in regard to a plea which was plainly of an academic nature. The opinion so obtained by the Chancellor, in our opinion, was not an adverse evidential material which the principles of natural justice might have required to be communicated to the petitioner. As mentioned above, the exercise undertaken by the Chancellor tantamounts to his consulting some textual authorities on the subject. In the calendar of the University amongst the subjects prescribed for the Master's degree Shankar Vedant has been mentioned as a subject separate and distinct from the various branches of Vyakaran. Ex facie, there fore, the Chancellor found that the petitioner did not possess the Master's degree in the subject concerned. The petitioner had already been apprised in the show cause notice of this objection. He had therefore ample oppor tunity to meet that objection by relying on such material as he might have liked to adduce in support of his plea that the subjects of Shankar Vedant and Vyakaran were in substance one and the same and that the doctorate in one subject should be treated as a doctorate in the other. We are, therefore, clearly of the view that there has not been, in the entire process, infraction of any principles of natural justice. The petitioner was given full opportunity to show cause and that in not making available to the petitioner the opinions of the experts, none of the requirements of either a fair procedure or due process of any kind was violated. It was also faintly urged that the petitioner was entitled to a personal hearing the Chancellor. The omission to give an oral hearing to the petitioner has vitiated the order passed by the Chancellor. The submission is completely devoid of any merit. It is now firmly established on all hands that oral or personal hearing is not an essential ingredient of the principle called audi alteram partem. In view of the settled state of the law we do not consider it necessary to dilate on this question beyond mentioning a few decisions of the Supreme Court. In the State of Assam v. Gauhati Municipal Board A. I. R. 1967 S. C. 1398 Gauhati, Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed thus: "we cannot agree with the High Court that merely because the State Government did not call upon the Board to appear for a personal hearing and to produce material in support of its explanation it vio lated the principles of natural justice. " Again in the case of Union of India v. Jyogi Prakash A. I. R. 1971 S. C. 1093 the Supreme Court stated the law thus- "a party likely to be affected by a decision is entitled to know the evidence against him and to have an opportunity of making a repre sentation. He, however, cannot claim that an order made without affording him an opportunity of a personal hearing is invalid. The President while making an enquiry is not a Court and the giving of personal hearing is entirely discretionary. " The same view has been expressed by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in their later decision also. The textual authorities on Administrative Law, too, are also unanimous on the point, namely, that oral hearing does not constitute an essential ingredient of the principles of natural justice. A Full Bench of our Court has also in the case of Triamback Pati Tripathi v. The Board of High School and Intermediate Education, U. P. Allahabad A. I. R. 1973 1. taken the same view following various decisions of the Supreme Court. Further, we find nothing either in intrinsic nature of the proceedings or the issue involved therein which might warrant the conclusion that omission to give personal hearing has in the slightest degree resulted in the failure of justice. The impugned order, therefore, cannot be assailed merely on the ground that no oral hearing was given to the petitioner. No other point was urged in support of the petition. In conclusion, the petition fails and is dismissed but we make no order as to costs. .;